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abstract 
This thesis examines the informal sharing of information and cooperation between 
police agencies across international borders, and how it is or should be informed by 
international human rights law.  The author looks at how intelligence-led policing theory 
has affected transnational policing.   A distinction is made between police actions made 
on domestic soil that have adverse consequences abroad and police actions made on 
foreign soil that have adverse consequences.  The first category of cases is firmly within 
jurisdiction and covered by domestic and international legal obligations.  The second 
category of cases introduces the concept of the extraterritorial application of 
international human rights instruments.  The theory is illustrated by the case studies of 
the Bali Nine and of Maher Arar.  Finally the author suggests methods of best practice 
for transnational information sharing and suggests that all government agencies should 
follow these rules.  
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1 Introduction 
1. Over the last few decades, a new spirit of police-to-police cooperation has 
emerged at the transnational level.  While this cooperation between national 
police agencies has come to prominence in the last fifteen to twenty years, it  
accelerated significantly after the al-Qaeda attacks on US soil in 2001.  But 
counter-terrorism is only one example of the increasing number of criminal 
activities which are being identified as having an international dimension requiring 
a transnational police-to-police response.  Other such crimes include drug 
trafficking, child pornography, people trafficking and identity theft. 
2. International cooperation takes many forms and is a wide area ripe for legal 
research and analysis.  Increasingly, national police forces post liaison officers to 
each other’s forces and to international and regional police organisations.  Police 
also undertake joint operations across jurisdictions.  Police attend international 
conferences and training courses at the international level, including at training 
centres set up for this purpose. This essay, however, examines only information 
sharing across international borders, touching on the other forms of cooperation 
only when relevant. 
3. The growth in transnational cooperation coincides with several global trends, 
without which the breadth, depth and frequency of international cooperation could 
not have been so rapid.  Foremost among these trends is the introduction and all-
pervasive expansion of information technology.  Computers have enabled the 
storage, collation and analysis of ever-increasing amounts of information.  This 
proliferation of information-gathering has spawned its own theory: intelligence-led 
policing. 
4. Intelligence-led policing means different things to different people.  At its core the 
theory is a management tool, which sees ‘raw’ information given to analysts who 
‘process’ it and turn it into intelligence.  This intelligence is used by police 
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management to target finite resources as effectively as possible.  As such, the 
theory is underpinned by and promotes the collection of information.  This leads 
to an insatiable desire for information that seems to be based on an 
undemonstrated belief that the more information fed to analysts, the better will be 
the resulting intelligence. 
5. The growth of telecommunications technology is another significant global trend 
informing increased transnational police-to-police cooperation.  Global 
telecommunications networks, such as the internet, have allowed police to 
increase dramatically the pool from which information can be drawn.  National 
police can conveniently and quickly access databases belonging to regional and 
international police organisations, such as Interpol, Europol and ASEANPOL. 
6. This growth in the willingness of police to share information across international 
borders has largely been without reference to international human rights 
standards.  It is to this latter trend that this essay is directed. 
7. Formal transnational cooperation in criminal matters, such as mutual legal 
assistance and extradition, is largely governed by treaty and domestic statute.  
Informal transnational cooperation in criminal matters, such as police-to-police 
information sharing and cooperation in investigations, is largely ungoverned by 
treaty or statute.  For example, there is no international treaty establishing 
Interpol.  However there are signs that this is changing.  Over the last decade the 
Europeans, through the establishment of Europol, have begun to establish a body 
of bilateral treaties governing transnational police cooperation. 
8. This paper will look at this brave new world of informal transnational policing 
through the prism of two infamous cases: the Canadian case of Maher Arar; and 
the Australian case of the Bali Nine.  These two case studies have brought 
transnational policing into the consciousness of the public like never before, 
undermining public confidence in operational policing.  The need to formalise 
transnational policing is important in order to restore public confidence in police 
and the important work they do across international borders. 
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9. The second chapter of this paper attempts to define the term informal 
transnational police-to-police information sharing.  It then examines the process of 
how information is shared by police across international borders, including the role 
of organisations such as Interpol.  The chapter introduces the controversial 
operational guidelines for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) when cooperating 
with a police agency from a country that retains the death penalty.  The guidelines 
came to public attention after the AFP shared information that led to the arrest of 
nine Australian drug traffickers Indonesia.  In Canada, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) operate under more formalised procedures when 
cooperating with countries that violate human rights.  These procedures came 
under judicial scrutiny in the Commission of Inquiry into case of Maher Arar, who 
was tortured in Syria after Canadian agents shared information with their 
American counterparts.  Finally, this chapter explores the theory of intelligence-led 
policing, which has influenced information gathering and sharing at domestic and 
international levels. 
10. Chapter 3 looks more closely at the two case studies.  Firstly, at how information 
sharing between the AFP and Indonesian National Police (INP) led to the death 
sentences of Australian drug smugglers in Indonesia in 2005.  Attention is paid to 
the AFP practice of transnational police-to-police cooperation and how the 
Australian courts have viewed it.  Secondly, this chapter traverses how information 
sharing between the RCMP and US authorities led to the torture of Maher Arar in 
Syria in 2002.  In particular, the chapter looks at the Arar Commission’s findings of 
RCMP practices, which were found wanting in this case. 
11. Chapter 4 looks at the domestic and international obligations of police when they 
operate across borders.  Two main legal scenarios are canvassed.  The first is 
when police travel abroad and act in a foreign jurisdiction.  The second is when 
police act domestically but their actions have adverse human rights consequences 
abroad.  Overarching these scenarios are domestic and international law.  The 
obligations to expose no one to the real risk of execution or torture are examined. 
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12. Chapter 5 examines the question of whether and how a country’s human rights 
obligations extend to the extraterritorial acts and consequences of its domestic 
agents.  The chapter first examines the legal concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under public international law and international human rights law.  In particular, 
the view of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Palestinian Wall case, 
which found that a country’s human rights obligations extend to all acts done in 
the exercise of that State’s jurisdiction abroad, whether in occupied territory or 
not.  The chapter examines the limited jurisprudence of Canadian, United States 
and Australian courts on this question.  For a more detailed legal analysis, the 
chapter examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which is more nuanced and developed than other jurisdictions.  The purpose of 
this detailed analysis is to explore some of the various complexities of jurisdiction 
and state responsibility raised by transnational cooperation. 
13. In the sixth chapter I attempt to draw together some of the legal issues raised in 
the Bali Nine and Arar cases by suggesting a model of best practice for informal 
transnational police-to-police information sharing.  Many of the suggestions 
endorse the recommendations of the Arar Commission of Inquiry.  Others are 
specific to Australia and/or Canada.  Before making these suggestions, there is a 
brief examination of police culture and methods for encouraging the adoption of 
best-practice among rank-and-file police officers.  At the end of the chapter, I 
examine the ‘ticking-bomb’ scenario and conclude that there are extreme 
situations in which the public interest outweighs the human rights of individuals. 
14. Finally, I suggest that further research is required into the feasibility of 
extrapolating this best-practice to all transnational agency-to-agency cooperation, 
not just police-to-police cooperation.  The proposed model is a legal framework 
that expressly requires State agents, whether police, immigration, intelligence, 
customs or otherwise, to consider the human rights implications of their actions 
when dealing with countries with questionable human rights records. 
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2 Informal Transnational Information Sharing 
in Law Enforcement 
15. This chapter first examines what I mean by the term informal transnational police-
to-police information sharing.  It then discusses why information sharing is 
necessary and legitimate.  Then this chapter explores the ways in which 
information is shared informally between foreign police agencies.  This is followed 
by a brief overview of the theory of intelligence-led policing and its relationship to 
the expansion of transnational police cooperation.  Finally, there is an outline of 
some of the limits placed on this form of international cooperation.  
2.1 Preliminary definitions 
16. This paper focuses on informal transnational police-to-police information sharing.  
As a matter of definition, I will briefly deconstruct this phrase and explain how I 
am using each of its constituent parts in this paper. 
17. Informal: I am broadly dividing all forms of transnational police-to-police 
cooperation into two categories: formal and informal.  The categories describe the 
degree of legal formality imposed on the cooperation.  I define ‘formal’ 
cooperation as that which occurs pursuant to international or bilateral treaties 
signed by nation states, often incorporated into domestic law and subject to 
judicial oversight.  An example of such structured cooperation is the mutual legal 
assistance treaty (MLAT), which commonly allows foreign police to request the 
provision of evidence for court and to request the exercise of coercive powers 
(such as search or seizure) in a foreign jurisdiction to obtain evidence.1  Other 
examples include extradition and anti-money laundering measures.  While these 
                                        
1 e.g Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of Canada on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters [1990] ATS 11; 1990 Canada Gazette Part I, 1582 (entry into force: 
14 March 1990); implemented by Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c.30 
(4th Supp.), and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). 
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treaty arrangements are largely expressed in terms of government-to-government 
cooperation, police-to-police cooperation is occasionally, and increasingly, 
expressly mentioned at treaty-level.2 
18. ‘Informal’ cooperation is, generally, that which is governed neither by statute nor 
treaty.  This is not to say that such arrangements are not governed by written 
guidelines or agreements between police.  There is a vast spectrum of such 
informal cooperation.  At one end of the spectrum is cooperation provided under 
such semi-formal documents as Memorandums of Understanding, negotiated and 
signed by the law enforcement agencies (rather the governments) of different 
nations.  At the other end of the spectrum is one-to-one cooperation where 
individual officers communicate and assist each other, for example over the 
telephone or by email. 
19. Transnational:  I use this term in a literal sense to mean simply across 
international borders.  This distinguishes cooperation from that which occurs 
between domestic law enforcement agencies.  I prefer this term to ‘global’, 
because that term is best reserved to describe multinational policing operations.3 
20. Police-to-police: This form of transnational cooperation occurs between law 
enforcement agencies.  It can be coordinated bilaterally, for example pursuant to 
Memorandums of Understanding, or multilaterally, the most obvious example of 
which is Interpol.  Police-to-police assistance is but one form of what is more 
widely known as agency-to-agency assistance. Police can assist other types of 
agencies, such as the RCMP’s cooperation with the CIA in the Arar case.  
                                        
2 for example, the recent ‘Lombok Treaty’ between Australian and Indonesia is the first formal 
treaty dealing with agency-to-agency assistance signed by Australia: Agreement between Australia 
and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation (Mataram, Lombok, 13 
November 2006) [2008] ATS 3.  Article 3 of the Lombok Treaty describes several areas of agency-
to-agency cooperation, including law enforcement.  In law enforcement, cooperation extends to 
inter alia dialogue, capacity building and joint operations. 
3 e.g. under the auspices of the United Nations as UN Police (formerly UNCIVPOL), 
<http://www.un.org//en/peacekeeping/sites/police/>. 
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21. Information sharing:  There are many forms of transnational police-to-police 
cooperation.  There are joint operations,4 such as Operation Alliance between the 
AFP and INP.5  Another example of cooperation is capacity building, whereby 
expertise and training is provided to a foreign law enforcement agency.  However, 
this paper deals only with the sharing of information and intelligence, which for 
brevity’s sake I shorten to ‘information sharing’.  I distinguish between information 
and intelligence.  Intelligence is the valued-added product after pieces of 
information have been analysed.  This difference lies at the heart of intelligence-
led policing, which is discussed later in this thesis.  Information sharing also 
occurs orally and in documentary form.  Such cooperation might be formal or 
informal. 
2.2 the legitimate need to share information 
22. While it is a trite point, it nevertheless needs to be acknowledged that cooperation 
and information sharing between police across international borders is important.  
There is a legitimate need to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of 
such transnational crimes as terrorism, child pornography, and drug and people 
trafficking.  This is underlined by the observation of his Honour Justice O’Connor, 
the Arar Commissioner, that:6 
Information sharing among agencies allows a more comprehensive picture to 
emerge. Viewing different pieces of information together may allow a more 
complete and accurate assessment of the threat being investigated and the steps 
needed to address that threat. Sometimes, seemingly inconsequential bits of 
information may take on an importance not otherwise apparent when viewed 
alongside other information. Broad information sharing is therefore essential to 
effective prevention. 
                                        
4 the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000), UNGA res 55/25, encourages 
parties to formalise joint-investigation cooperation and to ensure that ‘the sovereignty of the State 
Party in whose territory such investigation is to take place is fully respected’: Article 19. 
5 Operation Alliance was the joint AFP-INP investigation of the October 2002 Bali terrorist 
bombings: see, AFP, ‘Bali Bombings 2002’, archived at 
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/34194/20030807-0000/www.afp.gov.au/page70b2.html>. 
6 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006), 102. 
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23. The consequences of agencies not sharing information were central to the final 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in the USA.  As some sociologists had 
already observed in their research,7 the 9/11 Commission found that police and 
security agents were reluctant to share their information with other agencies.8  
The Commission identifies and criticises the prevailing culture wherein a ‘need-to-
know’ must be demonstrated prior to information sharing.  The Commission also 
notes that, while there are institutional risks associated with sharing information 
‘(criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions)’, there are few rewards for 
sharing information: 
There are no punishments for not sharing information.  Agencies uphold a “need-
to-know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-
share” culture of integration. 
24. While this is not a transnational example, given that it deals with the sharing of 
information between US agencies within the same jurisdiction, there are 
resonances for transnational police cooperation.  If information is not shared, or 
not gathered, then the threat of a serious crime might go undetected, thereby 
reducing any chance of preventing it.  This was certainly recognised by senior 
executives of the AFP when they increased transnational cooperation in the fight 
against drug trafficking in the late 1990s.9 
25. The process of transnational cooperation also needs to be reciprocal.  What the 
Arar Commission observed of information sharing in the context of terrorism-
related investigations holds true for all forms of information sharing:10 
                                        
7 e.g. Peter Manning, ‘Policing new social spaces’ in J. Sheptycki (ed) Issues in Transnational 
Policing (2000) 194: referring to the ‘conflict and competition’ between agencies (both national and 
transnational) which impacts on police-to-police information sharing. 
8 The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (22 July 2004), 416-7,  
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>. 
9 by the mid-1990s, the AFP was firmly of the view that ‘nearly all major crime issues impacting on 
Australia originate elsewhere’ and that international police cooperation was vital in disrupting 
transnational crimes like drug-trafficking and fraud: Alan Mills (Assistant Commissioner, AFP), 
‘Organised crime goes global’ (1995) 48 Platypus 19.  See also: David Schramm (Director of 
International, AFP), ‘Isolation no longer a natural security buffer against trans-national crime’ 
(1996) 51 Platypus 5. 
10 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 6, 102. 
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...information sharing must be reciprocal if it is to be effective. If an agency wishes 
to receive information from other agencies, it must be prepared to provide 
information in return. The networks within which terrorism-related information is 
shared must function on a co-operative basis. 
26. This imperative is at the heart of the AFP Commissioner’s all-or-nothing approach 
to information sharing.11  However, as this paper later argues, such cooperation 
should not be left solely to the discretion of police and it should have limits.  
Irrelevant, inaccurate, unreliable or out-of-date information can be dangerous to 
share.  The Arar Commission concluded that sharing such information is 
potentially dangerous and ‘may be worse than not sharing information at all’.12 
27. There are also legal and human rights implications to be considered.  Of course, it 
is important to consider how police might react to limits being placed on their 
ability to share information transnationally.13  All of these issues will be canvassed 
shortly. 
2.3 Informal Information-Sharing Mechanisms 
2.3.1 requests for and the spontaneous provision of information 
28. Transnational police-to-police information sharing can be instigated in two ways: 
by a request from a foreign law enforcement agency; or by its spontaneous 
provision to an agency. 
29. A solicited request is more likely to be auditable, because it is more likely to be 
communicated through a centralised bureau.  This is certainly so of requests for 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, which are formal and controlled by 
treaty and statute.  Nevertheless, a request can also be made informally, on an 
officer-to-officer basis or pursuant to an inter-agency agreement such a 
memorandum of understanding.  This is more likely to occur at the investigatory 
stage.  
                                        
11 see [80] below. 
12 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 6, 104. 
13 see “Police culture and human rights” on p.157. 
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30. The spontaneous provision of information is also recognised in some international 
treaties.14  This involves investigators providing information that they think might 
be of interest to a foreign agency, such as intelligence about the arrival of a 
criminal suspect in the foreign jurisdiction. 
31. This distinction is significant because formal mechanisms for sharing information 
often only refer to requests.  It is arguable, for example, that Australian MLATs 
only govern requests for information and not situations involving the spontaneous 
provision of information.  This is because the relevant legislation expressly states 
that:15 
Section 5:  
The objects of this Act are:  
  (a)  to regulate the provision by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters when a 
request is made by a foreign country for any of the following...; 
 (b) to facilitate the provision by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters when a 
request is made by a foreign country for the making of arrangements...; and  
 (c) to facilitate the obtaining by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters.  
Section 6:  
This Act does not prevent the provision or obtaining of international assistance in criminal matters 
other than assistance of a kind that may be provided or obtained under this Act. 
32. This potential loophole makes it possible for requests to be dressed-up, with a nod 
and a wink, as the spontaneous provision of information.  The provision of 
information pursuant to an informal police-to-police request for information, 
without a paper trail of the originating request, can easily be characterised 
retrospectively as spontaneous and unsolicited.   
                                        
14 see for example: Article 11 (“spontaneous information”) in Second Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2001), 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/182.htm>; and Article 18 in Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime [2004] ATS 12 (entered into force for Australia 26 June 
2004). 
15 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) ss.5-6. 
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33. The practice of spontaneous cooperation was explained to a Senate Committee by 
the AFP Commissioner in this fashion:16 
There is no requirement for us to await a request from the other agencies. If we 
have information we can actually provide the information. So we fully engage 
those countries with the exchange of information. That ought not come as too 
much of a surprise with globalisation and the transnational nature of crime. If 
criminals do not recognise borders and they conduct their operations without any 
regard for borders, then it is important that the policing agencies work together to 
ensure that there are no intelligence gaps or information gaps in trying to deal 
with a crime. 
34. While some information sharing might look spontaneous, it might actually be the 
result of a request.  For example, in the Bali Nine case, the AFP spontaneously 
provided the INP with intelligence that suspected drug traffickers were in 
Indonesia.  In court, the AFP maintained that ‘the terms of the MOU [between the 
AFP and the INP] contemplated the very provision of information by the AFP in 
circumstances such as in this matter and it could properly be said of the MOU that 
there was a standing request by Indonesia for such assistance’.17  This is 
significant, because if unsolicited information sharing can constitute a ‘standing 
request’, then such activity might fall within the jurisdiction of an MLAT treaty.  
This point was not tested in Rush v Commissioner.  This is an area ripe for further 
legal research and analysis. 
2.3.2 management of information flows 
35. According to Anderson’s classic analysis, cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies can be centralised or decentralised.18  For the purposes of this paper, it 
is not significant whether informal information sharing flows through a centralised 
or decentralised conduit.  This is so because the legal structure governing the 
sharing should remain the same, regardless of the conduit through which the 
                                        
16 Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168. 
17 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [73]. 
18 Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the politics of international police co-
operation (1989) 172-178. 
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information flows.  The same basic rules for sharing should apply, no matter how 
the information is communicated. 
36. In Policing the World, Anderson identifies four models for police-to-police 
cooperation.19  When applied to information sharing, all four models describe a 
tension between two competing priorities: the need to oversee information 
sharing and the need to provide quick and effective communication of information.  
In essence, Anderson’s models reflect a belief that these two priorities exist in 
inverse proportion.  
37. In Anderson’s centralised model, all cooperation is coordinated through a single 
agency, maximising oversight and respect for state sovereignty.  For the 
requesting police, the purpose of this centralisation is to ensure that they know to 
whom to address requests and can be confident that the requestee has the 
requisite authority to cooperate.  For the requested police, the purpose of 
centralisation is to ensure that management is aware of cooperation and that 
shared information is provided in an efficient and consistent manner.20 
38. In the decentralised model, police at all levels can share information and 
cooperate.  This decentralisation increases the efficient flow of information, but 
little effective oversight is possible.  It is plain to see why many investigators 
prefer this decentralised model: it is quicker, more efficient and there is a lot less 
paperwork. 
39. Anderson’s other two models are modified or ‘qualified’ versions of the first two.  
Anderson argues that these qualified models more closely resemble police 
practice.  In the qualified centralised model, information usually goes through a 
central agency, but individual police may cooperate directly in special 
circumstances. Finally, in the qualified decentralised model, police may cooperate 
                                        
19 Anderson, n 18, 172-178. 
20 e.g. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Volume 1 (2006), 33. 
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directly with their foreign counterparts, but are required to keep the central body 
informed of all such cooperation. 
40. Robertson suggests that Anderson’s centralised model is essentially strategic in 
nature;21 what we would call today an intelligence-led approach.  Whereas the 
decentralised model is tactical; taking an investigative case-by-case approach.  
Robertson observes that some forms of transnational crime will require the 
strategic approach, others the tactical:22 
This may mean that different crimes will create different forms of cooperation, 
some centralised and others decentralised, rather than there being a single 
national blueprint covering all forms of international police cooperation. 
41. Robertson’s analysis of Anderson’s four models might help to explain why both the 
RCMP and AFP have adopted a qualified centralised model.  The adoption of this 
halfway approach is flexible and adaptable to suit both strategic/intelligence and 
tactical/investigative ends.  For example, in an investigation such as Project A-O 
Canada, cooperation would ordinarily have been coordinated through the Criminal 
Intelligence Directorate (CID) in Ottawa.  In evidence to the Arar Commission, a 
senior investigative officer noted unfavourably that information sometimes takes 
weeks to reach an investigations team via CID.23  However, under certain 
circumstances once an investigation is underway, it is possible for investigators to 
liaise directly with their foreign counterparts, provided that CID is kept informed.24  
The AFP follows a similar qualified centralised model for transnational police-to-
police cooperation, centred on the AFP Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC) in 
Canberra,25 which operates inter alia Australia’s National Central Bureau (NCB) of 
                                        
21 Kenneth Robertson (1994), ‘Practical Police Cooperation in Europe: the intelligence dimension’ in 
Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer (ed), Policing Across National Boundaries  (London: Pinter 
1994), 111. 
22 Robertson (1994), n 21, 111-2. 
23 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 20, 24. 
24 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 131.  The Arar case highlighted  
the need for oversight, to ensure that such cooperation is conducted according to procedural 
guidelines.  In that case, operational officers shared information with the FBI without attaching 
written caveats. 
25 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/89127/AFPAnrep2007-08.pdf>, 82. 
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Interpol.26  All of this is not to say that completely informal pick-up-the-phone 
information exchange does not occur, but it is discouraged. 
42. The qualified centralised model is also favoured by Interpol in its Model Bilateral 
Police Cooperation Agreement.27  The Model Agreement provides an obligation, 
subject to national legislation, to exchange information relating to ‘ordinary 
crimes’.28  All information exchange, whether provided spontaneously or by 
request, is to be conducted via the relevant NCBs.29  Where the request ‘cannot 
be made in good time’ via a NCB, then direct police-to-police contact may be 
made.  In such cases, however, both NCBs should be informed of the direct 
request ‘as soon as possible’.  The commentary to this provision is enlightening 
because it highlights Interpol’s philosophy of the free flow of information to all 
members.  Though when entering information, members can choose to restrict 
access to that information to particular parties.30  The commentary reads in part:31 
The purpose of centralizing information exchanged under the Agreement is to 
make it available to services or States not directly involved in a particular 
exchange. These services or States can then use this information for other 
investigations which may turn out to be linked to those at the basis of the initial 
exchange. Centralizing information is the only way to establish and identify such 
links. To be truly effective, bilateral or regional co-operation must be part of a 
worldwide co-operation system... 
43. Apart from information sharing, the Model Agreement also provides for a right of 
cross-border surveillance and pursuit, though these are not considered mandatory 
provisions.32  The Model Agreement also contains a confidentiality clause, a 
personal data protection clause, provisions for joint investigations, forensic and 
technical assistance and training. 
                                        
26 Australia joined Interpol in 1948 and the first Australian NCB was established in Melbourne, 
hosted by Victorian Police: AFP, ‘Interpol – sixty years in Australia’ (2008) 98 Platypus 14.  In 1975 
the NCB was moved to Canberra and in 1979, when the AFP was formed, it inherited the NCB from 
the old Commonwealth Police. 
27 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, 
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/Model.asp>.  
28 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 4. 
29 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 5. 
30 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 5 (Raymond Kendall). 
31 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 5 (commentary). 
32 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 8 & 9. 
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44. One important element of the centralised model of transnational policing is the 
liaison officer.  Many countries post liaison officers abroad to facilitate cooperation 
and information exchange with the foreign law enforcement agency.  For example, 
the AFP’s International Network boasts 87 international liaison officers in 33 cities 
across 27 countries.33  According to AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty, the network is 
‘the backbone of our international crime fighting strategy’.34  The RCMP’s 
International Operations Branch has 36 liaison officers in 26 locations around the 
world.35 
45. The growth of liaison networks over the last decade has been impressive and 
reflects the growth of transnational policing.  For example, in 1998 there were 28 
AFP liaison officers in 16 countries.36  In 2004, 62 officers were based in 26 
countries.37  Now there are: 87 international liaison officers in 33 cities across 27 
countries.38 
46. Anderson’s is not the only model for police-to-police cooperation.  His centralised 
and decentralised models (and their qualified counterparts) are similar to the 
usage of the term ‘formality’ by the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference 
(CCIC).39  With respect to information sharing, the CCIC distinguishes between 
three tiers of transnational police-to-police communication: Formal, formal and 
informal.40  These categories are determined by the level of communication 
(rather than legal formality) at which cooperation occurs and the level of 
                                        
33 AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5. 
34 Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, ‘Enhancing security through law 
enforcement’, speech delivered at the Security in Government 2005 Conference (10 May 2005), 
<http://www.aps.gov.au/media/national_media/national_speeches/2005/security_in_government_2005_conference.html>. 
35 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘International Operations Branch’ (March 2009), 
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ip-pi/pdf/iob-soi-eng.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2009). 
36 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 1998-1999, 35 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3680/annualreport98_99.pdf>. 
37 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2004-2005, 3, 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3706/annualreport04_05.pdf>. 
38 AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5. 
39 James Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing 
(2002) 28ff. 
40 James Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing 
(2002) 28ff. 
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supervision involved.  ‘Formal’ communication is centralised and occurs at an 
agency’s national headquarters.  ‘formal’ communication occurs at the regional 
level and involves some amount of oversight.  While ‘informal’ information sharing 
occurs without supervision on a one-to-one basis. 
47. Anderson’s centralised model approximates the CCIC’s Formal level of 
communication.  Whereas the formal level is a modified model, and the informal is 
a decentralised model.  I have chosen to adopt Anderson’s terminology, because 
adopting the CCIC’s terminology would led to confusion, given my usage of the 
adjectives ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ to describe the degree of legal structure in which 
cooperation occurs (as opposed to the level and oversight of 
communication/information flows).41 
2.3.3 memorandums and letters of understanding 
48. In the Bali Nine case, AFP agents operated under a memorandum of 
understanding with their Indonesian counterparts.42  Written agreements 
negotiated between police agencies, setting out the terms and conditions of 
cooperation, often take the form of a memorandum of understanding or an 
exchange of letters.  The latter being more suited to ad-hoc case-by-case 
cooperation. 
49. The AFP has negotiated a considerable number of bilateral Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOU) covering police-to-police cooperation and the sharing of 
information and intelligence.43  Some agreements relate to cooperation in 
transnational crime generally.  Others relate to specific crimes.  For example, the 
                                        
41 for definition of formal and informal cooperation, see [17] ff. 
42 see [122] ff. 
43 these MOU have been signed with many law enforcement agencies, including: Afghanistan; 
Brunei; Cambodia; China; Fiji; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; 
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Timor Leste; the United Kingdom; and, Vietnam.  Of which only 
Cambodia, Philippines, Timor Leste and the UK have abolished capital punishment. 
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AFP has signed several MOU relating to child-sex offences with law enforcement 
agencies in Asia, the Pacific and South America.44 
50. The text of each AFP MOU is confidential and is not publicly available,45 so there is 
little which can be said about them.  However, according to AFP Commissioner 
Mick Keelty, the AFP can and does offer intelligence spontaneously, that is without 
waiting for a request, under the terms of these MOU.46  All information sharing, 
whether requested or spontaneous, is communicated via the AFP’s liaison 
officers.47 
51. Because these MOU are confidential, it is not possible to discern whether they 
contain human rights safeguards or recognise Australia’s sovereign right to place 
conditions on cooperation when it comes to death penalty cases.  The need for 
police secrecy is unclear.  While it is necessary that the details of an ongoing 
police operation should not be disclosed publicly, there is no reason why the 
‘framework’ procedures and rules for all such operations should be treated as a 
national secret.  Their release does not jeopardise any ongoing police operation 
and the public has a right to know the rules by which its police cooperate with 
foreign agencies.  Any argument for secrecy is undercut by the fact that the MOUs 
which Australia and Canada have separately negotiated with Europol are publically 
available on Europol’s website.48 
52. The Arar Commission noted that agreements to cooperate should always be 
written down, even if at first only in an exchange of letters, and they should be 
                                        
44 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007), 4, 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/61774/AFPAnrep2007.pdf>. 
45 Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 169.  Though, the MOU between Australia (not the AFP) and 
Europol is publically available (on Europol’s website): Agreement on Operational and Strategic 
Cooperation between Australia and the European Police Office (Feb 2007), 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/Australia.pdf>.  See also: AFP, 
Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5. 
46 Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168-9. 
47 Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168-9. 
48 see fn 45. 
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reviewed periodically.49  Such agreements should make it clear how Canada 
expects the foreign agency to use the information.  This is important because, 
‘[o]nce information is in foreign hands, it will be used in accordance with the laws 
of the foreign jurisdiction, which may not be the same as Canadian law’.50 
2.3.4 Interpol and other international bodies 
53. International policing is facilitated by several international police bodies, the most 
significant of which are Interpol and Europol.  There are other smaller bodies, 
such as ASEANAPOL, the Association of South-East Asian Nations Chiefs of Police.  
ASEANAPOL is a grouping of police chiefs who meet annually to network and 
discuss common issues.  ASEANAPOL has no permanent Secretariat office and it 
lacks the infrastructure of its two larger counterparts, though there have been 
discussions to rectify this.51  Since 2007, ASEANAPOL’s database has been 
accessible via Interpol.52 
54. Interpol (International Criminal Police Organisation) is not an operational police 
force.53  One of its main functions is to act as an information and intelligence 
clearing house.  It is forbidden by its own Constitution to deal with matters of a 
‘political, military, religious or racial character’.54  According to its Constitution, 
Interpol aims:55   
(1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all 
criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different 
countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
(2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the 
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes. 
                                        
49 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 320-1. 
50 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 320. 
51 Faez Hani, ‘Creation of ASEANAPOL Secretariat Discussed’ (20 March 2009) The Brunei Times, 
<http://www.bt.com.bn/en/home_news/2009/03/20/creation_of_aseanapol_secretariat_office_discussed>. 
52 Interpol, ‘Interpol and ASEANAPOL sign historic information-sharing agreement’ (media release) 
7 June 2007, <http://www.interpol.int/public/News/2007/Aseanapol20070607.asp>. 
53 Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-
operation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).  See also: Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 116. 
54 Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 3. 
55 Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 2. 
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55. Interpol is funded largely by contributions from its members.56  Its members are 
not nation-states, but a representative police agency of a nation-state.57 
Contributions are based on criteria such as a country’s population and Gross 
National Product, with a maximum contribution amount.58  Interpol has been 
granted Observer Status at the United Nations General Assembly and is treated as 
a quasi-intergovernmental organisation, despite the fact that it is not underpinned 
by treaty or controlled by any government.59  Interpol is recognised in several 
prominent multilateral treaties, including the Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime.60  It is not accountable to any external body.61  Though of 
course, national governments can control what is sent to Interpol by directing 
their own police how to cooperate.  There is also an internal ‘independent’ five-
member Supervisory Board responsible for overseeing the keeping and use of 
Interpol’s records.  The membership of the Supervisory Board includes an 
Executive member of Interpol, a member appointed by the French government 
and another appointed by Interpol.62  The complete independence of the Board is 
questionable given, as Sheptycki observes, only one member is not directly chosen 
by Interpol or selected from a list of candidates prepared by Interpol.63 
56. Interpol’s role as an information repository and clearing-house is underpinned by a 
network of National Central Bureaus (NCBs).  Each member is obliged to maintain 
                                        
56 Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 38. 
57 Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 119.  Sheptycki observes that the identity of Interpol members is 
ambiguous, though he concludes that ‘the RCMP...is a member of Interpol and not the government 
of Canada’. 
58 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 5 (Raymond Kendall). 
59 James Sheptycki, "The Accountability of Transnational Policing Institutions: The Strange Case of 
Interpol" (2004) 19 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 107, 117-23 
60 e.g. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, n 262, article 18; Convention 
against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, n 276, article 7; 
Convention against Corruption 2003, n 274, article 46.  Note, in these particular cases Interpol is 
only mentioned in the context of mutual legal assistance, not police-to-police cooperation.  
However, there is a general reference to Interpol in the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 1999 [2002] ATS 23 (entry into force: internationally, 1 April 2002; for 
Australia, 26 October 2002; for Canada, 10 April 2002), article 18. 
61 generally, see: Anderson (1989), n 53; and, Sheptycki (2004), n 59. 
62 Anderson (1989), n 53, 66. 
63 Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 122. 
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a NCB through which information and intelligence is exchanged.  The main 
function of a NCB is, in the words of Anderson, ‘to act as a link between the police 
forces in a country and the outside world’.64  In deference to national sovereignty, 
they operate independently of Interpol headquarters in Lyon in the sense that no 
member is obliged to send information to Interpol or to answer requests coming 
from other members or Lyon.65  Any such obligations arise from bilateral 
agreements between the parties, not via Interpol.  It is possible for a police 
agency sending information to Interpol to request that certain countries not have 
access to the information.66 
57. For example, in 2007/2008, the Australian NCB processed a total of 25,013 
incoming and outgoing messages via Interpol,67  of which 75% involved the 
exchange of operational information and intelligence.68 
58. The European Police Office (Europol) was launched in 1999.69   It was established 
due to many different pressures, including increased European administrative 
integration and dissatisfaction with Interpol.70  It has five principal aims: “acting 
as a central point for EU Members States’ exchange of criminal information; 
operational intelligence analysis with a central analytical database; conducting 
strategic intelligence analysis; spreading best investigative practice; 
and...supporting transnational operation as conducted by the Member States”.71  
Like Interpol, Europol acts as ‘an intelligence broker’.72  In 2007, Europol 
                                        
64 Anderson (1989), n 53, 81. 
65 Anderson (1989), n 53, 83. 
66 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 21 (Raymond Kendall). 
67 AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 82. 
68 Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005), 
n 165, 167. 
69 Paul Norman, ‘The Evolution of European Policing Strategies in Response to Transnational Crime’  
in James Sheptycki & Ali Wardak (eds), Transnational & Comparative Criminology (Abingdon: 
Glasshouse Press, 2006), 323. 
70 e.g. Anderson (1989), n 53, 170. 
71 Norman (2006), n 69, 323-4. 
72 Tom Schalken & Maarten Pronk,  'On Joint Investigation Teams, Europol and Supervision of 
Their Joint Actions' (2002) 10 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminology 70, 73. 
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exchanged 260,463 messages.73  Unlike Interpol, however, Europol also actively 
supports joint investigations.  Observing that Europol’s budget increased by 50% 
in 2002, Norman noted that the events in the US on 11 September 2001 spurred 
the growth and importance of Europol.74 
59. Europol has agreements with many non-European countries and organisations, 
such as Interpol.75  Europol has signed agreements with both Australia and 
Canada.76  For the AFP (and RCMP) these agreements provide ‘unprecedented 
access to an extensive intelligence information database’.77  Under the agreement, 
the AFP and RCMP each post a liaison officer to Europol headquarters in The 
Hague, where there is direct access to other liaison officers from Interpol, 27 EU 
countries as well as Australia, Canada, Croatia, Columbia, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and the United States (FBI, DEA, USPIS, ATF and US Secret 
Service).78  This direct access represents a wealth of intelligence, but also a cost 
saving given that only one liaison officer need be posted to one location rather 
than many officers to many different locations.  The Europol-AFP arrangements 
have ‘contributed significant intelligence’ to Europol’s Analysis Work Files and 
initiated an investigation which led to the arrest of several suspects on charges of 
child pornography.79 
60. The legal structure of Europol is much sounder than that of Interpol.  While 
Sheptycki’s observation that ‘[c]onstitutionally there is no framework for the 
governance of transnational policing globally’ remains largely true,80 the 
                                        
73 European Police Office, Annual Report 2007 (2008), 32, 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Annual_Reports/Annual%20Report%202007.pdf>. 
74 Norman (2006), n 69, 323-4. 
75 see <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=agreements>. 
76 Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the European Police 
Office (Feb 2007), <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/Australia.pdf>; 
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Police Office (2002) 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/227746.pdf> 
77 AFP, ‘Joining forces with Europol’ (2007) 94 Platypus 14. 
78 AFP, ‘Australia and Europol join forces to combat transnational crime’ (2008) 98 Platypus 10-11. 
79 Europol, Annual Report 2007 (2008), n 73, 79. 
80 J. Sheptycki, 'Patrolling the New European (In)security Field' (2001) 9(2) European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 144, 158. 
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governance of Europol within the framework of the European Union affords more 
oversight.   Interpol, the only truly international police cooperation organisation, is 
not accountable to any democratic national or international institution.  As 
discussed above, Interpol exerts a large influence over its independent 
Supervisory Board.81  In terms of data protection, Europol’s handling of 
individuals’ data is overseen by a National Supervisory Board in each member 
country and a Joint Supervisory Board.82  The Board of Governors of Europol is 
accountable to the Council of Ministers.83  Complaints of maladministration against 
Europol can be submitted with the Office of the European Ombudsman.84  
Europol’s annual reports can be scrutinised by the Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
is rarely done.85  However, the accountability for the actions of operational police 
working through Europol is largely left up to the institutions and parliaments of 
the state to which investigating officers belong.86  However, as Dorn observes, 
from 1 January 2010 the European Parliament acquired a general oversight role of 
Europol, as its finances move under the umbrella of the main EU budget.87  This is 
significant as the European Parliament has signalled that improvements are 
                                        
81 [55]. 
82 Europol Convention (1995) SN 3549/95, articles 23 & 24.  For details of present and future data 
protection mechanisms within Europol, see: Max-Peter Ratzel (Director of Europol), ‘Europol tasks: 
present and future’, speech to 10th Anniversary of the Joint Supervisory Body Conference in 
Brussels (9 October 2008), 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/Docs/JSB10thAnniversaryConferenceinBrussels9October2008.pdf>.  
83 Schalken & Pronk (2002), n 72, 79-80. 
84 Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general conditions governing the 
performance of the Ombudsman's duties (1994) Adopted by European Parliament on 9 March 1994 
(OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, p. 15) and amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002 (OJ L 92, 9.4.2002, p. 
13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ L 189, 17.7.2008, p. 25), 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/resources/statute.faces>. 
85 Kiron Reid, ‘Home Secretary and Improved Accountability of the Police’ (2005) 69 Journal of 
Criminal Law 232, 253. 
86 Reid (2005), n 85, 253-4. 
87 Nicholas Dorn, 'The end of organised crime in the European Union' (2009) 51(2) Crime, Law and 
Social Change 283, 284 & 286. 
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required “as regards Europol’s democratic responsibility, especially following the 
extension of its operational powers”.88 
61. Another important innovation is that the memorandums of understanding on 
police-to-police cooperation are negotiated between Europol and a state, not 
Europol and foreign police agencies.  This might account for the public availability 
of these MOUs.89 
2.3.5 policy and operational guidelines 
Australian practice: death penalty situation guidelines 
62. Australian practice and policy in relation to transnational police-to-police 
cooperation has been defined in large part by the drive to police drug trafficking 
and terrorism ‘at the source’ in South East Asia.  The fact that these offences 
attract the death penalty in much of the region has proven a significant challenge 
for Australian police and policy makers, who have preferred respect for the 
sovereignty of nations over respect for human rights in these matters. 
63. The AFP operates transnationally according to statute, ministerial directive and 
internal guidelines.  The Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (‘the AFP Act’) 
authorises the AFP to provide assistance and information in transnational policing 
operations to foreign law enforcement agencies:90 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE ACT 1979 - SECT 8  
Section 8: Functions  
             (1)  The functions of the Australian Federal Police are: 
... 
 (bf)  the provision of police services and police support services for the purposes of 
assisting, or cooperating with, an Australian or foreign:  
                              (i)  law enforcement agency; or  
                                        
88 Dorn (2009), n 87, 284. 
89 see [51]. 
90 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.8(1)(bf). 
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                             (ii)  intelligence or security agency; or  
                            (iii)  government regulatory agency; and  
... 
(c)  to do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of the foregoing 
functions.  
64. By ministerial direction, the AFP must inter alia “develop relationships with 
overseas law enforcement organisations to support international operational and 
general law and order outcomes that benefit Australia’s domestic and international 
interests”.91  It is also expected to contribute “effectively to the Government's 
international law enforcement interests including matters involving cooperation to 
combat transnational organised crime...”. 
65.  In situations where the death penalty might apply, AFP agents operate under a 
document entitled the AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police 
Assistance in Death Penalty Charge Situations.92  The death penalty situation 
guidelines have been in existence since 1993.93  They were revised in September 
2006 and again in December 2009.  I will refer to the guidelines in place when the 
Bali Nine were arrested as the ‘pre-September 2006’ guidelines.94 
66. The pre-September 2006 and September 2006 guidelines distinguish between 
cooperation in situations when a person has not yet been charged (‘pre-charge’) 
and when a person has been charged or convicted (‘post-charge’) of an offence 
subject to capital punishment.  In summary, the guidelines: 
                                        
91 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.37(2): the Minister in charge of the AFP may direct the 
AFP how to operate and the Commissioner must comply.  For most recent direction, see: 
Ministerial Direction (August 2008), <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/operational-
priorities/ministerial-direction.aspx>. 
92 AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police Assistance in Death Penalty Charge 
Situations (April 2004): “the AFP may provide such [police-to-police] assistance as requested, 
provided it meets existing policy guidelines, irrespective of whether the investigation may later 
result in charges being laid which may attract the death penalty”. 
93 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates, 24 May 2005, (Justice 
Minister, Senator Ellison) 59. 
94 it should be noted that the pre-September 2006 guidelines applied in the case of Rush v 
Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12. 
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a. grant police a discretion to cooperate (without reference to the 
Minister) prior to the laying of charges that could lead to the death 
penalty; and, 
b. allow police, with the permission of the Attorney-General or Minister 
for Home Affairs, to continue cooperating after capital charges are 
laid. 
67. The distinction between pre-charge and post-charge situations is controversial 
because not all legal systems demand that arrested suspects be charged and 
brought before a magistrate as soon as possible.  In a country with a civil law 
tradition, like Indonesia for example, it is possible to arrest and detain someone 
for months before actually charging them.  That is, before the Australian 
legislative framework of mutual legal assistance is enlivened to provide human 
rights protections and before the broad pre-charge police-to-police discretion is 
exhausted. 
68. The pre-charge guideline provides the AFP with a discretion to cooperate in death 
penalty situations without reference to the Attorney-General.  The discretion was 
described in the following manner:95 
pre-September 2006 
...the AFP may provide [police-to-police] assistance as requested, provided it 
meets existing policy guidelines, irrespective of whether the investigation may 
later result in charges being laid which may attract the death penalty. 
post-September 2006 
• Police-to-police assistance can be provided, without reference to the 
Attorney-General or Minister for Home Affairs, until charges are laid for the 
offence. 
• Information provided by the AFP to foreign law enforcement agencies must 
be in accordance with the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, and any 
other legislation, treaty, convention, Ministerial Direction, agreement, 
memorandum of understanding, policy, guideline, and practical guide or 
associated document relevant to the provision of information to foreign law 
enforcement agencies. 
                                        
95 a copy of the pre-September 2006 guidelines, released under freedom of information, is 
available on the website of the NSW Council for Civil Liberties: 
<http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/afp%20dp%20guidelines.pdf>.  
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69. The second paragraph of the revised guideline states that shared information 
must conform to inter alia treaty and convention obligations.96  The AFP seem to 
interpret this as referring solely to Australia’s treaty obligations under the UN anti-
crime treaties to cooperate in fighting transnational crime.97  The AFP appear to 
ignore the fact that Australia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Second Optional Protocol attached thereto, both 
of which carry with them an implied obligation not to expose anyone to the real 
risk of execution.98  Furthermore, this is contrary to the resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly that human rights are to be respected in the ‘wars’ against 
drugs and terrorism.99  It is unclear why the balance struck in extradition and 
mutual assistance law between these competing obligations is not also observed 
in police-to-police cooperation.  In Australian extradition and mutual assistance 
law, assistance is only provided where it is exculpatory or after an undertaking is 
made that no one will be executed.100 
70. The death penalty situation guidelines were modified in December 2009.  The 
reference to treaties and conventions was moved to cover all police-to-police 
cooperation.  The guideline referring to pre-charge situations was redrafted as 
follows:101   
Where no person has been arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed 
an offence in respect of which the death penalty may be imposed in a foreign 
country: 
                                        
96 it should be noted that the pre-September 2006 guidelines applied in the case of Rush v 
Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12. 
97 see “international treaties” on p.70 ff. 
98 see “To expose no one to the real risk of torture” on p.68. 
99 see [485]. 
100 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s.22(3)(c); and, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) 
ss.8(1A) & 8(1B). 
101 see AFP ‘New AFP Guidelines released’ (Media Release, 18 December 2009) 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2009/december/new-afp-guidelines-
released.aspx>.  The new guidelines are available at: 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/~/media/afp/pdf/g/guideline-for-international-death-penalty-
situation.ashx>. Prior to arrest or detention, the AFP is responsible for oversight of cooperation.  
Post-arrest, -detention, -conviction or –sentence, ministerial approval is required.  
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• Police-to-police assistance can be provided without reference to the 
Attorney-General or Minister for Home Affairs. 
• Requests for assistance with potential death implications will be subject to 
an approval process. 
• Requests for assistance to and from the AFP International Network must be 
forwarded to the relevant AFP International Desk via an overseas liaison 
communication, highlighting the issue. 
• Requests for assistance through Interpol via the AFP Operations 
Coordination Centre will also be subject to the approval process. 
71. There are two practical changes: AFP agents now require ministerial approval to 
assist in death penalty cases once a suspect has been arrested or detained; and, 
‘requests for assistance’ prior to arrest or detention must go through an approval 
process overseen by the AFP Manager International Network or the AFP  National 
Manager Border and International.  Redefining ‘pre-charge’ to ‘pre-arrest or 
detention’ narrows the discretion of police and was made in direct response to 
criticism in the Bali Nine case.  Under the old guideline, AFP agents could continue 
to cooperate in civil law jurisdictions (such as Indonesia) without ministerial 
approval in relation to a suspect who was arrested or being detained but who had 
not yet been charged – a period which could extend over several months.   
72. It is worth noting that the new ‘approval process’ remains independent of the 
Minister.  It also refers only to ‘requests for assistance’ and does not appear to 
cover spontaneous cooperation, such as that which occurred in the Bali Nine case.  
It is unclear whether spontaneous cooperation is covered by these guidelines or 
not. 
73. In practical terms, the new guidelines have not made any real difference to how 
the AFP operate in death penalty situations.  According to media reports, senior 
sources within the AFP admitted as much in September 2010:102 
                                        
102 Dylan Welch, “New rules 'window dressing', say federal police” (17 Sept 2010) Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney) <http://www.smh.com.au/national/new-rules-window-dressing-say-federal-police-
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If the Bali situation were repeated today, they say, the federal police could act in 
the same way and achieve the same result, which would mean Australians facing 
the death penalty overseas. 
74. The post-charge guidelines have also undergone some changes: 
pre-September 2006 
...where the assistance of the AFP is sought by the police or another law 
enforcement agency of a foreign country in relation to a matter in which a charge 
has been laid under the law of that foreign country, for a crime attracting the 
death penalty, no action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to 
the decision likely to be taken in respect of the request. All such requests are to be 
notified to the Director International and Operations as soon as possible after 
receipt. Following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the 
General Manager National Operations will provide the Commissioner and Deputy 
with such advice as considered necessary in order that advice may be provided to 
the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General. 
September 2006 
After charges have been laid for a crime attracting the death penalty: 
• ...The Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs may decide that 
police-to-police assistance can continue to be provided. 
• No action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to the 
decision likely to be taken in respect of the request. All such requests are to 
be notified to the Manager International Network as soon as possible after 
receipt. 
• Following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the National 
Manager Border and International will provide the Commissioner and the 
Deputy Commissioner (Operations) with such advice as considered necessary 
to seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs. 
• AFP will seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home 
Affairs on a case-by-case basis to ensure ongoing AFP actions correlate with 
Australian Government policy and other international obligations. 
December 2009 
After arrest, or detention, or charge, or conviction of an offence for which the 
death penalty may be imposed in a foreign country: 
• only the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs may approve the 
exchange of information on a police-to-police basis 
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• all requests for the exchange of information are to be notified to the 
Manager International Network as soon as possible after receipt 
• no action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to the 
decision likely to be taken in respect of the request 
• following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the National 
Manager Border and International will provide the Commissioner and the 
Deputy Commissioner (Operations) with such advice as considered necessary 
to seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs 
• the AFP will seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home 
Affairs on a case-by-case basis to ensure ongoing AFP actions correlate with 
Australian Government policy and other international obligations. 
75. The pre-September 2006 guideline for post-charge situations simply required that 
the Minister be advised of cooperation.  However, in practice the Minister’s 
permission was required to continue cooperation.103  This ministerial discretion is 
made explicit in the later updated guidelines.  No guidance is given to the Minister 
other than to ensure that AFP practice accords with government policy and 
international obligations. 
76. In terms of police practice, the AFP interprets its pre-charge discretion so broadly 
that the death penalty guidelines have little or no impact on police investigations.  
Agents do not appear to be required to consider whether the death penalty will 
apply.  In evidence before the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, the Acting 
National Manager responsible for international cooperation observed that:104 
...generally speaking, we would not refuse a police-to-police request because 
there was a potential that one of the persons subject to the investigation may be 
subject to a charge that could attract the death penalty some time at a later date. 
77. Police give several reasons for this broad interpretation.  A regularly expressed 
reason highlights the sheer volume of information shared, which is in the order of 
                                        
103 Evidence of Mike Phelan (AFP National Manager, Border and Intelligence Network) to the Joint 
Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Re: Amphetamines and other synthetic drugs (5 
June 2006) 73. 
104 Evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra (4 
September 2006) 8 (Tim Morris, Acting National Manager, International & Border, AFP). 
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13,000 pieces of information transmitted overseas every year,105 and the 
impossibility of screening each request or predicting whether any individual piece 
of information might lead to an arrest for an offence attracting the death 
penalty.106  It seems odd that foreign police are not required to explain the nature 
of the investigation they are undertaking, which should indicate whether there is a 
real risk of the death penalty being imposed.  If the foreign investigation is for 
drug trafficking in Indonesia or Vietnam, for example, then it is not difficult to 
conclude that there is a real risk that someone will be executed. It is disingenuous 
to argue that police have no actual or constructive knowledge of the use to which 
shared information will be put. The failure to so inquire could constitute 
recklessness or, in serious cases, negligence. 
78. The AFP has also argued that their interpretation of these guidelines has been 
standard operating procedure since they were introduced in the 1990s.  The AFP 
contends that the guidelines have remained essentially unchanged during both 
Coalition (conservative) and Labor Party governments.107  However, according to 
Mr Duncan Kerr MP, who was Justice Minister when the guidelines were drafted, 
they were never intended to be standard operating procedure.108  They were 
meant to be facilitative.  They were originally intended to be used only in 
exceptional circumstances where there is an imminent threat to human life: the 
‘ticking bomb’ scenario. 
79. Furthermore, the AFP follows the same death penalty situation guidelines 
regardless of the national origin of the agency with which they are cooperating.  
Speaking of the Bali Nine investigation, the AFP Manager of Border and 
International network said: “We operate exactly the same way no matter which 
                                        
105 Evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (Budget Estimates), 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra (17 February 2006) 40 (AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty). 
106 Evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (17 February 2006), n 
105, 56 (AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty). 
107 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates, 24 May 2005, 59 
(AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty). 
108 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 August 2006, 145ff (Mr 
Duncan Kerr MP). 
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country it is.  ...Had this occurred in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, we’d 
potentially do exactly the same thing given the same set of circumstances”.109   
80. It is not surprising then that these death penalty situation guidelines were glossed 
over in the Bali Nine case, given the views of AFP Commissioner Keelty.  In 
deference to the doctrine of national sovereignty, the Commissioner expressed the 
strong view that police-to-police cooperation is an all-or-nothing proposition:110 
We simply cannot dictate to a foreign law enforcement agency as to how they 
undertake their operations. We simply cannot restrict the areas in which we 
cooperate. We either cooperate or we do not cooperate. 
81. These views have been criticised by the former Justice Minister, Mr Duncan Kerr 
MP, who found it unbelievable that Australia would cooperate without 
discrimination:111 
...surely it cannot be the case, as is being proposed, that in all circumstances 
common sense flies out the window and we do not exercise judgement regarding 
circumstances in which assistance will be provided. Take, for example, the 
circumstances in Iran where a 16-year-old girl has been hanged for the offence of 
having sex with a person when she was not married. There are many countries 
which have the death penalty for offences that even the most draconian of 
lawmakers here would not recognise as appropriate, and for our police to say 
repeatedly and for our ministers to repeat that they are obliged in all instances to 
pass on information without any regard to the consequences to those who might 
be affected by it is simply shutting their eyes to the real consequences of that 
conduct. 
82. The flexibility with which these guidelines have been interpreted by police is also 
reflected in Australian policy.  What was once a strong principled opposition to the 
death penalty, has been slowly whittled away.  According to documents obtained 
under freedom of information legislation, federal Attorney-General Daryl Williams 
and Justice Minister Senator Amanda Vanstone began watering down Australia’s 
long-standing principled opposition to the death penalty in 1998.  In response to a 
                                        
109 Wockner & King (2006), n 161, 227. 
110 Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005), 
n 165, 170. 
111 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 August 2006, 
146 (Mr Duncan Kerr MP).  
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foreign serial murder case,112 Williams and Vanstone decided that a guarantee 
that no one would be executed would no longer be required in every case of 
police-to-police assistance.  Instead, the Minister would retain a discretion 
whereby he or she may refuse assistance in the absence of such an assurance.113  
Prior to this, Australia had always sought such an assurance.114 
83. In the last few years, the federal Attorney-General has authorised the AFP to 
assist in post-charge death penalty cases on at least three occasions without 
requiring any guarantees that no one will be executed : in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Tonga.115  The case in Indonesia involved the prosecution of the Bali 
bombers.  The three main terrorist bombers were executed on 9 November 
2008.116  It is unclear whether anyone has been executed as a result of AFP 
cooperation in Malaysia or Tonga.  The new December 2009 guidelines require the 
AFP Commissioner to report to the Minister for Home Affairs biannually ‘on the 
nature and number of cases where information is provided to foreign law 
enforcement agencies in death penalty cases’. 
84. There has been much criticism of the policy and practice surrounding police-to-
police cooperation in death penalty situations.  Calls for reform have been made 
by several prominent individuals and organisations, including the Senate Legal & 
Constitutional Legislation Committee,117 the Joint Standing Committee on 
                                        
112 FOI docs (December 2007), n 581, f.12.[32]. 
113 FOI docs (December 2007), n 581, f.68.[7]. 
114 FOI docs (December 2007), n 581, f.68.[8]. 
115 Letter from Senator David Johnston (Justice Minister) to Michael Walton (NSW Council for Civil 
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Treaties,118 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,119 the Law Council of 
Australia120 and the NSW Council for Civil Liberties.121 
85. In mid-2009, the United Nations Human Rights Committee voiced its concern of 
Australian law and practice:122  
The Committee notes with concern...the lack of a comprehensive prohibition on 
the providing of international police assistance for the investigation of crimes that 
may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in another state, in violation of the 
State party’s obligation under the Second Optional Protocol. 
The State party should take the necessary legislative and other steps to ensure 
that...it does not provide assistance in the investigation of crimes that may result 
in the imposition of the death penalty in another State... 
86. The death penalty situation guidelines also attracted judicial criticism in the 
Federal Court of Australia.  In the case of Rush v Commissioner of Police,123 
members of the Bali Nine sought preliminary discovery, prior to commencing 
action in the Federal Court of Australia against the AFP for negligence and 
misfeasance in public office, of AFP documents and the identity of decision-
makers.  The judge dismissed the application on the grounds that any substantive 
claims brought would be ‘purely speculative in character or else would have no 
                                        
118 Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 91 (June 2008), 
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122 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Australia (7 May 2009) UN Doc 
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prospects of success’.124  Ultimately, Finn J observed that the actions of the AFP 
had not been unlawful, ultra vires or exercised with reckless indifference.  The AFP 
and the Australian government saw this finding as vindication that the AFP had 
done nothing wrong in the Bali Nine case.  They ignored the fact that domestic 
lawfulness is no defence to a violation of international human rights law.125 
87. What is significant about the Rush case is that Finn J prefaced his judgment with a 
call for the death penalty situation guidelines to be reformed.  His Honour’s 
preface reads in part:126 
The circumstances revealed in this application for preliminary discovery suggest 
there is a need for the Minister administering the [AFP Act] and the Commissioner 
of Police to address the procedures and protocols followed by members of the 
[AFP] when providing information to the police forces of another country in 
circumstances which predictably could result in the charging of a person with an 
offence that would expose that person to the risk of the death penalty in that 
country. Especially is this so where the person concerned is an Australian citizen 
and the information is provided in the course of a request being made by the AFP 
for assistance from that other country’s police force. 
88. This judicial call for review seemed to confuse the AFP Commissioner and Justice 
Minister, both of whom could see no substantive criticism in the existing 
procedures.127  However four years later, in 2010, the now retired AFP 
Commissioner Mick Keelty appeared in an Indonesian court, dressed in a 
traditional Balinese shirt, to give evidence for one of the Bali Nine in his final 
death sentence appeal.128  Mr Keelty was followed by his former Manager for 
                                        
124 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [1]. 
125 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004), n 289, [4], citing Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 [1974] ATS 2 (entry into force internationally and for 
Australia and Canada, 27 January 1980), article 27. 
126 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [1]. 
127 Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates (17 February 
2006) 53. 
128 Tom Allard, “Death-row inmate faced fine in Australia, Keelty admits” (17 Sept 2010) Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney) <http://www.smh.com.au/world/deathrow-inmate-faced-fine-in-australia-
keelty-admits-20100916-15erh.html>. 
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Border Operations, Mick Phelan, who was dressed in full AFP uniform.  According 
to journalists, this level of assistance to a criminal offender is ‘unprecedented’.129   
Canadian practice  
89. Canadian police-to-police practice stands in stark contrast to Australian practice.  
The Arar Commission revealed the specific guidelines for: (i) sharing information 
with foreign agencies: and, (ii) cooperating with agencies from countries which 
violate human rights.   
90. It is RCMP policy that all information to be shared with other agencies is screened 
for relevance, reliability and personal information.130  Caveats should also be 
placed on shared information, ensuring that it will only be used for the agreed 
purpose and that it will not be passed on to other agencies.  The Arar 
Commissioner endorsed these procedures but was critical of the RCMP’s failure to 
implement them during Project AOC. 
91. The Commissioner was more critical of the RCMP’s written policy restricting 
cooperation with agencies from countries with a questionable human rights 
record.  The RCMP can also share information with the agencies of countries that 
violate human rights, but not if the information sharing could have a ‘negative 
human rights connotation’.131  Such connotations include torture and capital 
punishment.  Unlike Australia, no distinction is made between pre- and post-
charge situations: the same rule applies in all circumstances.  The full guidelines 
appear in the RCMP Operational Manual under the title “Enquiries from Foreign 
Governments that Violate Human Rights”: 
M. 3. Enquiries from Foreign Governments that Violate Human Rights 
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M. 3. a. The RCMP will not become involved or appear to be involved in any 
activity that might be considered a violation of the rights of an individual, unless 
there is a need to comply with the following international conventions: 
1. United Nations Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 
article 4(b) or through membership in such bodies as Interpol; 
2. the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; 
3. the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal); 
4. the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(The Hague); or 
5. the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft (Tokyo). 
M. 3. b. The disclosure of information to an agency of a foreign government that 
does not share Canada's respect for democratic or human rights may be 
considered if it: 
1. is justified because of Canadian security or law- enforcement interests, 
2. can be controlled by specific terms and conditions, and 
3. does not have a negative human rights connotation.  
92. The Arar Commissioner was critical of the exemptions for UN terrorism-related 
treaties:132 
The need to investigate terrorism and the need to comply with international 
conventions relating to terrorism do not in themselves justify the violation of 
human rights. The international conventions cited in the RCMP policy…do not 
authorize departures from human rights standards protected under various other 
international instruments Canada has agreed to abide by, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the…Convention against Torture… 
93. Having concluded that the existing policy is inadequate, the Arar Commissioner 
made the following recommendation with respect to this written policy: 
Recommendation 14 
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The RCMP and CSIS should review their policies governing the circumstances in which they supply 
information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records. Information should 
never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute 
to the use of torture. Policies should include specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible 
Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring 
accountability. 
94. The recommendation is essentially one of risk assessment, requiring the 
assessment of ‘credible risk’ of whether cooperation will ‘cause or contribute to’ 
torture or ‘other human rights abuses’. 
Recent changes to Canadian anti-death penalty policy 
95. In late 2007 the Harper government publicly announced it had changed its policy 
and would no longer intervene in clemency applications  by Canadians facing the 
death penalty ‘in a democratic country that honours the rule of law’.133  Assistance 
would now be provided on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the facts of each 
case.   
96. Though never explicitly confirmed, the change in government policy appears to 
have been a direct response to the case of Canadian citizen, Mr Ronald Smith.  
After being convicted of a double murder in the US state of Montana, Mr Smith 
has been on death row for 25 years.  The Canadian government has been 
assisting him in his legal appeals all that time.  After decades of providing Mr 
Smith with assistance, the government announced that, pursuant to this new 
policy, it would no longer assist him. 
97. Mr Smith brought an application in the Federal Court of Canada for an order that 
the relevant Minister petition the Governor of Montana to commute the death 
sentence.134  During his judgment, Barnes J noted that Mr Smith, being held in the 
US by US authorities, was beyond the jurisdiction of Canada.  All that Mr Smith 
could hope for was for Canada to use its influence on the Montana Governor.   
98. Mr Smith argued that the refusal to seek clemency was a violation of his Charter 
rights and a denial of the Canadian government’s duty of fairness.  The 
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respondent government argued that the case before the court was not justiciable 
because the act of petitioning for clemency was an Executive decision based on 
government foreign policy and therefore was a political, not a legal, matter and 
therefore could not be reviewed by a court.   
99. Barnes J rejected the respondent’s arguments on the grounds that the court can 
examine the decision of a government decision-maker which is based on 
government policy.  His Honour also dismissed the government’s argument that 
foreign policy is a matter for governments and not for courts.  His Honour 
distinguished between decisions to make a policy and decisions made under a 
policy.  Essentially, a court can examine decisions made by a government 
decision-maker which is based on clearly-articulated government policy:135 
Decisions involving pure policy or political choices in the nature of Crown 
prerogatives are generally not amenable to judicial review because their subject 
matter is not suitable to judicial assessment. But where the subject matter of a 
decision directly affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual, a 
Court is both competent and qualified to review it. 
100. Barnes J expressed concern that the government was unable to demonstrate that 
Mr Smith’s case had been carefully considered according to the rules of procedural 
fairness.  Given that the government had assisted Mr Smith for over 20 years, Mr 
Smith had a reasonable expectation that he would be consulted on the application 
to his case of this new clemency ‘policy’.  There was no evidence that the 
government had consulted him at all.  The court found this to be a breach of the 
duty of fairness and set aside the decision to withdraw support for Mr Smith’s 
clemency petition.136 
101. Barnes J also expressed concern that the government was unable to produce in 
court a clearly articulated version of its new policy on clemency.  Given the serious 
nature of the subject matter of the policy, which related to the fundamental right 
to life, his Honour concluded that there was no ‘new’ policy.  Therefore, the ‘old’ 
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policy, which was to seek clemency unconditionally, was still in place.  Having 
come to this conclusion, his Honour declined to examine the alleged breaches of 
the Charter and international obligations, because there was no ‘new’ policy to 
measure against these standards. 
102. His Honour set aside the decision to withdraw support for Mr Smith’s clemency 
petition on the grounds that the decision was unlawful as it did not apply the 
correct government policy.137  The court ordered the Canadian government ‘to 
take all reasonable steps’ to support Mr Smith’s application for clemency.  
103. The government chose not to appeal this decision, but has since published a 
detailed policy on when it will and will not assist in clemency appeals.138  Mr 
Smith’s case was decided as a matter of administrative law and the constitutional 
issue was left undecided.  So, it is reasonable to expect that the next Canadian to 
be refused assistance will launch a constitutional challenge to this new policy 
based on their constitutional right to life and Canada’s international human rights 
obligations. 
2.4 intelligence-led policing 
104. To understand the increase in transnational police-to-police cooperation, it is in 
my view necessary to acknowledge and appreciate the theory of intelligence-led 
policing.  Of course it is not the only force driving transnational cooperation 
between police, but it is a useful tool in making sense of the imperatives which 
drive this form of transnational cooperation.  In summary: information is the raw 
input material in the production of intelligence, and there is a perception that the 
more information one has, the better the end-product (intelligence) will be.  This 
imperative for more information justifies cooperation and information exchange 
with foreign agencies – even those which violate human rights. 
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105. Intelligence-led policing is the pre-eminent contemporary model for domestic 
policing throughout much of the western world.  It is embraced by both the RCMP 
and AFP.139  While intelligence-led policing, according to Ratcliffe, has its origins in 
the twentieth century, by the beginning of the twenty-first century it had been 
adopted by many of the police forces of the English-speaking world.140   Ratcliffe 
attributes the rise of its popularity to many factors, including the increasing 
complexity of policing, the increased need to cooperate transnationally to address 
organised and transnational crime, limitations of the traditional model of policing 
(which focuses on preventative patrols and on criminal investigation and 
prosecution), changes in technology, increased public-sector managerialism and 
resource constraints.141 
106. Defining the intelligence-led model is difficult,142 but most attempts begin with the 
assumption that intelligence-led policing is information-driven.  Information is 
gathered from as many sources as possible, stored electronically and accessed by 
trained intelligence officers who process the information and turn it into what is 
generally referred to as ‘intelligence’.  This value-added product helps senior 
police to identify trends in criminal activity and to plan the most effective 
distribution of limited police resources based on that intelligence.  Ratcliffe 
recognises that there is no one all-encompassing definition of intelligence-led 
policing, because the model is practised in many different ways across the 
globe.143   But after comparing intelligence-led policing with other policing models, 
he gives his best approximation:144  
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Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where 
data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making 
framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention 
through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that 
target prolific and serious offenders. 
107. Intelligence is a term usually associated with national security agencies, however 
it is now increasingly utilised by police.  According to Robertson, 'intelligence' is 
not just information or information-gathering.  It is a process whereby people's 
secrets are collected and analysed for the purpose of informing policy-making.145  
So the collection of information in the public domain is not knowledge, but when 
combined with other secret information it might become intelligence.  Gathering 
and keeping secrets is a key component of intelligence. 
108. Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘information’ as shorthand for ‘information 
and intelligence’.  Strictly-speaking, I see the two as separate.  ‘Information’ is a 
‘valueless’ allegation of fact: it is a piece in a puzzle.  Granted, some information is 
so probative that it might form evidence in its own right, for example surveillance 
video footage of a clearly-identifiable accused committing a crime.  But most 
information, such as a date of birth, will amount to little in and of itself.  
‘Intelligence’ is value-added knowledge; the product of the analysis of an 
aggregation of information. 
109. One of the assumptions that underpins the intelligence-led policing model is that 
the more information that can be collected, the better the end-product intelligence 
will be.  No piece of information is too trivial, because its significance might only 
emerge upon further analysis.  The significance, for our purposes, is that a police 
force with a finite budget can only gather so much information.  However, the 
volume of information can be increased by cooperating and exchanging 
information with other agencies, both domestic and foreign.  This is especially true 
                                        
145 Kenneth Robertson (1994), ‘Practical Police Cooperation in Europe: the intelligence dimension’ 
in Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer (ed), Policing Across National Boundaries  (London: Pinter 
1994), 106-9. 
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when dealing with transnational crime, where the criminal targets and their 
activities are spread across more than one sovereign jurisdiction. 
2.5 limiting cooperation 
110. Police-to-police information sharing is not unlimited.  Restrictions have long been 
placed on the free-flow of information.  Some restrictions are institutionalised, 
while others are more ad hoc and have evolved over time.  So calls to restrict 
transnational police-to-police cooperation are not unprecedented and are targeted 
at practices which are familiar with restrictions. 
111. Flowing naturally from the theory of intelligence-led policing is the view that police 
can more quickly and effectively confront transnational criminal activity if they 
exchange information in an unimpeded fashion, regardless of consequences. For 
example, for the AFP Commissioner, transnational cooperation is an all-or-nothing 
proposition.  Defending the AFP’s sharing of information with the INP in the Bali 
Nine heroin smuggling case, Commissioner Keelty told a Senate Committee:146 
We simply cannot restrict the areas in which we cooperate. We either cooperate or 
we do not cooperate. 
...Most of the countries that we deal with in terms of the cooperation, particularly 
on narcotics matters, do have the death penalty. Indeed, the United States, in 
some states, has the death penalty. I do not think anybody would be 
recommending that we stop our cooperation on police-to-police exchange of 
information intelligence with the FBI. 
112. Therefore, it is understandable that any requirements to limit the free flow of 
information are generally resisted by police.147  Nevertheless, most police-to-police 
sharing agreements, including the Constitution of Interpol, reserve to national 
police a discretion to refuse cooperation.  This reflects an institutionalisation of 
                                        
146 Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005), 
n 165, 170. 
147 see “Police attitudes to human rights safeguards” on p.160 ff. 
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deference to national sovereignty.148  This discretion recognises that police must 
operate within the laws of their own jurisdiction:149   
In order to further its aims, [Interpol] needs the constant and active co-operation 
of its Members, who should do all within their power which is compatible with the 
legislations of their countries to participate diligently in its activities. 
113. It should also be noted that, to facilitate the limitation of information sharing, 
Interpol databases have the ability for the information provider to restrict who can 
(or cannot) see the information they are sharing with Interpol.150   Even before 
sharing information with Interpol, however, national police have a discretion to 
share the information with Interpol or not. 
114. Other restrictions have been recognised over time.  For example, after pressure 
from the European community, many transnational information-sharing 
arrangements also place privacy restrictions on the exchange of individuals’ 
information.151  
115. Police are also limited by international law.  This is made explicit in the calls of the 
UN General Assembly that human rights law must be respected in the so-called 
‘wars’ on drugs and terror.152  Similarly, the 9/11 Commission, which 
recommended increased information sharing between US agencies, recognised the 
                                        
148 Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner), Interview, Four Corners (ABC TV), 27 March 2006, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2006/s1599179.htm>: “It’s respecting the sovereignty 
of other countries. ... it’s just a reality of working in the global environment that you have to 
accept that not everybody has the same laws, not every everybody has the same standards in 
terms of policing, the same standards in terms of their criminal justice systems...”. 
149 Interpol, Constitution (1956) Article 31. 
150 Evidence of Raymond Kendall (Secretary-General, Interpol) to Joint Committee on the NCA (5 
December 1996), n 630, 21.  
151 e.g. Cooperation Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the European Police 
Office, Article 7, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/227746.pdf>.  
See: Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril 
(2005). Historically, see: C. D. Raab, 'Police cooperation: the prospects for privacy', in Anderson & 
den Boer (eds), Policing Across National Boundaries (1994, London); also, M. Spencer, 1992 and 
All That: Civil Liberties in the Balance (1990, London). 
152 see [485]. 
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need to couple increased information sharing with measures to protect civil 
liberties such as individual privacy.153 
                                        
153 9/11 Commission Report (2004), n 8, 394-5.  
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3 Informal Transnational Policing: case studies 
116. In this chapter I have chosen two well-known case studies to illustrate how 
informal transnational policing works and how it can go wrong.  The first case 
study involves information sharing between Australian and Indonesian police 
during the course of an investigation into drug smuggling.  The ‘Bali Nine’ case, as 
it became known, resulted in several Australian citizens being sentenced to death 
in Indonesia.  The second case study involves information sharing between 
Canadian and US police in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks 
on US soil.  The case of Maher Arar resulted in Mr Arar being extraordinarily 
rendered to, and tortured in, Syria. 
117. Both case studies involve the sharing of information across national borders 
between police which result in adverse human rights consequences.  The purpose 
of these examples is to highlight the kinds of issues which arise in transnational 
police-to-police information sharing, as well as the lack of external oversight of 
this increasingly important activity.  Unfortunately there are other examples, such 
as the cases of Dr Mohammad Haneef154 and Mr Trinh Huu.155  There are also 
other examples that involve agency-to-agency cooperation between security 
agencies, like the cases of Mr Abelrazik156 and Messrs Almalki, Elmaati and 
                                        
154 see: John Clarke QC, Report of the Clarke Inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: Volume 
One (November 2008), <http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au/>.  Dr Haneef was an Indian-born 
doctor practicing in Queensland.  Dr Haneef knew one of the terrorists who attacked Glasgow 
airport on 30 June 2007.  When Dr Haneef attempted to leave Australia a few days later, he was 
arrested at the airport, then detained and charged with terrorism-related offences.  When bail was 
granted (for want of evidence), Dr Haneef’s visa was cancelled and he was deported.  Mr Clarkes’ 
inquiry found that the Commonwealth had no evidence with which to charge Dr Haneef and that 
the Minister for Immigration’s actions, while lawful, were ‘mystifying’: see p.xiii of the Report.  
155 Mr Trinh Huu, an Australian citizen, was arrested in Vietnam in December 2004 in possession of 
two kilograms of heroin, as a result of joint operation between Australian and Vietnamese police.  
Mr Trinh was convicted and received a death sentence, which was later commuted: see, Tom 
Hyland, ‘AFP under fire over Vietnam drug arrest’ Sun Herald (Sydney), 19 February 2006.  Similar 
cases were also reported prior to the arrest of the Bali Nine: see, Kimina Lyall, ‘Spare my life, 
convicted Australian drug trafficker begs Vietnam’ (27 December 2004) The Australian (Sydney), 6. 
156 Mr Abdelrazik is a Canadian-Sudanese citizen who was arrested in Sudan at the request of CSIS 
and, unknown to Canada, was subsequently tortured: Abdelrazik v Canada [2009] FCJ 656 (Zinn 
J), [91]-[92].  Abdelrazik was the subject of a UN global travel ban, as a suspected associate of al-
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Nureddin.157  There is insufficient space to cover all of these agency-to-agency 
cases, which is why I have chosen only two police-to-police examples.   
118. I will give the outline of these two case-studies below.  I will return to them again 
in more detail throughout this thesis where they illuminate a particular point. 
3.1 Information sharing between AFP and INP: the 
‘Bali Nine’ 
119. On 8 April 2005, the AFP voluntarily supplied information to the Indonesian 
National Police (INP) about several Australian citizens in Bali who were suspected 
of planning to smuggle heroin from Indonesia to Australia.158  The AFP liaison 
officer in Bali sent two formal letters to the INP, requesting that the Indonesians 
keep the Australian suspects under surveillance and that, should the INP suspect 
that the organiser and/or couriers were in possession of drugs at the time of their 
departure for Australia, then the INP should ‘take what action they deem 
appropriate’.159  Acting on this tip-off, INP officers began a surveillance operation.   
120. On 17 April 2005, the INP arrested nine Australians in Bali on charges of heroin 
trafficking.160  They were tried in Indonesia and, after prosecution appeals of 
                                                                                                                      
Qaeda.  Citing its obligation to respect the UN ban, the Canadian government refused to issue 
travel documents for Mr Abdelrazik to return from Sudan to Canada.  The court found this a breach 
of Abelrazik’s Charter right to enter Canada, and ordered his repatriation, which the government 
then facilitated. 
157 See: Frank Iacobucci, Report of the Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (2008), 
<http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca/en/home.htm>.  Mr Elmaati was detained and tortured in Syria 
and Egypt, partially on the strength of information provided by the RCMP and CSIS.  Mr Almalki 
was detained and tortured in Syria, indirectly because the RCMP shared its entire investigations 
database with US law enforcement.  Mr Nurredin was detained and tortured in Syria, partially on 
the strength of information provided to foreign law enforcement agencies by the RCMP and CSIS. 
Commissioner Iacobucci endorsed the recommendations of the Arar Commission. 
158 the letters were admitted into evidence in an Australian court: see, Rush v Commissioner of 
Police [2006] FCA 12, [22]-[23], <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2006/12.html. 
159 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [22] (quoting letter from AFP Agent Paul 
Hunniford to INP dated 8 April 2005). 
160 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [27]. 
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‘light’ sentences, six of the nine were sentenced to death.161  On 6 March 2008 on 
appeal, three of those death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment.162  The 
other three remain on death row: two organisers and one ‘mule’ (courier). 
121. Despite public disquiet about the AFP’s actions, the AFP was unapologetic and the 
government supported the police.   
3.1.1 Memorandum of Understanding 
122. At no point had a formal request been made, by either Australian or Indonesian 
authorities, under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Australia and 
Indonesia.163  At all times, the AFP agents involved were acting under a  
Memorandum of Understanding between the AFP and INP.164  In evidence before 
a senate committee, AFP Commissioner Keelty made it clear that the sharing of 
such information is standard operating procedure under the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the AFP and the INP.165 
123. It is important to note that the MOU in operation during the Bali Nine case was 
forged in the heady days after the Australian ‘heroin drought’, the MV Tampa 
crisis and the September 11 attacks on US soil.  This confluence of events at the 
turn of the century resulted in the AFP’s budget being increased almost five-fold 
(474%) over the decade from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008.166  Australia needed 
                                        
161 Cindy Wockner and Madonna King, One-Way Ticket: the untold story of the Bali 9 (2006). 
162 Mark Forbes, ‘Bali Three Spared Death’ (6 March 2008) The Age (Melbourne), 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/bali-three-spared-death-
penalty/2008/03/06/1204402565563.html>. 
163 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [30]. 
164 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [25].  For more about the MOU, see also: Senate 
Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Final Report (2002), 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/maritime_incident_ctte/report/index.htm>, [1.50] & 
464-5 (Additional Comments of Senator Faulkner). 
165 Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee (Supplementary Budget Estimates), Parliament of Australia, Canberra (31 October 
2005), 170, <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S8859.pdf>. 
166 Total budget funding for AFP in financial year 1997/1998 was $A255m; in 2007/2008 was 
$A1.209bn.  Sources:  AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-2007-08.ashx>; and, AFP, Annual 
Report 1997/1998 (1998), <http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-1997-
98.ashx>. 
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Indonesia’s cooperation to combat regional terrorism, drug smuggling and people 
smuggling at its source.  The relationship between the AFP and the INP was seen 
as crucial and Australia invested a significant amount of time and money 
supporting and improving that relationship, including establishing the INP 
Transnational Crime Coordination Centre167 and the Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation.168  As members of the Bali Nine discovered, the rights 
of individuals were given a very low priority in this political climate.  
3.1.2 AFP guidelines in death penalty situations 
124. In addition to the MOU, AFP agents in the Bali Nine case had internal guidelines to 
follow.  In situations where the death penalty might apply, AFP agents operate 
under a document entitled the AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police 
Assistance in Death Penalty Charge Situations.169  I have already examined these 
guidelines in greater detail.170  But it is worth reiterating that the guidelines permit 
AFP agents to cooperate at their own discretion prior to criminal charges being 
laid, i.e. at the investigatory stage.  Once charges have been laid, then 
cooperation can continue only when authorised by the Attorney-General or 
statute.171  The guidelines have been widely criticised for being inconsistent with 
Australia’s international obligations with respect to the death penalty. 
                                        
167 see: AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 166, 64. 
168 see: AFP answer to Question on Notice No.240 of Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, 
Estimates Hearings (31 October 2005), 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/sup_0506/ag/qon_240.pdf>.  
For more information, see the Centre’s website: <http://www.jclec.com>.  The EU has also 
provided money to build an accommodation complex and to sponsor conferences at the JCLEC: 
Commissioner Mick Keelty (speech to Law Council of Australia, Canberra) 23 March 2007, 11, 
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=E3FB6C79-1E4F-
17FA-D2E0-5A83E377CEC0&siteName=lca>. 
169 AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police Assistance in Death Penalty Charge 
Situations (April 2004): “the AFP may provide such [police-to-police] assistance as requested, 
provided it meets existing policy guidelines, irrespective of whether the investigation may later 
result in charges being laid which may attract the death penalty”. 
170 see [62] ff. 
171 e.g. under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). 
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3.2 information sharing between RCMP and US 
authorities: Maher Arar 
125. On 26 September 2002, Mr Maher Arar arrived at John F Kennedy airport in New 
York City from Tunisia via Zurich, in transit to Montréal.172  Mr Arar was detained 
and incarcerated by US authorities.  On 8 October 2002, he was formally denied 
access to the United States on the grounds that he was found to be a member of 
a foreign terrorist organisation, specifically al-Qaeda.173  Mr Arar is a dual 
Canadian-Syrian citizen.  Against his wishes and to the surprise of Canadian 
officials, Mr Arar was removed from the United States to Syria, where he was 
detained until his release on 5 October 2003.174  During his detention in Syria, Mr 
Arar was tortured and kept in degrading and inhumane conditions.175  After his 
release from Syrian detention, Mr Arar returned to Canada,176 where his case was 
the subject of a Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Canadian officials in 
relation to Mr Arar’s ordeal.177   
3.2.1 The Arar Inquiry 
126. The Commission of Inquiry, conducted by his Honour Mr Justice Dennis O’Connor, 
concluded inter alia that ‘it is very likely that [American authorities] relied on 
information received from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in making 
the decision to remove Mr Arar to Syria’.178  The Commissioner could not be more 
                                        
172 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Volume 1 (2006), Ch.2. 
173 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 205. 
174 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Volume 2 (2006), Ch.4. 
175 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006), 9 & 57. 
176 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Volume 2 (2006), Ch.4. 
177 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar.  The 
archived documents of the Commission of Inquiry are available at: <http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-
13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm>. 
178 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 157. 
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emphatic, because American authorities declined to testify or provide evidence to 
the inquiry and therefore the inquiry did not have access to classified information 
upon which the US removal order was based.179  
127. After the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC of 11 September 
2001 (‘the 9/11 attacks’), Canadian security and law enforcement officials moved 
swiftly to prevent further incidents.  The Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS), which suspected Ottawa-resident Mr Abdullah Almalki of terrorist-related 
activity, transferred its investigation of Mr Almalki to the RCMP.  In turn, the RCMP 
established Project A-O Canada (‘Project AOC’) to investigate Mr Almalki.  Mr Arar 
came to the attention of Project AOC when, on 12 October 2001, he met Mr 
Almalki in an Ottawa cafe and they spent the next three hours together.180  
Between this time and his detention at JFK airport in September 2002, Mr Arar 
was never suspected of committing any offence; he was only ever a person of 
interest to Project AOC’s investigation because of his association with Mr 
Almalki.181 
128. Project AOC was different from most traditional criminal investigations for several 
reasons.  First, it was a criminal investigation related to national security matters, 
rather than being related to the domestic criminal activity with which Project AOC 
officers were familiar.  Second, its primary mandate was to detect and prevent 
terrorist threats before they occurred, rather than to investigate and prosecute a 
criminal act after it had been committed.  Third, the sense of urgency following 
the 9/11 attacks had led to a verbal directive from RCMP headquarters to share 
information expeditiously with other agencies, including US partner agencies such 
as the FBI.  The Arar Commissioner was critical of the lack of supervision provided 
to Project AOC officers by senior RCMP officers, given that most Project AOC 
officers were inexperienced, and had received little or no training, in national 
                                        
179 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 156. 
180 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 53. 
181 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 69. 
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security-related or preventative-type investigations.182  However, his Honour was 
most critical of the manner in which Project AOC shared information with its 
American counterparts. 
129. It should be noted that Justice O’Connor found no bad faith on the part of Project 
AOC officers.183  The Commissioner accepted the RCMP’s evidence that no one 
understood that the Americans would remove Mr Arar to Syria.184  The inquiry 
report concludes that Project AOC’s errors were sloppy work attributable to a lack 
of training, experience and supervision.185 
130. The Arar inquiry identified three main problems with the way Project AOC shared 
information with American authorities.  First, that Project AOC failed to follow the 
standard RCMP procedures for information sharing.  Second, some of the 
information it shared was inaccurate and misleading.  Third, Project AOC failed to 
respect the caveats of other Canadian agencies by passing information provided 
by those agencies on to other agencies (domestic and foreign) without obtaining 
permission. 
3.2.2 Failure to follow standard procedures 
131. Within a few days of the 9/11 attacks, the RCMP had reached a verbal ‘free-flow-
of-information agreement’ with their American counterparts to assist in preventing 
further attacks.186  As a result of that agreement, an Assistant Commissioner of 
the RCMP told his officers to ‘share as much information as possible in real 
time’.187  This was interpreted by Project AOC officers to mean that they were 
conducting an ‘open book investigation’ and could share information without 
following standard RCMP information sharing procedures.188  Senior executive 
officers of the RCMP, however, testified at the inquiry that this was never their 
                                        
182 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 75-77. 
183 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 145. 
184 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 140. 
185 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 24, 71-2 & 77. 
186 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 38 & 41. 
187 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 39-40. 
188 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 119. 
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intention and that they had still expected operational officers to follow these 
standard procedures. 
132. The RCMP’s standard information sharing procedures require caveats to be placed 
on shared information to limit its use, and require all information to be screened 
for relevance, reliability/accuracy and personal information before sharing it.  In 
this context, a caveat is a written note attached to a document stating that the 
attached document and its contents are the property of the sharing agency, that 
the information is provided for intelligence purposes only and that neither the 
document nor its contents may be used for any other purpose or shared with any 
other agency without first obtaining the permission of the sharing agency.  I will 
discuss the role and usage of caveats in more detail later in this paper.189 
133. Initially, senior command staff were present when Project AOC officers met with 
FBI agents.190  However, from late October 2001, Project AOC developed a direct 
relationship with the FBI, which intensified over time.  Senior RCMP officials and 
the managers of Project AOC were aware that information shared with the FBI 
might be passed on to the CIA.191  Periodically, Project AOC officers had direct 
contact with CIA agents.192  When Project AOC shared information with American 
agencies, it contravened RCMP policy by failing to place written caveats on the 
documents and by failing to screen the information for relevance, reliability or 
personal information.193   
134. In late February 2002, FBI agents were given access to all physical files and 
material collected by Project AOC, including Mr Arar’s file.194  In April 2002, Project 
AOC made an electronic copy of all investigation documents on their computer 
                                        
189 see [439] ff. 
190 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 85. 
191 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 88. 
192 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Addendum (2006) 85. 
193 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 65. 
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database, including exhibits, statements, internal memos and reports.195  The 
information was given to the FBI on three CDs.196  This disclosure, of an entire 
investigation’s files, was unprecedented.  None of the RCMP officers and 
executives who testified at the Arar inquiry knew of any other instances.197  It 
should be noted that Project AOC was at all times an RCMP investigation.  It was 
never a joint investigation with the FBI.198  The FBI, and other Canadian and US 
agencies involved, were being kept informed of Project AOC’s progress to facilitate 
a larger effort to prevent further terrorist attacks.  The close relationship between 
the RCMP and FBI continued after the US removed Mr Arar to Syria.  It was only 
in October 2002, after CSIS stepped in to express its concern about the close 
contact, that FBI access to Project AOC offices was curtailed.199    
3.2.3 Inaccurate and misleading information 
135. Some of the information shared with the Americans related to Mr Arar.  The Arar 
Commissioner examined all this information and found that it was sometimes 
inaccurate, inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to Mr Arar.  Justice O’Connor 
criticised Project AOC officers for overstating Mr Arar’s importance to their 
investigation, having:200 
...variously described Mr Arar as a suspect, a target, a principal subject of its 
investigation, a person with an 'important' connection to Mr Almalki, a person 
directly linked to Mr Almalki in a diagram titled “Bin Laden's Associates: Al Qaeda 
Organization in Ottawa” and a business associate or a close associate of Mr 
Almalki. 
136. As Justice O’Connor observes, in the context of the US response to the 9/11 
attacks, it was extremely dangerous to describe Mr Arar in this way.  It is 
important to recall that Arar was never charged with any offence and he was 
never a suspect of the Project AOC investigation.  Mr Arar was only ever a person 
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of interest to the investigation, about whom Project AOC made inquiries and never 
unearthed any evidence linking him to Al-Qaeda or any terrorist group. 
137. In October 2001, Project AOC sent a request to US and Canadian Customs officials 
to place Mr Arar, his wife (Dr Mazigh) and other individuals on border lookout lists.  
The request’s cover letter describes the subjects of the lookout request as ‘a 
group of Islamic Extremist individuals suspected to being linked to the Al Qaeda 
terrorist movement’.201  The request to US authorities would have been placed on 
US Custom’s TECS database.  Evidence of one expert witness at the Arar inquiry 
described this database as ‘the mother of all databases’, perhaps because there is 
no automatic removal of information from the database unless requested when 
the information is entered.202  Several US agencies have access to this database, 
including the CIA and the National Central Bureau (NCB) of Interpol in Washington 
DC.203  Without the benefit of the testimony of American officials, the inquiry could 
not determine how or whether this inflammatory misstatement affected the 
American view of Mr Arar. 
138. Another example of Project AOC providing unfair information about Mr Arar to 
American authorities occurred when Mr Arar was first detained in New York City.  
At the invitation of the FBI, a Project AOC officer faxed to the FBI a list of 
investigative questions to be asked of Mr Arar.  The information sent to the FBI 
included an assertion that Mr Arar was in the vicinity of Washington DC on 11 
September 2001, when in fact Mr Arar had actually been in San Diego on that 
day.  The fax also indicated that Mr Arar had refused to be interviewed by the 
RCMP and had ‘soon after...departed [Canada] rather suddenly for Tunisia’.204  
This information is untrue and cast Mr Arar in a very suspicious light.  Project 
                                        
201 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 62. 
202 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 61. 
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AOC’s fax did not include a written caveat, but it did include an explicit 
assessment that the RCMP had never been able to link Mr Arar with Al-Qaeda.   
3.2.4 Failure to caveat shared information 
139. Finally, the inquiry found that Project AOC ignored the RCMP policy to respect 
caveats and to seek the permission of the caveators before sharing their 
information.205   
140. RCMP procedure mandates the use of written caveats when sharing information 
with foreign agencies wherever the information ‘warrants safeguarding’ 
(“designated”) or is ‘sensitive to the national interest’ (“classified”).206  The Arar 
Commissioner endorsed this policy.  As examples of standard RCMP caveats in 
national security situations, the Commissioner quotes:207 
1. “This document is the property of the RCMP.  It is loaned to your 
agency/department in confidence and it is not be reclassified or further 
disseminated without the consent of the originator.” 
2. “This document is the property of the Government of Canada.  It is provided 
on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the 
receiving government and that it not be declassified without the express 
permission of the Government of Canada.” 
141. In the Arar case, the RCMP repeatedly failed to caveat information.  For example, 
the three CDs handed to the FBI and containing all of the investigation’s 
documents included caveated documents of CSIS and Canada Customs.208  This 
allowed US agents, without reference to the RCMP, to share this information with 
others, presumably including Syrian and Egyptian agencies. 
                                        
205 the policy in mentioned at: Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 
106. 
206 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 339ff. 
207 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 31. 
208 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 124. 
 – 56 –  
4 Legal obligations affecting information 
sharing 
142. The legal framework in which police operate domestically is well-defined.  
However, the legal framework in which police operate beyond their borders is less 
well-defined.  There are two situations in which policing has international 
consequences: first, when police travel abroad and act in a foreign jurisdiction; 
and second, when police act domestically but their actions have consequences 
abroad. 
143. Police can operate as state agents abroad, for example when police physically 
participate in operations in another country.  Complex questions of legal 
jurisdiction arise in these circumstances.  State agents abroad are bound by the 
law of the country in which they operate, but they also bound by their own 
domestic law.  These two sets of laws sometimes conflict, such as when only one 
of the legal systems prohibits executions. 
144. Police can also take actions within their own domestic jurisdiction that have 
consequences abroad, including adverse human rights consequences such as 
exposing someone to the real risk of torture or execution.  Questions of conflicting 
jurisdictions rarely arise in these circumstances because all actions occur 
domestically.  Some aspects of international cooperation in criminal law are well 
structured legally, such as extradition and mutual legal assistance law – both of 
which are strictly regulated by statute and treaty.  On the other hand, informal 
transnational police-to-police cooperation is only loosely regulated by domestic 
legislation and policy. 
145. This section briefly examines the domestic role of policing.  It then examines the 
domestic and international legal frameworks which have evolved to regulate it.  
Issues of international human rights law are dealt with in the next section, 
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because the role of that area of law in the regulation of policing is less well 
acknowledged or accepted. 
4.1 Domestic Obligations 
146. Domestic law defines and limits the powers of modern police.  In both Canada and 
Australia, the national police forces are established in legislation which also sets 
out the duties and goals of the force.209  In Canada, the RCMP Act expressly sets 
out the standards required of every member of the force, including ‘to respect the 
rights of all persons’.210  There are also constitutional limits, primarily arising from 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.211  I do not intend to trace these obligations 
in any detail here, only to point out their existence and importance.  The AFP Act 
has no equivalent respect-the-rights-of-all-persons provision; nor is there a single 
federal legislative or constitutional Bill of Rights. 
147. Policing can be seen as an organ of state power.  Max Weber once famously 
wrote that the state is defined by its success at monopolising the legitimate use of 
force in its territory.212  Police are one of the state institutions delegated to 
exercise this monopoly on violence.  Friedrichs argues that ‘there is no direct link 
from the legitimacy of force to its physical use’.213 To extend this legitimacy from 
theory to practice, Friedrichs traces a “chain of coercion” which connects the 
legitimisation of force to particular choices (made by the state) of coercive 
methods.  He identifies five links or 'levels' in this chain: discursive; juridical; 
legitimisation; authorisation; and operational.214  To maintain its monopoly on 
                                        
209 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 1985, RSC 1985, c.R-10; Australian Federal Police Act 1979 
(Cth).  See also: [153]-[155]. 
210 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 1985, RSC 1985, c.R-10, s.37(1).  There is also a Code of 
Conduct (Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988, SOR/88-361, Part III), made pursuant 
to RCMP Act, s.38. 
211 see e.g. James Stribopoulos, ‘In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the 
Charter’ (2005) 31 Queen's Law Journal 1 (the role of the judiciary in creating police powers). 
212 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1918). 
213 Jörg Friedrichs, Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and international police cooperation 
(Routledge, London: 2008) 6. 
214 Friedrichs (2008), n 213, 6-7. 
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violence, the state must control all five levels.  Applying these levels to policing, 
Friedrichs identifies the following stages of the justification for legitimate police 
violence:215  
1. normative discursive conceptualisation of deviant behaviour: that is,  
identifying the behaviours which require the intervention of state violence.  
Or put another way, deciding what is and is not a crime;  
2. juridical legitimisation of crime fighting: that is, deciding ‘what constitutes a 
legitimate and legal case for enforcement’ by police; 
3. selection of appropriate methods for the repression of crime: for example, 
whether strip-searching or torture is appropriate; 
4. authorisation for police intervention: that is, identifying the circumstances 
under which it is appropriate to exercise these powers; and,  
5. operational law enforcement: that is, exercising control over operational 
policing.  For example, through bodies which hold police accountable for 
their actions, such as courts and ombudsmen. 
148. Weberian theory, and Friedrichs’ analysis, are useful in this thesis to the extent 
that they offer an insight in to why and how the state defines and limits the 
powers of police.  This is a top-down approach, which places the role for defining 
legitimate force in the hands of the state.  At each of Friedrichs’ levels, there is a 
process of definition and, both implicitly and explicitly, limitation.  This is a very 
broad brush, which does not seek to account for the independent actions of 
individual officers.  It does not include, for example, an account for the discretion 
of police to exercise their powers in any given situation.  The Weberian theory 
exists at a ‘macro’ level, where the theory seeks to explore how the state decides 
when force is appropriate and how the state legitimises that decision.  For our 
purposes, we can draw from this analysis a conclusion that, politically, it is the 
state (constituted as government, parliament and courts) that decides what 
limitations will be placed on policing.  There must be a political will to limit policing 
                                        
215 Friedrichs (2008), n 213, 6-7. 
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on any given ground, and those limitations are expressed through policy, 
legislation and case law. 
149. Both the RCMP and AFP must comply with ministerial directions.216  In Australia, 
this is done by way of written ‘Ministerial Directions’,217 which sets out broad 
statements of expectations and priorities such as “contributing effectively to the 
Government's international law enforcement interests including matters involving 
cooperation to combat transnational organised crime...”.  The RCMP complies with 
several ministerial directives, including one on entering into information sharing 
and cooperation with domestic and foreign agencies.218 
4.1.1 the role and legal duties of police 
150. This short section examines the traditional domestic role of police and the source 
of their legal authority and duties.  
151. In the English-speaking world, the genesis of modern policing is generally 
attributed to the reforms instituted in England by Sir Robert Peel, who synthesised 
a uniquely English concept of policing in the establishment of the Metropolitan 
Police in 1828.219  Reiner identifies two main schools of thought on the creation of 
the Metropolitan Police by Peel.  In the ‘orthodox’ view, the Industrial Revolution 
led to a breakdown in law and order which required the creation of a police force 
to restore order.220  The English form of policing had its roots ‘in ancient traditions 
of communal self-policing’.221  The police, recruited from the general population, 
as opposed to from the gentry, were the protectors of the poor and working class, 
who were collectively perceived as the source of most crime.  In the ‘revisionist’ 
view, the new middle class, having profited from the redistribution of land and the 
                                        
216 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.37(2); Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. R-10, s.5(1). 
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218 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 321.  See also [455]. 
219 R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Oxford: OUP, 2000, 3rd ed); see also, Peter Manning, 
Police Work: the social organization of policing (Waveland Press: 1997, 2nd ed) 49, 72-9. 
220 Reiner (2000), n 219, 19ff. 
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Industrial Revolution, needed a police force to protect their position and property 
from the working class.222 
152. Whatever the impetus, the Metropolitan Police became a model for most of the 
English-speaking world.  It is a model based on low-profile legalistic consensual 
policing.  Reiner identifies eight policies that assisted the manufacture of this 
consent of the public to being policed:223  
a. creation of full-time merit-based professional force; 
b. respect for the Rule of Law, i.e. police are subject to the law; 
c. adoption of a strategy of minimal force, whereby force was an option 
of last resort; 
d. non-political constabulary, independent of government and 
government policy; 
e. police are not ‘above’ the citizenry, but citizens themselves; 
f. police perform a public service role; 
g. emphasis on preventative policing by uniformed officers, who visibly 
patrol the streets to deter crime; and, 
h. cultivating a perception of police as being effective at their ‘core 
mandate of crime control and order maintenance’. 
153. Contemporary police forces, like the Metropolitan Police of 1828, are creatures of 
statute.  Their primary functions are laid out in legislation, as are the duties of 
police officers to perform those functions.  All police officers must swear an oath 
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or affirmation that they will perform these duties.224  The duties of all RCMP 
officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner, include:225 
...the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada 
and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of 
criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody. 
154. The AFP’s enabling Act defines ‘police services’ as: ‘the prevention of crime and 
the protection of persons from injury or death, and property from damage...’.226  
The function of the Australian Federal Police includes the provision of police 
services in relation to the laws and property of the Commonwealth ‘and the 
safeguarding of Commonwealth interests’.227   
155. These duties and functions, it could be argued, constitute statutory duties.  This is 
certainly what the RCMP argued before the Iacobucci Inquiry.228  This duty is 
presented with unique challenges as police forces increasing recognise that much 
of the crime they are fighting requires transnational cooperation.  Indeed, in 2005, 
the AFP Act was amended inter alia to clarify ‘the scope of the functions of the 
Australian Federal Police in the current environment of increasingly globalised 
criminal activity and law enforcement responses...including in criminal 
investigations and major disaster situations’.229  As a consequence, the AFP’s 
functions now also include the provision of police services:230 
...for the purposes of assisting, or cooperating with, an Australian or foreign: 
  (i)  law enforcement agency; or  
(ii)  intelligence or security agency; or  
                                        
224 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 1985, RSC 1985, c.R-10, s.14(1) & Schedule ‘Oath of 
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(iii)  government regulatory agency; 
156. Police are also subject to other laws, such as the provisions of the relevant Privacy 
Acts.  The RCMP is also subject to the provisions of the constitutional Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  As Australia has no equivalent constitutional Bill 
of Rights, the AFP is not subject to a comprehensive human rights document.231 
157. In the context of transnational policing, the fundamental question becomes: what 
should police officers do if they are cooperating with a foreign agency and the 
laws of that foreign country conflict with the laws and obligations of the officer’s 
own country?  Which law should they obey?  Should they respect the sovereignty 
of the foreign country, or obey the law they are sworn to uphold?  This is another 
way of stating the questions discussed in this thesis. 
4.2 International Obligations 
158. There are two human rights issues which have attracted much controversy 
recently in the context of transnational policing.  The first is torture, in the context 
of counter-terrorism policing, in the context of a post-September-11 world.  
Specifically, the RCMP has been criticised for the manner in which it has shared 
information with US law enforcement agencies.  The second issue is the death 
penalty, in the context of the policing of the international drug trade and counter-
terrorism.  Specifically, the AFP has been criticised for the manner in which it has 
shared information with Indonesian and other South-East Asian police forces. 
4.2.1 To expose no one to the real risk of execution 
159. The obligation to expose no one to the real risk of execution does not appear 
expressly in any international human rights treaty.  Instead, it arises as an 
implication from state practice and UN treaty law.  This is analogous to the non-
refoulement implications found in extradition and mutual assistance law.  In that 
body of law, bilateral treaties sometimes expressly include protection against 
                                        
231 see “Domestic Obligations” on p.57. 
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refouement.  As Gilmore observes, such bilateral treaties sometimes go ‘above 
and beyond’ the individual protections found expressly in the UN human rights 
treaties.232  However, this level of protection is often only found in the UN human 
rights treaties by implication. 
160. The UN Human Rights Committee is the treaty-based committee responsible for 
interpreting the ICCPR and the Second Optional Protocol attached thereto.233  It is 
therefore appropriate to turn to its jurisprudence on this issue.  In 1997, the UN 
Human Rights Committee found that the Second Optional Protocol obliges 
ratifying nations not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution for any 
offence.  In 2003, the Committee found that the ICCPR itself places the same 
obligation on ratifying countries that have already abolished the death penalty. 
161. Both the ICCPR and the Second Optional Protocol are silent on the law of 
extradition.  They do not expressly prohibit the extradition of a fugitive to a 
retentionist nation. There is no mention of extradition in the Special Rapporteur’s 
report on the Second Optional Protocol. In 1994, some members of the UN 
Human Rights Committee were of the view that the Second Optional Protocol does 
not affect the law of extradition.234  However, the Committee’s jurisprudence has 
developed since then. 
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162. In 1997, the UN Human Rights Committee heard two important refoulement 
(return) cases against Australia: ARJ v Australia and GT v Australia.235 
163. ARJ, an Iranian national, was convicted of drug supply in Australia.  After he had 
served his sentence, Australia wanted to deport him to Iran.  Mr J complained to 
the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that if Australia deported him to Iran 
then it would violate his right to life (ICCPR Article 6).  On the case before them, 
the Committee accepted the evidence of Australia that Mr J was not at risk of 
execution if returned to Iran and therefore found that Australia would not violate 
the ICCPR by deporting Mr J. 
164. On the law, the Committee observed that the ICCPR does not ‘necessarily require 
Australia to refrain from deporting an individual to a State which retains capital 
punishment’.236  Relevantly, the beginning of Article 6 of the ICCPR states: 
Article 6 – Right to Life 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed 
only for the most serious crimes…  
165. Reading paragraphs 6(1) and 6(2) together, the Committee concluded that 
Australia would only violate the ICCPR if it exposed Mr J to a real risk of being 
executed for offences other than ‘the most serious crimes’.237  The Committee 
defined a ‘real risk’ as a ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’.238   
166. It is worth noting that this obligation applies to all state parties to the ICCPR, 
including those which still practice capital punishment.  Capital punishment is not 
prohibited by international customary law.239  Nor is it prohibited by the ICCPR, 
given that article 6(2) expressly contemplates such a penalty.  However, it does 
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not follow that all forms of capital punishment are acceptable or that retentionist 
countries are permitted to expose people to all forms of capital punishment.  
167. A few months after publishing its observations in ARJ v Australia, the Committee 
examined the case of GT v Australia.240  GT, an Australian citizen, was married to 
Mr T, a Malaysian citizen who was under threat of deportation from Australia to 
Malaysia.  Mr T had been convicted in Australia of importing drugs from Malaysia.  
After he had served his sentence, Australia wanted to deport him to his homeland.  
Mrs T complained to the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that if Australia 
deported her husband to Malaysia then it would violate his right to life (ICCPR 
Article 6) because drug offences in Malaysia attract a mandatory death sentence.  
On the facts before it, a majority of the Committee found no violation of the 
ICCPR because it accepted Australia’s evidence that Mr T would not face execution 
if returned to Malaysia. 
168. On the law, the Committee modified its interpretation of Australia’s human rights 
obligations.  The Committee observed that Australia has ratified the Second 
Optional Protocol, which imposes additional obligations.  Whereas the ICCPR 
imposes an obligation not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution for 
offences other than ‘the most serious crimes’, the Second Optional Protocol 
imposes a broader obligation not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution 
for any offence.   
169. In 2003, the Committee revisited and revised this jurisprudence.  The case of 
Judge v Canada involved a US citizen, Mr Judge, who was sentenced to death in 
the US for murder.  Mr Judge escaped his US prison and fled to Canada, where he 
committed two robberies and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.  When 
Canada tried to deport Mr Judge back to the United States, he sent a complaint to 
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the UN Human Rights Committee alleging a violation by Canada of his right to 
life.241 
170. The Committee departed from its earlier decision in ARJ and reinterpreted 
paragraphs 6(1) and 6(2) of the ICCPR:242 
Paragraph 1 of article 6, which states that “Every human being has the inherent 
right to life…” is a general rule: its purpose is to protect life. States parties that 
have abolished the death penalty have an obligation under this paragraph to so 
protect in all circumstances. …For countries that have abolished the death penalty, 
there is an obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its application. 
171. Unlike its earlier decision in ARJ v Australia, the Committee concluded that 
paragraph 6(2) only applies to those State parties that ‘have not abolished the 
death penalty’.  Therefore abolitionist countries are obliged by paragraph 6(1) to 
protect life in all circumstances.  The implied obligation on all abolitionist countries 
is that they will not expose anyone to the real risk of execution.  This is the same 
obligation implied under the Second Optional Protocol (GT v Australia).  The 
obligation attaches whether an abolitionist party to the ICCPR has ratified the 
Second Optional Protocol or not.243 
172. The Committee went on to conclude that Canada (an abolitionist country) would 
violate Mr Judge’s right to life by deporting him to the United States (a retentionist 
country) without first obtaining a guarantee that Mr Judge would not be executed. 
173. It should be observed that this is a negative obligation (an obligation to refrain 
from an action), not a positive obligation (a duty to act).  This point was made in 
a recent Canadian administrative law case in which a Canadian on death row in 
the US attempted to use Judge v Canada to argue that Canada was obliged to 
assist him.244  The Federal Court judge, while not using these words, essentially 
limited Judge v Canada to an obligation to refrain from any action that exposes a 
person to the real risk of the death penalty in another state. 
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174. I also note that in Judge v Canada the UN Human Rights Committee states that 
abolitionist nations are obliged to protect life in all circumstances.  This language 
is very general.  I would argue that this generality extends the obligation beyond 
these extradition cases and encompasses all actions by a State and its agents.  
This includes, for example, the actions of RCMP officers or AFP agents when 
cooperating or sharing information with foreign police agencies in retentionist 
countries.  This means that extra care must be taken when Canadian and 
Australian police cooperate with their counterparts from countries like the United 
States of America, Indonesia and the Peoples Republic of China. 
175. Finally, though it has not been asked to decide the issue, it is highly likely that the 
Committee would conclude that all parties to the ICCPR – both abolitionist and 
retentionist – must not expose any one to the real risk of a mandatory death 
sentence – even for ‘the most serious offences’.  This arises as an implication from 
the Committee’s expressed view that the automatic and mandatory imposition of a 
death sentence constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life and, as such, is a 
violation of an individual’s article 6(1) right to life.245  This arbitrariness cannot be 
cured or justified by article 6(2).  Therefore, an implication must arise that no 
state party to the ICCPR may expose anyone to the real risk of a mandatory death 
sentence. 
176. In summary, there are two degrees of this obligation for parties to the ICCPR.  For 
those parties which retain capital punishment: they must not expose anyone to 
the real risk of a mandatory death sentence or of execution for any offence other 
than for ‘the most serious crimes’.  For those parties which have abolished the 
death penalty and/or ratified the Second Optional Protocol: they must not under 
any circumstances expose anyone to the real risk of execution for any offence. 
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4.2.2 To expose no one to the real risk of torture 
177. The position with respect to torture is more straightforward and less controversial 
than it is for capital punishment. 
178. Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited 
by Article 7 of the ICCPR.  These forms of treatment are also prohibited by the UN 
Convention against Torture.246  The prohibition on torture is absolute247 and 
cannot be suspended or derogated during times of public emergency, including  
times of war.248  Torture is prohibited during times of war by Article 2 of the 
Convention against Torture, Article 4(2) of the ICCPR and by the Geneva 
Conventions which form part of international humanitarian law (the law of armed 
conflict).249  The International Criminal Court lists torture as a crime against 
humanity.250  So widely is torture condemned by the international community that 
it has attained the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens), which means that it 
‘enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 
“ordinary” customary rules’.251 
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179. The Convention against Torture requires states to criminalise the commission of, 
and participation or complicity in, torture.252  The Convention also expressly 
prohibits refoulement.253  The Convention also expressly extends a party’s 
jurisdiction extraterritorially and universally.254   
180. An implication arises from the Convention that states must not expose anyone to 
the real risk of torture.  According to Professor Peter Burns, a state violates the 
Convention if it shares information knowing that the information will be used to 
torture someone.255 
181. The Arar Commission was unequivocal in its recommendation that ‘[i]nformation 
should never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it 
will cause or contribute to the use of torture’.256   
182. Recently, a senior CSIS lawyer who would not rule out cooperation in potential 
torture cases was publicly contradicted by the head of CSIS before the same 
House of Commons Committee.257  The RCMP remains less than absolute, in 
evidence to the same committee:258 
I would like to be clear that there is no absolute ban on the use of any information 
received by the RCMP. However, we do not use information whose reliability, 
accuracy, and relevance is suspect. Information knowingly extracted under torture 
would by definition be unreliable. In the real world, the challenge is to make a 
judgment on the known facts about whether any particular information received is 
the result of torture. Our policy is based on making such assessments on a case-
by-case basis. 
                                        
252 Convention against Torture, n 246, Article 4. 
253 Convention against Torture, n 246, Article 3. 
254 Convention against Torture, n 246, Article 5.  See the excellent analysis of Convention 
jurisdiction in: Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: a commentary (2008) 116-7 & 308-21. 
255 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 52. 
256 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 14, 345. 
257 evidence of Mr. Geoffrey O'Brian (Advisor, Operations and Legislation, CSIS) to Standing 
Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House of Commons (31 March 2009), 15-17.  
See also: ‘Official misspoke; CSIS says it’s not involved in torture’ (2 April 2009) The Star 
(Toronto), <http://www.thestar.com/article/612514>. 
258 evidence of Chief Superintendent Gilles Michaud (Director General, National Security Criminal 
Operations Branch, RCMP) to Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House of 
Commons (31 March 2009), 4. 
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183. The AFP Commissioner says that the AFP, when acting abroad, attempts ‘as best 
we can’ to adhere to Australia’s obligations against torture.259  This statement is 
less than absolute.  However, when the Australian Attorney-General Phillip 
Ruddock publicly supported the Bush Administration view that sleep deprivation is 
not torture, Commissioner Keelty stridently contradicted him and stated that it was 
indeed a form of torture and the AFP did not practice it.260 
4.2.3 international treaties 
184. There are some international criminal law treaties which expressly raise 
obligations for police-to-police cooperation in the investigation of crime.  Many of 
these are administered by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):261 the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (‘the TOC 
Convention’) and the Protocols attached thereto;262 the anti-drug conventions; and 
counter-terrorism treaties. 
185. The TOC Convention has been ratified by both Canada and Australia.263  The TOC 
Convention relates to the ‘prevention, investigation and prosecution’ of ‘serious 
offences’ conducted transnationally by organised criminal groups.  ‘Serious 
offences’ are those attracting a term of imprisonment of 4 or more years,264 as 
well as laundering the proceeds of crime,265 corruption of public officials,266 and 
obstructing the course of justice with respect to these offences.  The Convention 
                                        
259 Mark Dodd, ‘Sleep tactic is torture: Keelty’ (5 October 2006) The Australian (Sydney) 3. 
260 Mark Dodd, ‘Sleep tactic is torture: Keelty’ (5 October 2006) The Australian (Sydney) 3.  The 
Chief of the Australian Army also contradicted Ruddock publicly on this point: Sarah Smiles, ‘Army 
contradicts Ruddock on torture’ (2 November 2006) The Age (Melbourne) 2. 
261 website: <www.unodc.org>. 
262 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 [2004] ATS 12 (entered into force 
internationally and for Canada on 29 September 2003; entered into force for Australia, 26 June 
2004).  See generally: David McClean, International Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters 
(2002, 2nd ed), 221-3. 
263 Canada ratified on 13 May 2002; Australia ratified on 27 May 2004. 
264 TOC Convention, Article 2 (‘serious offence’). 
265 TOC Convention, Article 6. 
266 TOC Convention, Article 8. 
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relates to conspiracy, ‘organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or 
counselling’ these proscribed offences.267 
186. The TOC Convention contains provisions for inter alia extradition (Article 16), 
mutual legal assistance (Article 18) and cooperation with respect to the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime (Article 13).  Article 19 encourages the 
establishment of joint investigation teams, under bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.  Article 27 of the TOC Convention requires State Parties to cooperate 
closely with one another in terms of law enforcement (police-to-police) 
cooperation: 
States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their 
respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness 
of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention. 
Each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures: [inter alia] ... to 
facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of 
the offences covered by this Convention... 
187. Further, as the UNODC points out in relation to both the TOC Convention and the 
Convention against Corruption:268 
This general obligation to cooperate is not absolute; rather, it is to be conducted 
consistent with [a State party’s] domestic legal and administrative systems. This 
clause gives States parties the ability to condition or refuse cooperation in specific 
instances in accordance with their respective requirements. 
188. There are three protocols attached to the TOC Convention, relating to people 
trafficking;269 migrant smuggling;270 and, the illegal arms trade.271  Canada and 
                                        
267 TOC Convention, Article 5. 
268 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide for the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (2004) 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime_convention_legislative_guides.html>, [504].  The 
identical explanation appears in the legislative guide for the Convention against Corruption: 
UNODC, Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (2006), [643].  For more on the Convention against Corruption, see [189]. 
269 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
2000 [2005] ATS 27 (entered into force internationally and for Canada, 25 December 2003; 
entered into force for Australia, 14 October 2005).  Australia ratified on 14 September 2005, with a 
declaration that the treaty does not oblige Australia to admit anyone to, or retain anyone in, 
Australia. 
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Australia have ratified the first two and signed the third.  A signature indicates an 
intention to ratify at a later date; upon ratification, a treaty is binding at 
international law.  These protocols supplement the TOC Convention and extend 
the obligations of the parent convention, relating to law enforcement cooperation, 
to their subject crimes. Each of the protocols, subject to the parent Convention as 
well as domestic law and other international obligations, places additional 
obligations on information sharing, related to the nature of the subject crime, and 
expressly reserves the receiver’s right to restrict the use of such information.  For 
example, Article 10 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol places additional obligations 
for information sharing, such as intelligence on the modus operandi of organised 
smuggling groups, the theft of travel documents and the sharing of technology to 
fight this crime.272  The Arms Trafficking Protocol also allows for the confidentiality 
of legitimate commercial information, though it does not penalise the disclosure of 
such information.273  These protocols also encourage other forms of transborder 
cooperation. 
189. Article 48 of the UN Convention against Corruption (CAC) also obliges close law 
enforcement cooperation, in almost identical terms to article 27 of the TOC 
Convention.274  The CAC Convention also encourages joint investigative teams, in 
terms similar to the TOC Convention.275 
                                                                                                                      
270 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 2000 [2004] ATS 11 (entered 
into force internationally and for Canada, 28 January 2004; entered into force for Australia, 26 
June 2004). 
271 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition 2001 [2002] ATNIF 7 (entered into force internationally, 3 July 2005; 
not in force for Canada or Australia). Canada signed on 20 March 2002; Australia signed on 21 
December 2001.  As at 1 June 2009, neither Canada nor Australia have ratified this Protocol: UN 
Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), 12.c, 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
c&chapter=18&lang-=en>. 
272 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, n 270, article 10.  See also: Arms Trafficking Protocol, n 271, 
article 12; and, People Trafficking Protocol, n 269, article 10. 
273 Arms Trafficking Protocol, n 271, article 12(5): ‘If such confidentiality cannot be maintained, the 
State Party that provided the information shall be notified prior to its disclosure’. 
274 Convention against Corruption 2003 [2006] ATS 2 (entry into force: internationally, 14 
December 2005; for Australia, 6 January 2006; for Canada, 1 November 2007). 
275 Convention against Corruption, n 274, article 49.  See also: [186]. 
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190. There are three main international narcotics conventions: The Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs (1961), as amended by the Protocol of 25 March 1972; 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); and, the Convention against the 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988).  Australia and 
Canada have ratified all of these conventions.276  Both the Single Convention and 
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances oblige a party to ‘ensure that 
international co-operation between the appropriate agencies be conducted in an 
expeditious manner’.277  The Convention against Illicit Trafficking obliges parties to 
enter into agreements to facilitate ‘the secure and rapid exchange of information’, 
‘to cooperate with one another in conducting enquiries, with respect to offences 
[proscribed by the Convention], having an international character’ and to facilitate 
the establishment of joint investigative teams.278 
191. In 2008, the Executive Director of UNODC delivered a speech in Vienna to 
celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs:279 
Finally, last but certainly not least, human rights. Our work is guided first and 
foremost by the UN Charter that commits signatories to fundamental freedoms, 
and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 60 years old this year.   
                                        
276 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 [1967] ATS 31 (entered into force internationally and 
for Canada, 13 December 1964; entered into force for Australia, 31 December 1967); Protocol 
amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 30 March 1961, 1972 [1975] ATS 33 
(entered into force internationally and for Australia, 8 August 1975; entry into force for Canada, 4 
September 1976); Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 [1982] ATS 14 (entered into force 
internationally, 16 August 1976; entered into force for Australia, 17 August 1982; entry into force 
for Canada, 9 December 1988); and, the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 [1993] ATS 4 (entered into force internationally and for Canada, 11 
November 1990; entered into force for Australia, 14 February 1993). 
277 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by 1972 Protocol), n 276, article 35(d); and, 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, n 276, article 21(d). 
278 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, n 276, 
article 9. 
279 Antonio Maria Costa (Executive Director of UNODC), speech delivered to the 51st session of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna (10 March 2008), 
<http://www.unodc.org/india/cnd_ed_remarks.html>. 
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In Article 25 of the Universal Declaration, health is listed as a basic human right. 
As we emphasize the health aspects of drug control, it stands to reason that 
implementation of the drug Conventions must proceed with due regard to human 
rights. Thus far, there has been little attention paid to this aspect of our work. This 
definitely needs to be amended. Although drugs kill, I don't believe we need to kill 
because of drugs.   The UN drug Conventions have left it to individual states to 
deal with health care and crime retribution, in relation with the specific cultural 
and judicial contexts. Mindful of this, today I propose that Member States extend 
the concept of harm reduction to include the need to give serious consideration to 
whether the imposition of capital punishment for drug-related crimes is a best 
practice. 
The recent General Assembly moratorium suggests a way forward. More must be 
done to bridge the gap between international standards and the right of individual 
nations to decide in this difficult area. As the custodian of the judicial standards 
and norms set by the World Crime Congresses, UNODC insists on the importance 
of translating them into national laws and practice. 
192. The United Nations lists thirteen major anti-terrorism instruments.280  Australia 
and Canada have ratified all but one of the treaties.281  Several of these treaties 
contain a general obligation to cooperate in the prevention of their subject crimes 
by exchanging information generally.282  This obligation is general and does not 
refer explicitly to police-to-police cooperation. 
193. Canada and Australia are party to other international instruments which create 
criminal offences and require the transnational cooperation of police.  For 
example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 283 is parent to an optional 
protocol prohibiting sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child 
sex tourism.284  Article 6 of this optional protocol obliges parties to provide ‘the 
                                        
280 United Nations, ‘UN Action to Counter Terrorism: international instruments to counter terrorism’, 
<http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml>, accessed 1 June 2009. 
281 see “Appendix 2: International Counter-Terrorism Instruments” for details.  As at 1 June 2009, 
neither Canada nor Australia had ratified the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, which is not yet in 
force internationally. 
282 e.g. Diplomatic Agents Convention, article 4; Hostages Convention, article 4; Maritime 
Convention, article 13; Terrorist Bombing Convention, article 15; Terrorist Financing Convention, 
article 18(3); Nuclear Terrorism Convention (not yet in force), article 7.  See “Appendix 2: 
International Counter-Terrorism Instruments” for full citations. 
283 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 [1991] ATS 4 (entry into force internationally, 2 
September 1990; for Australia, 16 January 1991; for Canada, 12 January 1992). 
284 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography 2000 [2007] ATS 6 (entry into force internationally, 18 January 
2002; for Canada, 14 October 2005; for Australia, 8 February 2007). 
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greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or 
extradition proceedings’ relating to the offences proscribed by the protocol.  
Article 10 obliges parties to ‘take all necessary steps to strengthen international 
cooperation...for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and 
punishment’ of the protocol’s proscribed offences. 
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5 Extraterritorial human rights obligations 
194. I now turn to the question of whether, and to what extent, a country’s 
international human rights obligations extend to transnational policing.  There are 
two aspects to this question: whether human rights obligations apply to the 
actions of police abroad (the offshore aspect); and whether human rights 
obligations apply to the domestic actions of police which have consequences 
beyond their territorial borders (the onshore aspect).  This question requires an 
examination of the extraterritorial application of international human rights law 
and the obligations it imposes, if any, on state agents acting abroad and on 
domestic actions with international consequences.  
195. The question of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is unsettled 
at international law.  It is a question of public international law.285 The 
jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee, International Court of Justice 
and European Court of Human Rights cannot always be reconciled.  I will examine 
this shortly. 
196. There can be no question that transnational policing should respect human rights.  
This principle can be found in police practice as well as law.  For example, it is a 
founding principle of Interpol.  Interpol’s Constitution states that its mission is to 
promote mutual assistance ‘in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’.286  The commitment is also reflected in more recent Interpol instruments, 
such as the Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, which includes in its 
Preamble this recital: ‘Aware of the need for police co-operation to respect human 
rights’.287  Indeed, many of the more recent human rights instruments require 
                                        
285 Dominic McGoldrick, 'Extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights', in Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga (ed), Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (2004) 44. 
286 see [54]. 
287 Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, 
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/Model.asp>. 
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police-to-police cooperation to combat transnational human rights violations such 
as people trafficking and child pornography. 
197. This section deals only with specific obligations found, expressly or by implication, 
in international human rights law.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
examination of all the international legal obligations under which police operate.  I 
focus on two human rights issues which have attracted criticism in transnational 
policing practice: the death penalty and torture.  While the obligations with 
respect to torture arise as  jus cogens in international law and expressly in UN 
treaty law, the obligations with respect to the death penalty arise as implications 
from state practice and UN treaty law.  These obligations are important because 
they set the parameters within which Australian and Canadian police ought to 
cooperate transnationally. 
198. A state is expected to give more than lip-service to these obligations: a state is 
expected to do, or refrain from doing, certain things.  At international human 
rights law, a state should respect, protect and fulfil human rights.288  These 
obligations derive from the UN Charter and international human rights treaties 
such as the ICCPR and Convention against Torture.289  Transnational policing is a 
                                        
288 Manfred Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: commentary (2005, 2nd 
ed), [2.18]-[2.20].  See also: Christopher McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ in Colin 
Harvey (ed), Human Rights in the Community (2005, Hart Publishing) 12 (citing Henry Shue, Basic 
Rights (1996)).  See also: Sigrun Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights 
Obligations in International Cooperation (2006) 66-72; and, Fons Coomans, ‘Some Remarks on the 
Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 
in Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(2004) 192-9 (in the context of ICESCR).  For a commentary of these obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights see: Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2004) 59ff. 
289 Charter of the United Nations (1945) [1945] ATS 1 (entry into force internationally, 24 October 
1945; for Australia, 1 November 1945; for Canada, 9 November 1945), Articles 1 & 2.  See also 
discussion in: Skogly, n 288, 74-5.  For commentary on ICCPR Art 2, see: UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 31: the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States 
parties (26 May 2004) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [2].  See also discussion in: Crawshaw et 
al (2007), n 623, 4-5.  A similar purpose is stated in Article 1 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms according to which contracting parties are 
obliged to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ set out in the 
Convention. 
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function of the state and, unlike military action, there is no reason to believe that 
human rights law does not apply to transnational policing at all times. 
5.1 extraterritorial jurisdiction under public 
international law 
199. At public international law, the principle of national sovereignty generally ensures 
that police acting within their own national territory are free to do whatever they 
wish, subject to domestic and international law, no matter the consequences 
beyond domestic borders.  There are also several sources of jurisdiction 
authorising the extraterritorial actions of domestic police, which I cover below 
briefly. 
200. That the State is responsible for the actions of its agents, acting in their official 
capacity, has long been recognised in customary international law and is codified 
in Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility.290 
201. At public international law, jurisdiction refers to the right of a state to legislate, 
enforce and adjudicate its domestic law.291  A state's right to exercise jurisdiction 
derives from its sovereignty as a state.292  There are three forms of jurisdiction: 
legislative (also called prescriptive or substantive); executive (aka administrative); 
and, judicial.293  Legislative jurisdiction is, generally, vested in parliament; 
                                        
290 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
introduction, text and commentaries (2005) 94-5.  Note: the ILA’s Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts (2001) do not have force of law.  They have only been noted 
and commended, on three occasions, to States by the UN General Assembly: A/RES/56/83 (12 
December 2001), A/RES/59/35 (2 December 2004) and A/RES/62/61 (8 January 2008). 
291 Antonio Cassesse, International Law (2005, 2nd ed) 49. 
292 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 1 (Peace) (1992, 9th ed) 457.  See also: 
Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law (1998, 5th ed) 301. 
293 Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 456; and, Brownlie (1998), n 292, 301.  
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executive jurisdiction in government and its agents, such as police officers; and, 
judicial jurisdiction in the courts.294 
202. A state's jurisdiction is primarily territorial.295  Everyone within a state's territory is 
subject to its jurisdiction.296  The definition of territory includes land, domestic 
waterways, territorial sea and airspace.297  This basis of jurisdiction is sometimes 
referred to as the territoriality principle.  This principle includes criminal offences 
with a foreign aspect, such as crimes commencing or terminating abroad, or 
crimes which have a 'real and substantial connection' to a state.298  This could 
found a quasi extraterritorial jurisdiction upon which to justify transnational 
policing activities.  For example, AFP involvement in drug trafficking investigations 
in Indonesia where illicit drugs are likely to be imported into Australia from 
Indonesia. 
                                        
294 see e.g. R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [58]. 
295 Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 458; Brownlie (1998), n 292, 301; and, F. A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law, Twenty Years Later’ (1984) 3 Receuil du Cours 19, 22.  See also: 
R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [61]; and, Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 
52207/99, [59]. 
296 Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 458; and, Mann (1984), n 295, 22.  However, international law 
recognises that a foreign state has a right to claim exemption from local jurisdiction 'chiefly for 
itself, its Head of State, its diplomatic envoys, its warships and its armed forces abroad': 
Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 460-1.  The immunity also extends to Heads of Government and 
Foreign Ministers: Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium [2002] ICJ 1, [51] & [54].  This 
immunity belongs to the state (not the bearer of office) and the state may waive this immunity: 
DRC v Belgium [2002], [61].  By virtue of express treaty provision, this immunity does not bar 
prosecution by certain international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court: DRC 
v Belgium [2002], [61]. In the DRC v Belgium, the ICJ found that Belgium had breached 
international law by issuing an international arrest warrant for the incumbent Foreign Minister of 
the DRC.  Under customary international law, the jurisdiction over diplomatic envoys encompasses 
the staff of embassies and consulates: Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 
52207/99, [59]; and, Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [97] (per Lord 
Carswell). 
297 Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 146.  See also: Blunden v Cth [2003] HCA 73, [74] (Kirby J). 
298 Robert J. Currie & Stephen Coughlan, ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Bigger Picture or 
Smaller Frame?’ (2007) 11 Canadian Criminal Law Review 141, 146.  At 146, Currie & Coughlan 
describe three theories which 'stretch' territorial jurisdiction to foreign territory, namely: the 
initiatory (subjective) principle; the terminatory (objective) principle; and the 'more modern and 
less orthodox approach' of real and substantial connection, which usually means that 'a significant 
portion of the activities have taken place' on domestic territory. 
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203. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights of other states.299  According to an often criticised decision of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice from 1927, a state can only exercise its 
jurisdiction outside its territory 'by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention'.300 
204. However, international law recognises several exceptions to the territoriality 
principle.  By definition, any exercise of jurisdiction that is not based on the 
territoriality principle is an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.301  There are 
several principles upon which a claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be based.  
The nationality principle is well-established in public international law.  It grants a 
state jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.302  According to Currie and Coughlan, 
this principle also encompasses permanent residents and foreign citizens serving 
in a state’s military and is commonly asserted by those countries which refuse to 
extradite their own nationals.303   
205. Of more recent formulation, and therefore more controversial, are claims of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens in foreign territory.304  The protective 
principle  grants a state ('the first state') jurisdiction over aliens who commit, on 
the territory of another state, offences against the first state.  These are generally 
offences which threaten national security or the ‘dignity of the sovereign’, but also 
                                        
299 see e.g. Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [59]; R v Hape 
[2007] 2 SCR 292, [62]. 
300 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (1927) PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, [18]-[19].  For commentary on the 
Lotus decision, see e.g.: Cassese (2005), n 291, 50-1.  For criticism of the Lotus decision, see e.g.: 
Brownlie (1998), n 292, 314. 
301 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: international law and how we use it (1994) 73. 
302 Mann (1984), n 295, 24ff (a personal link between state and subject); and, Brownlie (1998), n 
292, 306 (based on who commits the extraterritorial [criminal] act). See also: Oppenheim (1992), 
n 292, 462; Higgins (1994), n 2, 73; Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 146-7; and, Bernhardt 
(1992), n 327, 338.  See further, Cassese (2005), n 291, 451, dividing nationality into two classes: 
active nationality, where the accused is a national; and passive nationality, where the victim is a 
national.  The latter category is more often referred to as the ‘passive personality principle’ and I 
deal with it as such: see also, n 306 below.  For judicial comment, see: R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 
292, [60]-[64]. 
303 Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 146. 
304 Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 466ff. 
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include crimes such as sedition and counterfeiting.305  The passive personality 
principle founds jurisdiction over aliens who, in the territory of another state, 
commit crimes against nationals of the first state.306  The universal principle 
founds jurisdiction over aliens on foreign territory who commit acts which offend 
the public policy of the international community.307  These acts are usually 
international crimes such as 'genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity, 
piracy, slavery, aggression [and] torture'.308  These offences are crimes under 
international law and need not be defined in domestic law to found universal 
jurisdiction.309  Universal jurisdiction is unusual because no link between the state 
and the impugned foreign act or actor is required.310  The exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is often justified by claims of upholding the rule of law in territories 
where it has ceased to operate effectively.311 
                                        
305 Brownlie (1998), n 292, 307 (also known as the ‘security principle’); Higgins (1994), n 2, 73 
(noting that this principle is unproblematic); and, Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 147 (these 
crimes against ‘the dignity of the sovereign’ also found jurisdiction for regulating foreign polluters).  
306 Cassese argues that this is a species of the nationality principle, which he calls ‘passive 
nationality’ based on the nationality of the victim; as opposed to ‘active nationality’, where the 
criminal accused is a national: Cassese (2005), n 291, 451.  While there is a certain logic to this 
categorisation, it should be avoided because it obscures a fundamental underlying difference 
between the two principles, i.e. that in its passive form jurisdiction is asserted over an alien, not a 
national.  For the passive personality principle, see: Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 466ff; Brownlie 
(1998), n 292, 306ff; Higgins (1994), n 2, 74; and, Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 147 (noting 
that the USA exercises this jurisdiction regularly). 
307 Brownlie (1998), n 292, 307ff.  See also: Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 466ff; Cassese (2005), n 
291, 451; Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 147-8; and, R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [61]. 
308 Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 148.  Brownlie cautiously adds hijacking and narcotics 
trafficking to this list: Brownlie (1998), n 292, 308.  Oppenheim cautiously adds terrorism to this 
list, as well as 'the most serious violations of human rights such as torture': Oppenheim (1992), n 
292, 466ff.  The significance of these additions is that they exist at customary international law, 
independent of treaty law, and may grant jurisdiction to states which have not ratified the relevant 
international treaties.  Cassese notes that universal jurisdiction is controversial because it is open 
to abuse as a tool to hinder a foreign official from performing his or her lawful duties abroad: 
Cassese (2005), n 291, 451.  While this is true, the doctrine of state immunity will temper such 
abuse, as in the case of Congo v Belgium: see n 296 above. 
309 Brownlie (1998), n 292, 308ff. 
310 see Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 148, noting that the impugned actor is deemed an enemy 
of humanity (hostis humani generis). 
311 Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 165. 
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206. Extraterritorial jurisdiction can also be conferred by treaty.312  Where jurisdiction is 
granted by treaty it is uncontroversial because it is recognised by the consent of 
the ratifying parties.  Such is the complex law aboard civilian ships, aircraft and 
spacecraft, which generally confers on the state whose flag is being flown 
exclusive jurisdiction when the vessel is in international waters, airspace or space, 
and concurrent jurisdiction when within the territory of another state.313  Universal 
jurisdiction is increasingly being conferred by treaty, for example over the 
suppression of terrorist activities,314 the protection of diplomats, UN personnel and 
other ‘internationally protected persons’,315 the protection of nuclear materials316 
and the protection of human rights.317  
207. However, all these bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction are subordinate to 
territorial jurisdiction.318  In theory, where conflict arises from the concurrent 
jurisdiction of two or more states, the state with territorial jurisdiction will have 
precedence.  Absent military occupation, a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction on 
foreign territory without the foreign state’s consent, invitation or acquiescence.319  
This accords with the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
                                        
312 see The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (1927) PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, [18]-[19] (‘jurisdiction...cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention’, emphasis added).  For a list of legislative sources of 
the exercise of Canadian prescriptive jurisdiction of these treaties, see Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 
298, 148ff.  
313 Bernhardt (1992), n 327, 338.  See also: Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 479ff;  
314 e.g. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian Aviation (1971); Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988); 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979); International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and, International Convention for the suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
315 e.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); and, Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel (1994). 
316 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980). 
317 e.g. Convention Against Torture (1984); and, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2000). 
318 Higgins (1994), n 301, 73.  See also: Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 
52207/99, [60]. 
319 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (1927) PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, [18].  See also: Bankovic et al v 
Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [60]; R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [65]; and, 
Oppenheim (1992), n 292, [137]. 
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interference at international law.320  This is why the Canadian Supreme Court 
found that, absent consent of the foreign territorial sovereign, Canadian law 
cannot be enforced outside of Canada.321 
208. Because there are several bases for jurisdiction, state jurisdiction is not always 
exclusive.322  More than one state may have a legitimate basis from which to 
assert jurisdiction over property, people or events.  For example, a state (‘the first 
state’) maintains jurisdiction over its nationals abroad, based on the nationality 
principle.  That jurisdiction is concurrent with the territorial jurisdiction of the 
foreign state in which a national resides abroad.  While the first state is free to 
exercise its extraterritorial legislative and judicial jurisdiction over its nationals 
living abroad, an attempt to exercise its executive jurisdiction is more 
problematic.323  The exercise of legislative and judicial jurisdiction extraterritorially 
is rarely controversial because it occurs on the sovereign territory of the first 
state.  In its own territory, a state’s parliament is free to pass laws which purport 
to have extraterritorial application and its courts are free to apply those laws.  
Generally, controversy only arises when a state seeks to exercise its executive 
jurisdiction outside its territory, especially without the consent of the territorial 
sovereign.   
209. According to Brownlie, extraterritorial acts will only be lawful when a state 
observes three general principles:324 
a. ‘there should be a substantial and bona fide connection between the 
subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction’;325 
                                        
320 see also: Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium [2002] ICJ 1, [1]. 
321 R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [69].  
322 Brownlie (1998), n 292, 314. 
323 see Currie & Coughlan (2007), n 298, 144; and R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [60] & [64]. 
324 Brownlie (1998), n 292, 313. 
325 in obiter, Kirby J adopted Brownlie’s formulation to extend the territorial limitation on the 
competence of Australian courts: Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] HCA 10, 
[105] (Kirby J dissenting).  See also: Blunden v Cth [2003] HCA 73, [72]-[74] (Kirby J concurring).   
In a discussion of prescriptive jurisdiction, Oppenheim prefers a slightly different formulation: 
‘there being between the subject matter and the state exercising jurisdiction a sufficiently close 
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b. the principle of non-interference must be observed; and,  
c. accommodation, mutuality and proportionality should inform exercise 
of this jurisdiction. 
210. The principles of accommodation and mutuality derive from what is sometimes 
called ‘the comity of nations’.326  Since all nations are equal at international law, 
states should seek to accommodate each other’s wishes and exhibit mutual 
respect.  The principle of proportionality requires a state to minimise any 
interference with the concurrent jurisdiction of another state, in other words to 
only do what is necessary and no more.327   
211. In summary, transnational policing is an exercise of extraterritorial executive 
jurisdiction.  For any act of transnational policing to be lawful at public 
international law, then the consent of local authorities must be obtained and the 
extraterritorial acts should be grounded in treaty law or one of the recognised 
jurisdictional principles (territoriality, nationality, protective, passive personality or 
universal). 
5.2 extraterritorial jurisdiction under international 
human rights law 
212. Over the last half century or so, claims that human rights treaties have 
extraterritorial application have increased.  Over that time, a growing consensus 
has evolved that the legitimacy and pervasiveness of human rights law is 
underpinned by its universality.328  Tomuschat, in his essay on the universality of 
human rights, notes that the concept is often criticised as a uniquely Western 
                                                                                                                      
connection to justify that state in regulating the matter and perhaps also to override any 
competing rights of other states’ (emphasis added): Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 457-8. 
326 see Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: Collected Papers – Volume 3 (Law of Peace) (1977) 
222ff (criticising term ‘comity of nations’ as a redundant synonym for ‘international law’).  The 
concept of nations acting as ‘good neighbours’ is also codified in the Preamble of the UN Charter; 
while the doctrine of sovereign equality is laid down in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. 
327 Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1992) Volume 2 (E-I), 341. 
328 see e.g. [5.2.3] re: Ben-Naftali (2006), n 378.  
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view.329  In response to such criticisms, Tomuschat quotes former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan:330 
It was never the people who complained of the universality of human rights, nor 
did the people consider human rights as a Western or Northern imposition.  It was 
often their leaders who did so. 
213. There are two main bodies charged with interpreting international human rights 
law: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Human Rights Committee. 
There are other treaty body committees, but they have generally followed the 
established jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and the ICJ on the 
question of jurisdiction.  Because the ICJ has, by and large, endorsed the Human 
Rights Committee’s view of extraterritorial jurisdiction, I begin with a review of the 
Committee’s jurisprudence. 
5.2.1 UN Human Rights Committee 
214. The UN Human Rights Committee is firmly of the view that a State party to the 
ICCPR can “be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which 
its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the 
acquiescence of the government of the State or in opposition to it”.331  With 
respect to article 2 of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
commented that:332 
...a State Party must respect and ensure that rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.   
...This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the 
forces or a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances 
in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting 
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or 
peace-enforcement operation. 
215. This places transnational policing well within the jurisdiction of the ICCPR. 
                                        
329 Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 69ff.  
330 Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 94. 
331 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.3]. 
332 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 (2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [10]. 
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caselaw 
216. The leading cases from the UN Human Rights Committee come from the 1980s 
and involve what we would today call ‘extraordinary rendition’: the abduction of 
people on foreign soil and taking them elsewhere for detention and torture.  The 
offending state party in these cases was Uruguay. 
217. While the cases deal with the issue of extraterritoriality in the substantive body of 
their conclusions, the question is more one of admissibility as it deals with the 
competence of the Committee to hear the application before it.  The first two 
cases make this mistake, but the third correctly deals with this issue as a 
preliminary question. 
218. In 1976, Uruguayan agents, assisted by Argentinean authorities, arrested, 
detained and tortured Mr Burgos, who had been granted political asylum in 
Argentina.333  Burgos was then unlawfully taken back to Uruguay, where he was 
held in communicado, tortured and put on trial. 
219. The Committee had to consider the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction because Mr 
Burgos was first arrested and detained in Argentina.  The Committee noted that 
Articles 1 (“individuals subject to its jurisdiction”) and 2(1) (“individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction”) were no bar to this complaint.334  With 
reference to Article 1, the Committee noted that this is not a reference to location 
of an alleged breach of Covenant rights, but rather to “the relationship between 
the individual and the State” in relation to such a breach.335 
                                        
333 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979.  This complaint was brought by Mr 
Burgos’ wife against Uruguay.  No complaint could be made against Argentina, which was not then 
a signatory to the First Optional Protocol.  Identical reasoning and conclusions were delivered in 
the case of Casariego v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 56/1979.  In that case, Ms Casariego 
was a Uruguayan exile living in Italy.  She and her young family travelled to Brazil, where they 
were arrested by Uruguayan agents, with the assistance of two Brazilian police officers: at [2.2].  
They were separated and taken to Uruguay. 
334 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.1]. 
335 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.2]. 
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220. In relation to Article 2(1), the Committee said:336 
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect 
and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held 
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit 
upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the 
Government of that State or in opposition to it. 
221. The Committee relied on Article 5(1) of the Covenant to support their view.  
Article 5(1) states that the Covenant should not be interpreted to imply a right to 
act in a manner destructive of Covenant rights and freedoms ‘to a greater extent 
than is provided for’ in the Covenant. The Committee concluded that:337 
… it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of 
the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant 
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its 
own territory. 
222. Zwart is critical of the UN Human Rights Committee’s reasoning in the Uruguay 
cases.338  In these cases, the Committee invoked Article 5(1), which states that 
nothing in the Covenant can be interpreted to defeat the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Covenant.  This is a purposive interpretative provision, giving 
precedence to the purpose of the Covenant (to protect human rights).  However, 
Zwart argues that Article 5(1) cannot be invoked if Article 2(1) dictates that the 
Covenant does not apply because the complaint falls outside Covenant jurisdiction 
of the State Party: ‘Article 5 of the Covenant can only be invoked if the Covenant 
is applicable, and that was the question the Committee had to answer in the first 
place’.  In other words, the question of jurisdiction is a ‘gateway’ issue.  If there is 
jurisdiction, then the Committee is competent to hear the complaint and then, and 
only then, may the Committee examine the Covenant’s other provisions (such as 
Article 5).  If there is no jurisdiction, then the Committee is not competent to hear 
                                        
336 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.3]. 
337 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.3]. 
338 Tom Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: The Case Law of the European 
Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee (1994, Springer) 95. 
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the complaint and the text of the Covenant is not relevant.  I agree with Zwart’s 
assessment that the Committee’s finding is ultra vires. 
223. Zwart prefers the reasoning which appears in the separate concurring opinion of 
Committee Member Tomuschat.339  Mr Tomuschat agreed with the Committee’s 
decision in all but its reasoning on Article 2(1).  Mr Tomuschat expresses the view 
that Article 5 is not relevant to the present case.  Tomuschat argued that the term 
‘within its territory’ was intended to recognise that a State Party could not be held 
responsible for securing Covenant rights in foreign territory where the State Party 
has no authority or power to act without consent, in accordance with international 
law and the principles of non-interference and sovereign equality.  According to 
Tomuschat, this was the intent of the drafters of the Covenant.  However:340 
Never was it envisaged...to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to 
carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity 
against their citizens abroad.  Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), 
the events which took place outside Uruguay came within the purview of the 
Covenant. 
224. The final Uruguayan case is not a rendition case,341 but rather a passport case.  
Ms Montero was a Uruguayan citizen studying in West Berlin (as it was then 
called).  Without giving reasons, the Uruguayan government refused to renew Ms 
Montero’s passport.  Ms Montero complained to the UN Human Rights Committee 
that this constituted a breach of her freedom of movement. 
225. Two issues of jurisdiction arose.  The first involved Article 2(1) of the Covenant.342  
The second involved Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol, which states that the 
Committee may hear complaints from people ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a State 
Party.343   The issue centred on whether, because Ms Montero was in West 
Germany and not physically located in Uruguay, she was within the jurisdiction of 
Uruguay at the relevant times.  
                                        
339 Zwart (1994), n 338, 95-6. 
340 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, concurring opinion of Mr Tomuschat. 
341 Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981. 
342 Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981, [5]. 
343 Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981, [7.1]. 
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226. The Committee found that Uruguayan jurisdiction was engaged by the impugned 
actions and, therefore, the Committee was competent to examine the 
complaint.344 
227. The Committee was of the view that the right to leave any country, including 
one’s own country, imposed an obligation on both the country of residence and 
the country of nationality.  Only Uruguay can issue a passport to a Uruguayan 
citizen.  The Committee concluded that Article 2 ‘could not be interpreted as 
limiting the obligations of Uruguay under article 12(2) [freedom of movement] to 
citizens within its own territory’. 345  This is clearly a recognition of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction based on nationality. 
228. One final case needs to be examined: Kindler v Canada.346  Like the European 
Human Rights Court case of Soering,347 this extradition case is more accurately 
classified as one of state responsibility rather than jurisdiction.  This is because 
the individual concerned is within the sovereign territory of the State Party and, 
therefore, the question is not one of sovereign jurisdiction but of consequences of 
sovereign action.  Nevertheless, this issue was dealt with by the Committee as a 
threshold issue of its jurisdictional competence. 
229. Mr Kindler was a US citizen sentenced to death in Pennsylvania.  He escaped and 
fled to Canada, where he was arrested.  In 1991, Canada extradited Mr Kindler 
back to the US.  Mr Kindler complained to the UN Human Rights Committee that 
his extradition breached his Covenant rights, including the guarantee against cruel 
and inhuman treatment or punishment. 
230. Canada argued that it was United States law, not Canadian law, which required Mr 
Kindler’s execution and, therefore, Canada could not be held responsible for the 
                                        
344 see also Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981, [9.3]-[9.4]. 
345 Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981, [5]. 
346 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991. 
347 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88.  The UN Human Rights Committee refers to this 
case at [15.3] of the Kindler determination.  Zwart argues that the majority in Kindler relied heavily 
on Soering: Zwart (1994), n 338, 98 at fn.286. 
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laws of another country.348  In an argument reminiscent of the UK’s argument in 
Soering, Canada argued that it cannot be held responsible for what another 
country might do on its own sovereign territory. 
231. The Committee rejected this argument in quite broad terms.  The Committee did 
not limits its language to extradition alone, but rather framed its response in 
terms of decisions ‘relating to persons within its jurisdiction’:349 
If a person is lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party concerned will not 
generally have responsibility under the Covenant for any violations of that person’s 
rights that may later occur in the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State party 
clearly is not required to guarantee the rights of persons within another 
jurisdiction.  However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within 
its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that 
person’s rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the 
State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows from the fact 
that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the 
handing over of a person to another State (whether a State party to the Covenant 
or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose 
of the handing over. For example, a State party would itself be in violation of the 
Covenant if it handed over a person to another State in circumstances in which it 
was foreseeable that torture would take place. The foreseeability of the 
consequence would mean that there was a present violation by the State party, 
even though the consequence would not occur until later on. 
232. In short, where a State makes a decision about an individual who is within 
jurisdiction and that decision will, in a certain or purposeful way, have the 
necessary and foreseeable consequence of violating an individual’s Covenant 
rights in a foreign jurisdiction, then the decision-making State may itself be in 
breach of the Covenant.  This requires a State to ensure it does not expose an 
individual to ‘a real risk of a violation of [their] rights under the Covenant’.350  A 
real risk is one that has a necessary and foreseeable consequence of violating an 
individual’s Covenant rights.351  Extradition is an example of a decision which 
could have such adverse consequences.352 
                                        
348 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, [4.3]. 
349 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, [6.2]. 
350 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, [13.1]. 
351 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, [14.1]. 
352 Kindler v Canada (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, [13.2]. 
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233. In 1997, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR obliges ratifying nations not to expose anyone to the real 
risk of execution for any offence.353  In 2003, the Committee found that the ICCPR 
itself places the same obligation on ratifying countries that have abolished the 
death penalty.354  Both these matters are extradition cases, in which the 
complainant is located physically within the territory of the State Party and, 
therefore strictly-speaking, no issue of extraterritoriality arises other than what 
might happen to the complainant once she or he is surrendered to a foreign 
power.355  They are analogous to decisions made by police in their own territory 
that have human rights ramifications abroad. 
General Comment 31 
234. The Committee summarises its view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Covenant in its General Comment 31.356  The Committee confirms its view that 
‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ means that: 
…a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.  … [This principle] applies to those 
within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside 
its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective 
control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State 
Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.   
235. At the end of this passage the Committee goes further than the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) by including the actions of nationals assigned to 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions.  In Behrami v France, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECHR found that France was not responsible for the actions of the 
troops it contributed to an international peace-keeping force in Kosovo because 
the United Nations, and not France, was the entity exercising authority over the 
                                        
353 ARJ v Australia (1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996.  See also [162] ff. 
354 Judge v Canada (2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998.  See also [169] ff. 
355 these types of cases are referred to below as 'Soering cases'. 
356 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 (2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [10]. 
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troops and the region.357  The ECHR followed this view in Blagojevic v 
Netherlands.358 
236. I would argue that the Committee’s extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
include national contingents in all international peace-keeping operations is too 
broad.  Jurisdiction will turn on the circumstances of each case: who has effective 
control of the troops; from whom do the troops take their orders; and, what 
arrangements have been made to preserve or abrogate sovereignty over troops? 
commentary 
237. While it is not expressly acknowledged, the principles of international law have 
strongly influenced the jurisprudence of the Committee.  In Kindler, state 
responsibility was engaged because the individual was already within jurisdiction.  
That is a recognition of sovereign jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle.  
In the passport case of Montero, the nationality principle explains extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  In the Uruguayan rendition cases, jurisdiction arose with respect to a 
national abroad from effective control over the national with the consent of local 
authorities.  Extraterritorial jurisdiction might also be found in these rendition 
cases based on the nationality principle.  
238. The Uruguayan cases were cited with approval by the ICJ in the Palestinian Wall 
advice.359  This is significant because it raises the status of these decisions in 
international law, given that a court has cited them as support for the 
extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The court’s view supports the Committee’s own conclusion that Israel is 
responsible for implementing the ICCPR in the Occupied Territories 'to the extent 
that it [exercises] “effective control”’.360 
                                        
357 see [289] below. 
358 see [290] below. 
359 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory - 
Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 2 (7 July 2004), [109].  See also [240] below. 
360 UN Human Rights Committee (1998) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.3 (18 August 1998), [10]; cited in 
Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 130. 
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5.2.2 International Court of Justice 
239. The International Court of Justice has largely adopted the view of the UN Human 
Rights Committee with respect to Article 2 of the ICCPR:361  
...while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be 
exercised outside the national territory. 
… the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their 
obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They 
only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their 
State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of 
that of the State of residence… 
...[the ICCPR] is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its own territory. 
240. The ICJ expressly examined the issue of the extraterritorial application of human 
rights treaties in its advisory opinion on the Palestinian Wall.362  In that case it 
confirmed the view of the UN Human Rights Committee.  The Court’s ruling is 
significant because its jurisprudence constitutes what is called ‘hard’ international 
law.  In other words, its authority as law is of the highest order. 
241. In the Palestinian Wall case, the ICJ was required to determine ‘whether the 
international human rights conventions to which Israel is party apply within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory’.363  The court first rejected the suggestion by Israel 
that human rights law does not apply in times of armed conflict.364  The court then 
turned its attention to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.365 
242. In determining the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, the ICJ first turned its 
mind to the wording of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and whether the phrase ‘within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ should be read disjunctively or 
                                        
361 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory - 
Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 2 (7 July 2004), [108]-[111]. 
362 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory - 
Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 2 (7 July 2004).  This was a reference from the UN General Assembly. 
363 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [102]. 
364 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [102] & [106]. 
365 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [104] & [107]-[111]. 
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conjunctively.366  The court concluded that the disjunctive interpretation is correct.  
In coming to this conclusion, the court observed that the object and purpose of 
the ICCPR made it ‘seem natural’ that States would be obliged to comply with the 
ICCPR when a State exercises its jurisdiction in foreign territory.  The court also 
observed that this interpretation was the practice of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.367  The Court also found support for this view in the travaux 
préparatoires, which:368 
…show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters of the Covenant did not 
intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise 
jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons 
residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall 
within the competence of that State, but of that of the State of residence. 
243. Adopting the view of the UN Human Rights Committee, the Court concluded that 
the ICCPR ‘is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its own territory’.369  This is a disjunctive reading of article 
2(1).  The Court also found that two other human rights instruments, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, applied extraterritorially.370  In the 
Palestinian Wall case, this required Israel to extend its obligations under these 
human rights treaties to the Occupied Territories.  The Court did not find that the 
construction of a wall, of itself, breached those obligations.  However, the Court 
did find that the course chosen by Israel for the construction of the wall did 
breach the human rights of the Palestinian residents affected by its construction, 
including article 12(1) rights of freedom of movement.371 
                                        
366 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [108]-[109].  See also [245] ff. 
367 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [109], citing the ‘Uruguayan cases’ of Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, Casariego v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 
56/1979, & Montero v Uruguay (1983) Communication No. 106/1981. 
368 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [109]. 
369 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [111]. 
370 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [112]-[113]. 
371 Palestinian Wall advice (2004), n 362, [137]; see also [122] of ICJ’s advice for Court’s finding 
that the course of the wall also breaches Israel’s duty to respect the self-determination of the 
Palestinians. 
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244. In summary, the Court’s expression of the extraterritorial application of human 
rights instruments is very broad.  It is not limited to occupied territory.  It is only 
limited to acts done in the exercise of a State’s jurisdiction abroad.  This confirms 
the universality of human rights.  A State’s international human rights obligations 
extend beyond its territory and apply wherever the State exercises its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially.  So, the bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised at public 
international law carry with them a State’s international human rights obligations.  
In short, police and other state agents must comply with their state’s international 
human rights obligations, whether they act domestically or abroad.  By corollary, 
both state policy and state practice with respect to transnational policing must 
comply with a state’s international human rights obligations.  
5.2.3 conjunctive/disjunctive 
245. There is some controversy in the literature on the correct interpretation of the 
phrase ‘territory and jurisdiction’ in Article 2 of the ICCPR.  Milanovic observes that 
no other human rights treaty uses this formula.372  The closest is the Migrant 
Workers Convention, adopted in 1990, which uses an ‘or’ not an ‘and’: “within 
their territory or subject to their jurisdiction”.373 
246. Dennis argues that the phrase should be read conjunctively: an individual 
complainant ‘must be both within the territory of a State Party and subject to the 
jurisdiction of that State Party’.374  This has been the view of State Parties, 
according to Dennis, and he cites the comments of a US State Department Legal 
Advisor before the Human Rights Committee.375  Dennis is critical of the 
                                        
372 Marko Milanovic, 'From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in 
Human Rights Treaties' (2008) 8(3) Human Rights Law Review 411, 413. 
373 Milanovic (2008), n 372, 413, citing International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) Article 7. 
374 Michael Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially During Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’ (2006) 100 American Society of International Law Proceedings 85, 
87. 
375 Dennis (2006), n 374, 88.  Dennis also quotes from a similar view of the Netherlands 
government, but this deals with the situation of Dutch military officers acting in their capacity as 
UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and is selectively quoted. 
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Committee’s disjunctive interpretation of ‘and’ in the limitation clause.  He also 
suggests that both Nowak and Tomuschat express views similar to his.376 
247. However, the swiftness with which Dennis brushes aside the ICJ’s endorsement of 
the UN Human Rights Committee’s earlier decisions on the disjunctive 
interpretation of Article 2 jurisdiction suggests Dennis has chosen to ignore the 
hard-law precedential value of the Palestinian Wall advice. 
248. Dennis’ reference to the travaux préparatoires is more convincing.  He quotes the 
US representative to the Commission on Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt, whose 
view prevailed over that of others seeking to have the limitation clause to reflect 
the European formulation of simply ‘within jurisdiction’.  The dissenting States, 
including France and Lebanon, were concerned that the effect of this narrow 
interpretation was that a State is not obliged to protect the Covenant rights and 
freedoms to its nationals abroad.  The US view prevailed throughout the drafting 
and adoption process.  Roosevelt explained the view of the United States by 
stating that it did not want to be responsible for extending Covenant rights to 
people within its occupied territories:377 
An illustration would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan: 
persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the occupying 
States in certain respects, but were outside the scope of legislation of those 
States. Another illustration would be leased territories. 
249. In a response opposing Dennis’ views, and in support of the disjunctive 
interpretation, Ben-Naftali argues that human rights law has evolved over the 
decades since the drafting of the ICCPR and there is now a wide consensus of the 
universality of this body of law.378  Ben-Naftali argues that the disjunctive 
interpretation ‘gives expression to the object and purpose of the [human rights] 
Conventions which is to protect individuals from the improper exercise of power, 
                                        
376 Dennis (2006), n 374, 89, citing: Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Commentary (2005, 2nd ed); and, Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: between idealism and 
realism (2003) 109-11. 
377 cited in Dennis (2006), n 374, 90. 
378 Oma Ben-Naftali, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights to Occupied Territories’ 
(2006) 100 American Society of International Law Proceedings 90. 
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whereas a narrower, territorially-based meaning, would exclude certain individuals 
from protection, but not from power’.379  She then lists five reasons in support of 
the disjunctive interpretation:380 
a. it avoids redundancy of terms;  
b. it coheres with the jurisdictional clauses of the [Convention Against 
Torture] and the [Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination], many of the obligations of which overlap with the 
ICCPR, thus generating the sensible subjection of all major [human 
rights] treaties to the same jurisdictional regime;  
c. it coheres with Article 1 of the first Optional Protocol which 
authorizes the HRC to review communications from individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of state parties, dispensing with the term 
"territory" altogether; 
d. it advances the object and purpose of the treaty - a method of 
interpretation that, under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention, carries 
more weight than the drafters' intent; and, 
e. it is highly supported by practice. 
250. In reality, Dennis’ piece is disingenuous.  His citation of Nowak and Tomuschat in 
support of his ‘conjunctive’ theory is simply false.  Nowak actually criticises the 
literal (conjunctive) interpretation of Article 2(1) as leading ‘to often absurd 
results’ such as Article 12(4) right of a person to re-enter their national territory: a 
literal interpretation of Article 2(1) would mean that a person outside their country 
could never allege a breach of Article 12(4) when they are refused re-entry.  
Nowak instead prefers an interpretation wherein a State might be held 
accountable for ‘persons who are located on their territory and subject to their 
                                        
379 Ben-Naftali (2006), n 378, 92. 
380 Ben-Naftali (2006), n 378, 93. 
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sovereign authority’.381  This allows for exceptional circumstances where a State 
has jurisdiction, but not the means to secure the rights of those within its 
jurisdiction.  Such exceptional circumstances include where the sovereign territory 
of a State is occupied by a foreign force and where a State has jurisdiction over its 
nationals abroad but cannot be held responsible for human rights violations 
committed by a foreign sovereign.  Nowak argues that a State Party will be 
responsible for actions abroad which breach the Covenant rights of individuals 
‘subject to their sovereign authority’.382  Though Nowak does not express it in this 
manner, it would appear that the travaux debates led to Article 2(1) confusing and 
eliding jurisdiction with state responsibility, in a manner with which the European 
Court of Human Rights has had to grapple over the last two decades. 
251. With respect to Dennis’ claims that Tomuschat supports his literal interpretation of 
ICCPR jurisdiction: nothing could be further from the truth.  In fact, Tomuschat 
cites Guantanamo Bay as a good example of why disregarding the literal 
interpretation of Article 2(1) is warranted.383  Noting the ICJ’s advice that the 
ICCPR applies in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, Tomuschat finds the 
US view on ICCPR jurisdiction ‘far from being persuasive’ in its attempts to rebut 
the Human Rights Committee’s purposive interpretation.384  He concludes that 
Article 2(1) ‘should not be misconstrued as a device designed to open up 
loopholes permitting manipulative curtailment of rights and freedom under the 
[ICCPR]’.385 
252. Dennis reads the Palestinian Wall decision narrowly.  He argues that the ICJ 
viewed the occupied Palestinian territory as Israeli territory, but only for the 
purposes of its examination of freedom of movement under Article 12(1) of the 
ICCPR.  This argument makes no sense and is disingenuous.  The ICJ referred to 
the Palestinian territory as occupied territory over which Israel had jurisdiction 
                                        
381 Nowak (2005), n 376, [2.28]. 
382 Nowak (2005), n 376, [2.29]. 
383 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: between idealism and realism (2003, 1st ed) 110-1. 
384 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: between idealism and realism (2008, 2nd ed) 131-2. 
385 Tomuschat (2003, 1st ed), n 383, 111. 
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owing to its military occupation.  Having found Article 2(1) jurisdiction, the only 
valid reason to say that particular rights do not apply is if a valid derogation exists.  
The ICJ acknowledged a valid derogation to article 9, but stated clearly that all 
‘other Articles of the Covenant…remain applicable not only on Israeli territory, but 
also on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.386  To say that the ICJ advice can only 
be read as confirmation that jurisdiction exists with respect to article 12 makes no 
sense.  State responsibility might be limited by a valid derogation, but either there 
is jurisdiction or there is not.  Jurisdiction cannot apply to some articles and not 
others.  Dennis is simply wrong. 
5.3 European Court of Human Rights 
253. At the turn of the 21st Century, European jurisprudence was the most nuanced 
and developed of all jurisdictions.  European human rights law does not, 
obviously, apply to non-European nations such as Canada and Australia, but it 
does exert an influence on both international and domestic courts and tribunals 
beyond its borders.  So a detailed analysis is warranted to use as a measure 
against other judicial bodies. 
5.3.1 European Convention on Human Rights 
254. The European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’) is a multi-lateral 
document and applies only to those countries which have ratified it (‘the 
Contracting States’).387  Contracting States are required to secure all Convention 
rights to everybody ‘within their jurisdiction’.388   The phrase ‘within jurisdiction’ is 
interpreted in conformity with the concept of jurisdiction at public international 
law.389  This means that jurisdiction is primarily territorial.390  The Convention has 
                                        
386 Wall advice, [127]. 
387  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
<http://www.jusline.eu/index.php?cpid=f92f99b766343e040d46fcd6b03d3ee8&lawid=7&paid=>. 
388 The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), Article 1: ‘The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention’. 
389 e.g. see Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [312]. 
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no application beyond the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting 
States.391  The extent of that legal space is the sum of the jurisdictions of the 
Contracting States. 
255. Therefore the Convention does not usually provide protection for people in the 
territory of non-Contracting States: for example, prior to their respective 
ratifications of the Convention, in the European principality of Andorra392 or in the 
Serbian capital of Belgrade during the 1999 NATO bombings.393  In the words of 
the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’): ‘The Convention was not 
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of 
Contracting States’.394 
256. The Court has noted that, in exceptional circumstances, a Contracting State’s 
territorial  jurisdiction might be limited where the State does not control a part of 
its territory due to war or rebellion.395  Despite noting this, the Court has generally 
found that a Contracting State maintains jurisdiction over any national territory it 
no longer controls, but that its obligations to secure the Convention rights of 
people within that territory are limited accordingly.396  
257. In other exceptional circumstances a Contracting State’s jurisdiction, and therefore 
the legal space to which the Convention applies, will extend extraterritorially.  This 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of States is the subject of this section. 
258. Any understanding of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on the 
extraterritorial application of the Convention, requires an appreciation of the 
difference between ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘state responsibility’.  The Court’s 
                                                                                                                      
390 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [59]-[61]. 
391 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [80]. 
392 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87.  The Principality of 
Andorra ratified the Convention on 22 January 1996.   
393 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99.  The Republic of Serbia 
ratified the Convention on 3 March 2004. 
394 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [80]. 
395 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [312] ; Bankovic et al v Belgium 
et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [70]. 
396 e.g. Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99. 
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jurisprudence has evolved a clear differentiation between jurisdiction and state 
responsibility.  Unfortunately, the two are often confused by commentators.397  
Early in the development of this jurisprudence, even the Court often confused the 
two concepts.398 
259. The issue of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction is a preliminary threshold issue.399  
It is closely linked to a Contracting State having a decisive level of control over 
land, people and/or property in a foreign territory.  On the other hand, state 
responsibility requires an examination of the merits of a specific allegation.400  The 
issue with respect to state responsibility is whether the Contracting State has 
discharged its negative duties (to refrain from infringing rights) and positive duties 
(to secure human rights), which is measured by a proportionality test.  Because 
the Convention only requires a State to discharge these duties within its 
jurisdiction, determining the extent of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction must, 
logically, be determined before examining whether a duty has been breached.  If 
the court finds that the alleged violation occurred outside of a Contracting State’s 
jurisdiction, then the Court has no competence to adjudicate an alleged breach 
because it falls outside the Convention’s legal space (espace juridique).  In short: 
there can be no state responsibility without jurisdiction, but there can be 
jurisdiction without state responsibility. 
                                        
397 see the discussion between Lawson and O’Boyle, in which the latter accuses the former of 
conflating the two concepts: Michael O’Boyle, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: a comment on ‘Life After Bankovic’ in Fons Coomans and Menno 
Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, 2004).  This 
article is a response to Lawson’s own chapter in the same book: Rick Lawson, ‘Life After Bankovic: 
on the extraterritorial application of the European Convention of Human Rights’ in Coomans & 
Kamminga (2004), op cit.  See also Milanovic (2008), n 372, who correctly and clearly distinguishes 
the two concepts.  Tomuschat also misreads the jurisprudence of the ECHR, incorrectly criticising it 
for not recognising jurisdiction over individuals a state holds on foreign territory: see Tomuschat 
(2003, 1st ed), n 383, 108; and Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 128-9.  Tomuschat’s misreading 
in 2008 is odd, given that he discusses the Loizidou decision. 
398 e.g. see [264] below in relation to an early decision of the Court in Cyprus v Turkey (1975). 
399 e.g. Loizidou v Turkey (23 March 1995) ECtHR 15318/89 (preliminary objections), [60]. 
400 e.g. Loizidou v Turkey (23 March 1995) ECtHR 15318/89 (preliminary objections), [60]. 
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5.3.2 jurisdiction 
260. Certain categories of circumstances attracting extraterritorial jurisdiction  have 
been identified by the Court, but the list of categories is not closed.  Jurists and 
commentators have attempted to summarise the recognised categories.  I will 
briefly examine some of these attempts and then propose my own summary.  But 
first, I will review some significant cases in the Court’s jurisprudence on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
caselaw 
261. In the foundational case of Cyprus v Turkey (1975), the government of Cyprus 
took Turkey to the European Human Rights Commission alleging Turkish human 
rights breaches in occupied northern Cyprus.401  This preliminary decision was 
concerned only with the issue of admissibility, not with the merits of the matter.  
Turkey challenged the admissibility of Cyprus’ application inter alia on the ground 
that the Commission did not have the power to hear the complaint, because of 
where the acts occurred (ratione loci).  Turkey observed that, because of the 
wording of Article 1 of the Convention,402 the Commission was only competent to 
hear complaints of acts committed within the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party.  
Turkey argued that, because the acts of which Cyprus complained did not occur 
inside the national territory of Turkey and that Turkey had never annexed 
northern Cyprus, the alleged acts occurred outside of Turkish jurisdiction.  
Therefore, Turkey was not obliged to secure Convention rights to people in 
northern Cyprus. 
262. The Commission rejected Turkey’s argument, finding that ‘jurisdiction’ is not 
limited to a Contracting Party’s national territory.  Article 1 requires a Contracting 
Party to secure Convention rights and freedoms to everyone ‘under their actual 
authority and responsibility’.403  The Commission further explained that:404 
                                        
401 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75.  
402 see n 388. 
403 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136. 
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...nationals of a State, including registered ships and aircrafts, are partly within its 
jurisdiction wherever they may be, and that authorised agents of a State, including 
diplomatic or consular agents and armed forces, not only remain under its 
jurisdiction when abroad but bring any other persons or property "within the 
jurisdiction" of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over such 
persons or property . Insofar as, by their acts or omissions, they affect such 
persons or property, the responsibility of the State is engaged. 
263. The Commission then noted that Turkish troops, under the sole direction of 
Turkey and following Turkish military law and practice, had entered Cyprus.  
Therefore, Turkish troops, acting as agents of Turkey, brought any people or 
property on Cyprus within the jurisdiction of Turkey ‘to the extent that they 
exercise control over such persons or property’.405  If the actions or omissions of 
Turkish troops affected the Convention rights of those people in Cyprus within 
Turkey’s jurisdiction, then Turkey would be responsible for those breaches.  
Having established that the acts complained of fell within Turkey’s jurisdiction, the 
Commission concluded that it had the power (competence ratione loci) to hear the 
merits of Cyprus’ complaint.406 
264. The test of ‘authority and responsibility’ is a strange test for jurisdiction, because it 
invokes both jurisdiction (‘authority’) and state responsibility (‘responsibility’).  
This is, of course, relatively early in the Commission’s jurisprudence and the 
confused legal formula would be reworked over the next few decades.  It would 
have been preferable for the Commission to have used wording like: authority and 
capable of attracting  responsibility.  The Commission’s decision also conflates two 
types of control, which emerge in later jurisprudence as two distinct categories: 
(1) control over foreign territory; and (2) control over people and property within 
a foreign territory. 
                                                                                                                      
404 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136. 
405 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 137. 
406 in a determination of the merits dated 10 July 1976, the Commission found that Turkey had 
breached several Convention rights and freedoms.  Usually, the matter would then have been 
referred to the European Court of Human Rights, however Turkey did not at that time recognise 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  So the matter was sent to the Council of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe for their consideration.  For more, see: Robert Blackburn & Jörg Polakeiwicz, 
Fundamental Rights in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and its Member States, 
1950-2000 (2001, OUP), 227. 
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265. Another curious ruling of the Commission in Cyprus v Turkey (1975) relates to 
Article 56 of the Convention.407  Under Article 56, a Contracting State may elect 
(opt-in) to extend its Convention obligations to some or all of its territories abroad 
and, further, to recognise the competence of the Court to accept complaints from 
those territories.408  The accepted interpretation today is that, without such an 
express declaration under Article 56, the Convention ‘jurisdiction’ cannot extend to 
these territories.409  However, in Cyprus v Turkey the Commission read the Article 
more broadly, effectively finding that the Article’s actual purpose is to ensure that 
the Convention is read in concert with local culture and customs in non-European 
territories:410 
The Commission does not find that [Article 56] of the Convention, providing for 
the extension of the Convention to other than metropolitan territories of High 
Contracting Parties, can be interpreted as limiting the scope of the term 
'jurisdiction'...to such metropolitan territories.  The purpose of [Article 56] is not 
only the territorial extension of the Convention but its adaptation to the measure 
of self-government attained in particular non-metropolitan territories and to the 
cultural and social differences in such territories;  [Article 56(3)] confirms this 
interpretation.  This does not mean that the territories to which [Article 56] applies 
are not within the 'jurisdiction' within the meaning of Article 1... 
266. The matter of Hess v UK related to the continuing detention of Adolf Hitler’s 
private-secretary, Herman Hess, at Spandau Prison.411  The application was 
brought by Hess’ wife, who complained inter alia that her husband was being held 
in solitary confinement: he was the only prisoner in a facility capable of holding 
600 people.  The prison was located in the British sector of Berlin, where Soviet, 
                                        
407 Article 56 was formerly known as Article 63, and is referred to as such in this case and the later 
decisions of Tyrer & Thanh: see, [271] below. 
408 This is different, for example, from the ICCPR, which has no such opt-in mechanism.  The 
ICCPR has an ‘opt-out’ mechanism in the form of reservations.  Controversially, the UN Human 
Rights Committee is of the view that reservations which are inconsistent with the ICCPR are 
invalid.  See discussion in: Joseph, Schultz & Castan (2004), n 714, [25.14] ff.  The controversy 
arises because the Committee is not constituted as a court and also because there is nothing in the 
ICCPR expressly granting the Committee the power to declare reservations invalid for 
inconsistency. 
409 this is the view the Commission took in the later cases of Thanh (see [271] below) and Quark 
Fishing (see [287] below). 
410 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136-7. 
411 Hess v United Kingdom (28 May 1975) ECommHR 6231/73. 
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American, French and British troops took turns guarding Hess.  Mrs Hess also 
alleged UK responsibility because the agreement between the Four Powers had 
been signed in London in August 1945.  The Commission found that the UK’s 
Convention jurisdiction was not engaged and dismissed the application.  Of 
relevance was the fact that the Four Powers treaty required unanimous agreement 
of the four parties on all decisions affecting the running of the prison.  The 
Commission found that this quadripartite administration over the prison could not 
be divided into four separate jurisdictions and, therefore, is not a matter ‘within 
the jurisdiction’ of the UK.  The Commission also noted in passing that the Four 
Powers treaty could not attract Convention jurisdiction in any case, because the 
treaty was ratified before the Convention came into force. 
267. The case of Soering v UK is not really a case of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but 
rather of state responsibility in refoulement cases.412 However, it is mentioned 
here because the Contracting State unsuccessfully raised jurisdictional objections.  
Soering, residing in the United Kingdom, was the subject of an extradition request 
on capital charges by the United States, which refused to provide a guarantee that 
the death penalty would not be sought or applied.  Soering alleged that his 
extradition to the US would breach his Convention rights by exposing him to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, due to the conditions on death 
row in the relevant US state (the ‘death row phenomenon’).413  The Court agreed 
and found that it would be a violation of Mr Soering’s Convention rights if the UK 
extradited him to the US. 
268. The UK argued that it was not a Contracting State that would be committing the 
alleged rights violation, nor would the violation occur within its jurisdiction.  
Therefore, argued the UK, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter 
because any potential breach of Convention rights would occur in, and be 
                                        
412 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88. 
413 for death row phenomenon, see: Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: a worldwide 
perspective (2008, 4th ed) 180-3; and, William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
International Law (2002, 3rd ed) 141-151. 
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performed by, the United States and the Court is not competent to adjudicate the 
actions of a non-Contracting State.   
269. The Court found in Soering that, because of the ‘foreseeable consequences...[and] 
serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering risked’, a decision to 
extradite might engage state responsibility ‘where substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
the requesting country’.414  The Court reached this conclusion by observing that 
the purpose and spirit of the Convention is to secure and protect individual rights, 
and it would be contrary to that purpose and spirit for a Contracting State 
'knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial 
grounds for believing that [an individual] would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed'.415 
270. The issue of jurisdiction is not dealt with in Soering.  The Court moves quickly to 
the question of state responsibility for the adverse consequences ‘suffered outside 
the jurisdiction of the extraditing State’ due to the actions of the receiving 
State.416  As the Court observes in Bankovic, the applicant in Soering was within 
the territory of the UK and therefore clearly within the UK’s jurisdiction.417 
271. The two separate cases of Tyrer v UK (1978) and Thanh v UK (1990) are 
important to a legal understanding of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction with 
respect to its self-governing territories under Article 56 of the Convention.418  
Tyrer was a juvenile UK citizen residing in the Isle of Man, who complained about 
his judicial sentence of corporal punishment (by lashing) in 1972.  The Isle of Man 
was a self-governing dependency of the British Crown.  In 1953, the UK had made 
an Article 56 declaration with respect to the territory.  On the other hand, Thanh 
                                        
414 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [90]-[91]. 
415 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [87]-[88]. 
416 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [85]. 
417 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [68]. 
418 Tyrer v UK (25 April 1978) ECtHR 5856/72; Thanh et al v UK (12 March 1990) ECommHR 
16137/90.  For more information on Article 56, see [265] above. 
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and his co-applicants were Vietnamese nationals detained in Hong Kong pending 
deportation back to Vietnam because their refugee status applications were 
unsuccessful.  At the time, Hong Kong was a self-governing British territory, about 
which the UK had made no Article 56 declaration.   
272. On the question of jurisdiction, the Court found that the Isle of Mann fell within 
the UK’s jurisdiction, while the Commission found that Hong Kong did not.419  The 
Hong Kong decision was ruled inadmissible because of the absence of an Article 
56 declaration.  Bound by the express words and purpose of Article 56, the 
Commission noted that even if it had found that the UK controlled Hong Kong 
immigration policy, the absence of an Article 56 declaration rendered the 
Commission incompetent to adjudicate the matter.  Because of the Article 56 
declaration with respect to the Isle of Man, there were no impediments to UK 
jurisdiction in the Tyrer case.420  While it is tempting to distinguish these cases on 
the fact that Tyrer was a subject of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, whereas 
Thanh was not, these cases were not decided on that point.   
273. The decision in Thanh seems to contradict the Commission’s earlier broad 
interpretation of Article 56 in Cyprus v Turkey (1975),421 however the reasoning in 
Thanh is later confirmed by the Court in the Quark Fishing case.422  
274. Thanh’s case illuminates another important aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
This was a refoulement case (Soering type case), in which Thanh and his fellow 
applicants faced deportation to Vietnam, where they alleged there was a real risk 
of torture or mistreatment.  Because the applicants did not fall within the 
Convention jurisdiction of the UK, the UK was not obliged under the Convention to 
secure the applicants’ rights.  This demonstrates starkly the two-step process of 
                                        
419 the applicants in Thanh did not appeal the Commission’s decision to the Court.  This is why I 
am dealing with a Commission decision here. 
420 there was a minor jurisdictional objection unsuccessfully raised before the Court by the UK, 
which relied on the fact that the Article 56 declaration with respect to the Isle of Man expired in 
1976, before the Commission put the matter before the Court.  At hearing, the UK withdrew the 
objection and consented to the Court’s jurisdiction in the matter. 
421 see [265] above. 
422 see [287] below. 
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determining jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, which can render a complaint 
inadmissible without any assessment of state responsibility.  
275. In Chrysostomos et al v Turkey, Turkey argued inter alia that it had not elected to 
extend its Convention jurisdiction to northern Cyprus by way of an Article 56 
declaration.423  The Commission found that Article 56 was not applicable because, 
in the express terms of that Article, it only applies to territories ‘for whose 
international relations [the Contracting State] is responsible’ and Turkey had no 
such internationally-recognised responsibility over northern Cyprus.424 
276. In Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, the two applicants were convicted of a 
crime in Andorra.425  As is often the case in Andorra, the panel of trial judges 
included a French and a Spanish national sitting as judges of the Andorran court.  
The applicants argued before the European Court of Human Rights that their trial 
had been unfair and that, due to the nationality of the trial judges, France and 
Spain were responsible for these violation of their Convention rights.  On this 
point, the Court did not deal with the substantive complaint, only examining the 
question of jurisdiction.   The Court found against the complainants because 
Andorra was not a party to the Convention (ratione loci), and because the criminal 
justice system of Andorra was separate from that of Spain or France and the 
judges were not sitting in their capacity as French or Spanish judges (ratione 
personae).  Since the offenders did not fall within the jurisdiction of a Contracting 
Party to the Convention, the Court was not competent to hear the case. 
277. The case of WM v Denmark was a consular case in which the applicant 
complained that the Danish ambassador in communist East Germany had acted 
contrary to the Convention by declining his application for asylum and by calling 
East German police to remove him from the Danish Embassy.426  While the 
                                        
423 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou & Loizidou v Turkey (4 March 1991) ECommHR 15299/89, 
15300/89 & 15318/89. 
424 European Human Rights Convention, article 56(1). 
425 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87.  
426 WM v Denmark (14 October 1992) ECtHR 17392/90. 
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complaint was ultimately unsuccessful, the Commission did confirm that the acts 
of authorised state agents abroad can attract Convention jurisdiction under the 
authority and control test:427 
The Commission notes that these complaints are directed mainly against Danish 
diplomatic authorities in the former DDR. It is clear, in this respect, from the 
constant jurisprudence of the Commission that authorised agents of a State, 
including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or property within the 
jurisdiction of that State to the extent that they exercise authority over such 
persons or property. In so far as they affect such persons or property by their acts 
or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged. 
Therefore, in the present case the Commission is satisfied that the acts of the 
Danish ambassador complained of affected persons within the jurisdiction of the 
Danish authorities within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. 
278. The case of Loizidou clearly demonstrates the separate nature of jurisdiction and 
state responsibility.  Mrs Loizidou , a Greek Cypriot, complained that she was 
denied access to and enjoyment of her property in northern Cyprus, an area 
occupied by Turkey.  The Court was called upon to determine whether Turkey was 
responsible for this violation of the applicant’s Convention rights.  In its first 
judgment, the Court looked only at the question of jurisdiction.428  This was a 
preliminary matter of determining the Court’s competence to proceed to the 
substantive issue of Turkey’s responsibility for the violations.429 
279. In determining the jurisdictional issue, the Court applied an ‘effective control’ test 
because of Turkey’s military presence in the region.  Since Turkey acknowledged 
that Mrs Loizidou’s complaint stemmed from the fact of its occupation of the area 
and the actions of Turkish troops in preventing her access to her property, the 
Court concluded these acts fell within Turkish jurisdiction.  However the Court 
stressed again that the question ‘[w]hether the matters complained of are 
                                        
427 WM v Denmark (14 October 1992) ECtHR 17392/90, [1]. 
428 Loizidou v Turkey (23 March 1995) ECtHR 15318/89 (preliminary objections), [60]-[61]. 
429 Loizidou v Turkey (23 March 1995) ECtHR 15318/89 (preliminary objections), [60]. 
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imputable to Turkey and give rise to State responsibility are thus questions which 
fall to be determined by the Court at the merits phase’.430 
280. The next northern Cyprus case is highly significant because it is an appeal to the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, consisting of seventeen 
judges of the Court including its President.431  In Cyprus v Turkey (2001), Cyprus 
alleged that Turkey continued to deny Convention rights to Greek, Turkish and 
gypsy Cypriots resident in, or displaced from, northern Cyprus.432  Applying the 
effective control test, the Grand Chamber again rejected Turkey’s submission that 
it was not responsible for the acts of the local administration, which Turkey 
claimed was independent of the Turkish state.  Then the Grand Chamber went 
further, to explain that ‘effective control’ meant that Turkey’s Convention 
jurisdiction could attach not only to the acts and omissions of Turkish nationals, 
but also to the acts and omissions of local administrators:433 
Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility 
cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus 
but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which 
survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support. It follows that, in terms of 
Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey's “jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to 
securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention... and 
that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey. 
281. The Grand Chamber observed that, since the government of Cyprus was unable to 
secure these rights in northern Cyprus, a decision that the region was not within 
Turkey’s jurisdiction would leave the residents of northern Cyprus unprotected by 
the Convention.  This would ‘result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of 
human-rights protection in the territory’.434  The Grand Chamber then went on to 
impute Turkish responsibility in several substantive violations. 
                                        
430 Loizidou v Turkey (23 March 1995) ECtHR 15318/89 (preliminary objections), [64]. 
431 pursuant to Article 43 of the Convention.  Only matters raising a ‘serious question’ of 
interpretation or general importance may be heard by the Grand Chamber: Article 43(2).  The 
Grand Chamber is the highest appellate configuration of the Court and its decisions are final: 
Article 44(1). 
432 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94. 
433 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94, [77]. 
434 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94, [78]. 
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282. The case of Bankovic was also an appeal to the Grand Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber’s decision was delivered per curiam.435  In Bankovic, the six applicants 
brought an application on behalf of deceased Serbian  relatives complaining of 
breaches of the right to life and freedom of expression.  The victims had been 
killed during the bombing of Belgrade by NATO aircraft in 1999.  The Grand 
Chamber dismissed the case, finding that the victims were not within the 
Convention jurisdiction of any Contracting State.  The Grand Chamber stressed 
that the concept of jurisdiction is essentially territorial and that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction ‘is exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular 
circumstances of each case’.436  The applicants had argued inter alia for another 
exceptional category of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be recognised.  The Grand 
Chamber characterised the proposed category as bringing within jurisdiction 
‘anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever 
in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt’.437  The 
Grand Chamber refused to recognise this category, rejecting the applicants’ 
submission that jurisdiction is proportionate ‘to the level of control exercised in 
any given extra-territorial situation’.  Though the Grand Chamber did not use 
these words, it effectively rejected this argument because the applicants were 
proposing that the test for state responsibility should be used for jurisdiction.  As 
the Grand Chamber majority pointed out, this renders the issue of jurisdiction 
‘superfluous and devoid of any purpose’.438  The Grand Chamber rejected the 
applicants’ further submission that the ‘effective control’ of airspace was a limited 
form of ‘effective control’ of a territory, which therefore attracted a limited form of 
jurisdiction and limited form of state responsibility.  The Grand Chamber observed 
that this was just a variation of the first proportionality argument.439  The Grand 
Chamber also observed that the applicants were not within the legal space 
                                        
435 ‘per curiam’ (‘by the court’) means that all seventeen judges agreed with the final decision; that 
there were no dissenting judges at all.  This lends the decision a strong precedent value. 
436 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [61]. 
437 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [75]. 
438 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [75]. 
439 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [76]. 
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(espace juridique) of the Convention, because at the relevant time they were not 
within the territory of a Contracting State or foreign territory occupied by a 
Contracting State.440 
283. The case of Ilascu v Moldova & Russia was an appeal to the Grand Chamber.441  
The applicants complained of their treatment and lengthy imprisonment in the 
Moldovan province of Transdniestria.  In the early 1990s, Moldova gained its 
independence from the former Soviet Union.  During this time, the province of 
Transdniestria declared independence from Moldova, supported to varying extents 
by the USSR and later the Russian Federation.  Neither Moldova nor the 
international community recognise the province’s independence.  Mr Ilascu and 
several other applicants were arrested in 1992, charged with crimes against the 
Transdniestrian state and convicted.  Mr Ilascu was released from prison in May 
2001, the other three applicants remained in prison.  The Grand Chamber was 
called upon to decide whether Moldova or Russia is responsible for these actions 
of provincial officials.  The Grand Chamber’s final decision was technical and 
complex.  The issues of jurisdiction and state responsibility were very closely 
related and the Grand Chamber dealt with them in the same judgment. 
284. In relation to Moldova, the Grand Chamber explained that, where a Contracting 
State does not exercise authority over some of its territory due to the specific 
circumstance of a ‘separatist regime’ (whether backed by foreign troops or not), 
then the scope of its jurisdiction in that territory is reduced but not eliminated.  
This reduced jurisdiction accordingly reduces the state’s responsibility.  The State 
will still have certain positive obligations to take ‘appropriate and sufficient’ 
measures, such as ‘all legal and diplomatic means available’ to the Contracting 
State, to ensure that the people in the separatist territory continue to enjoy their 
Convention rights and freedoms.442  The Grand Chamber found that Moldova still 
had jurisdiction over the province, despite the presence of Russian and rebel 
                                        
440 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [80]. 
441 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99. 
442 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [333]. 
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troops, and could still be held responsible for some breaches of the applicants’ 
Covenant rights.  Moldova was responsible for any breaches attributable to it and 
which were made after it became bound by the Covenant (ratione temporis).  The 
Grand Chamber found against Moldova in the limited circumstances where it failed 
to sufficiently exercise its positive obligations to the applicants.  Specifically 
Moldova had failed to raise the applicant’s cases in negotiations brokered by 
Russia. 
285. With respect to the Russian Federation, the Grand Chamber found that Russian 
troops in the rebel Moldovan province had arrested and handed over the 
applicants to the separatist regime in full knowledge of the consequences for the 
applicants’ human rights.  This satisfied the ‘authority and control’ test and 
attracted Russian jurisdiction, however Russia could not be held responsible under 
the Convention because it was not bound by the Convention at the relevant time 
(ratione temporis).443  The Grand Chamber also found that the separatist 
administration only survives because of the significant political, military, financial 
and economic assistance provided by Russia.  According to the Grand Chamber, 
this attracted Russian jurisdiction by satisfying the ‘effective control’ test, and 
even if it did not, the circumstances satisfied a new standard of ‘decisive influence’ 
over a foreign separatist administration.444  This could make Russia responsible 
under the Convention for the actions taken after 5 May 1998 (the date on which 
Russia ratified the Convention) by its own agents in the region and by the 
separatist administration, but also for actions taken before 5 May 1998 by the 
same actors, where the consequences of those prior actions have a continuing 
affect on the applicant’s human rights.445  For example, Russia was held 
responsible for conditions of Mr Ilascu’s ongoing detention and the treatment he 
received from 1992 through to 2001, but not for what happened at Mr Ilascu’s 
                                        
443 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [384]. 
444 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [392]. 
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trial which ended in 1993 and was not therefore ‘continuing’ at the time of 
Russia’s ratification of the Covenant in 1998. 
286. In the case of Issa, six women from northern Iraq brought applications on behalf 
of deceased family members, all of whom were shepherds.446  In 1995 Turkish 
troops invaded northern Iraq, during which time the non-combatant shepherds 
were killed and mutilated.  The Court dismissed the applications on the grounds 
that Turkey did not have jurisdiction over the disputed area at the relevant time.  
The Court first applied  the ‘effective control’ test, distinguishing this case from the 
Northern Cyprus cases.  While Turkey had approximately the same number of 
troops in Cyprus and Iraq, it did not occupy the entire region of Iraq, it did so only 
for a short time and it did not establish a local administrative authority or border 
checkpoints.  The Court next looked at the ‘authority and control’ test and found 
that it was not satisfied to the requisite standard (‘beyond reasonable doubt’) that 
Turkish troops had killed the victims, because there was doubt about whether 
Turkish troops were active in the relevant area at the relevant time.  Accordingly, 
there was no jurisdiction, the killings fell outside the espace juridique of the 
Convention and the case was dismissed.  
287. In the case of Öcalan v Turkey, the Grand Chamber effectively affirmed the 
“authority over people” test expounded in WM v Denmark:447 
The Court notes that the applicant was arrested by members of the Turkish 
security forces inside an aircraft registered in Turkey in the international zone of 
Nairobi Airport.  
It is common ground that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials 
by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and 
therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the 
Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its 
territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by 
Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and 
return to Turkey. 
                                        
446 Issa et al v Turkey (3 March 2005) ECtHR 31821/96. 
447 Öcalan v Turkey (12 May 2005) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 46221/99, [91]. 
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288. In Quark Fishing v UK, the applicant complained about the actions of UK officials 
which resulted in the applicant company failing to obtain a fishing licence for the 
water of the Atlantic island of South Georgia.448  South Georgia is a British 
overseas territory.  The applicants submitted that the ‘effective control’ test 
applied to engage the UK’s Convention jurisdiction.  The Court rejected this, 
noting that there was no relevant Article 56 declaration with respect to the 
territory.  The Court made it clear that the absence of an Article 56 will be fatal to 
an application.  In essence, such an absence will take precedence over the 
‘effective control’ test of Bankovic because it relates to the purpose and operation 
of an express provision of the Convention:449 
This "effective control" principle...does not...replace the system of declarations 
which the Contracting States decided, when drafting the Convention, to apply to 
territories overseas for whose international relations they were responsible. ... 
Bankovic, a decision of the Grand Chamber, emphasises the regional basis of the 
Convention and the exceptional nature of extensions beyond that legal space (§ 
80). The situations which it covers are clearly separate and distinct from 
circumstances where a Contracting State has not, through a declaration under 
Article 56 (former Article 63), extended the Convention or any of its Protocols to 
an overseas territory for whose international relations it is responsible. 
289. In Behrami v France, Mr Behrami complained that France, which commanded the 
local military contingent of the UN military force in Kosovo, was responsible for 
not clearly marking the minefield into which his son fatally strayed.450  This was an 
appeal to the Grand Chamber.  The Grand Chamber found the complaint 
inadmissible because the acts of French troops were attributable to the authority 
exercising overall control of the region at the time, which was the UN and not 
France.  Therefore, pursuant to the Monetary Gold principle,451 the Grand 
                                        
448 Quark Fishing Ltd v UK (19 September 2006) ECtHR 15305/06. 
449 Quark Fishing Ltd v UK (19 September 2006) ECtHR 15305/06, 4-5. 
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Chamber was not competent to adjudicate on the matter because the UN is not a 
Contracting Party to the Convention. 
290. More recently, in the case of Blagojevic v Netherlands, the applicant complained of 
his treatment before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), sitting in the Hague.452  Mr Blagojevic argued that the ICTY was located 
within the national territory of Netherlands and, therefore, that Contracting State 
was responsible for securing his Convention rights.  Applying the Grand Chamber’s 
decision in Behrami, the Court found that overall control of the process was 
exercised by the United Nations, which is ‘a legal personality separate from that of 
its member states and is not itself a Contracting Party’ and therefore the Court 
lacks jurisdiction ratione personae.453  This represents another limitation on 
jurisdiction within the national territory of a Contracting State.  
291. Finally, in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, the applicants were Iraqi nationals 
arrested separately by UK military forces in UK-occupied southern Iraq in 2003.454  
From December 2003 to December 2008, the applicants remained in a UK-run 
detention facilities in Iraq.  The detention facilities were initially established by 
military force, but later the sovereign Iraqi authorities recognised the exclusive 
control and authority of the UK over these facilities.  In December 2007, Iraqi 
authorities requested that the applicants be transferred to them for trial.  The 
applicants took action in the UK courts, arguing that their surrender would amount 
to refoulement on the ground that they would face charges attracting the death 
penalty.  On 31 December 2008 Iraqi recognition of exclusive UK control of the 
Iraqi detention facilities expired.  In 30 December 2008, the applicants were 
transferred to Iraqi authorities.   
                                        
452 Blagojevic v The Netherlands (9 June 2009) ECtHR 49032/07. 
453 Blagojevic v The Netherlands (9 June 2009) ECtHR 49032/07, [36]. 
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292. The UK Court of Appeal had found that the applicants did not fall within the 
Convention jurisdiction of the UK.455  Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was 
refused.  The European Court of Human Rights ruled separately on the 
jurisdictional and substantive issues.456 
293. The applicants in Al-Saadoon argued that, for the entire period from their arrest 
through to their transfer to Iraqi authorities, they fell within the Convention 
jurisdiction of the UK.  The UK argued inter alia that it had no choice other than to 
hand over the applicants to the sovereign power of the territory on which the 
detainees were held, as the sovereign power had requested.  This was because, 
once the Iraqi government no longer recognised exclusive British authority over 
the detention facilities, it would have been unlawful to deny the request of the 
sovereign power.  On the facts, the Court found that the UK had ‘total and 
exclusive control’ over the facilities at the relevant time and, therefore, the 
applicants fell within the UK’s Convention jurisdiction.  For the Court, this was a 
straight-forward application of the ‘authority and control’ test.  The legality 
defence, raised by the UK, was not a matter for the preliminary determination of 
jurisdiction, but for the later merits determination of state responsibility.457 
analysis 
294. The case of Bankovic seemed to stir much controversy among European legal 
commentators.  Many authors were critical of the Grand Chamber’s ‘restrictive 
view’ of jurisdiction.458  They also seemed concerned by the doctrine of the legal 
space (espace juridique) of the Contracting Parties.459  This latter concern is 
something I do not understand, because I read the concept of legal space as little 
                                        
455 Al-Saadoon & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 
7. 
456 Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v UK (30 June 2009 & 2 March 2010) ECtHR 61498/08. 
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349, 370. 
459 e.g. Gondek (2005), n 458, 375ff; and, Sigrun Skogly, Beyond International Borders: states’ 
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more than a synonym for the sum of the jurisdictions of the Contracting Parties.  
Given that extraterritorial jurisdiction is elastic, in the sense that it will expand and 
contract according to the circumstances of a case, the espace juridique is not a 
fixed legal space but also correspondingly elastic.   
295. In his 2008 paper, Milanovic argues that the term ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights 
treaties is not the same concept as jurisdiction in general international law.  He  
argues that it refers ‘solely [to] a sort of factual power that a state exercises over 
persons or territory’.460  This is Milanovic’s sole test for jurisdiction.  This leads him 
to conclude that the European Court of Human Rights was wrong to find Moldovan 
jurisdiction in Ilascu.  While this is an interesting theoretical approach, it does not 
assist in a complete understanding of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
296. In a 2004 collection of papers on the extraterritorial application of human rights 
treaties, several authors attempted to summarise the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
extraterritorial Convention jurisdiction of Contracting Parties.  I will examine two 
of those authors’ attempts.  Cerna summarises the categories of circumstances 
which would result in a violation of the Convention extraterritorially.461  The 
chapter is written after the case of Bankovic (2001),462 but before an equally 
important case of Ilascu (2004) involving Moldova and Russia.463  While her first 
category is accurate, the second is loose and requires modification after Ilascu, 
and the third is  superficial and contributes nothing to the understanding of 
jurisdiction:464 
(1) ... [‘the Soering cases’]...if lawful acts committed within the territory of a state 
(such as extradition or deportation determinations) were likely to give rise to 
actual violations outside the state's territory; 
                                        
460 Milanovic (2008), n 372, 417. 
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(2) ...in territories that are under [a state’s] 'effective control', even if the 
territories are outside the state; and 
(3) ... as in the Issa v Turkey case, where neither the Court nor Turkey questioned 
that the Convention applied to Turkish forces operating in Iraq, a state not party 
to the Convention... 
297. In the same 2004 collection of papers, Lawson summaries the caselaw into four 
categories.465  This is a version of his earlier three-category summary of 2002,466 
modified to accommodate the Bankovic decision.  Unfortunately, these categories 
are confused because they do not clearly differentiate between jurisdiction and 
state responsibility.  This failure is the focus of O’Boyle’s justified criticism of 
Lawson’s paper.467  Respectfully, I must say that Lawson has misread Bankovic.  
Though of course, that is easier to say with the advantage of several subsequent 
cases which have clarified Bankovic considerably.  The four categories identified 
by Lawson are:468 
(a)  The ‘northern Cyprus situation’, where one state party to the 
Convention...exercises effective overall control over part of the territory of another 
state party to the Convention... 
(b)  The ‘Kosovo situation’: same as (a), but [occupied territory belongs to a state 
which] is not a part to the Convention... 
(c)  The ‘intra-European temporary operation’, where agents of one state party to 
the Convention exercise de facto control over persons and property abroad in a 
more or less limited, incidental, ad hoc fashion in the territory of another state 
party to the Convention... 
(d)  The ‘external temporary operation’: same as (c), but [occupied territory 
belongs to state which] is not a party to the Convention... 
298. In relation to Lawson’s first two categories, there is nothing in the Court’s caselaw 
to support the bifurcation of these categories.  Whether the foreign territory 
belongs to a Contracting or non-Contracting State is irrelevant.  If a Contracting 
State exercises effective control over foreign territory, then that territory will fall 
                                        
465 Lawson (2004), n 397, 121-3. 
466 Rick Lawson, ‘Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts” in Gérard Kreijen, State, Sovereignty and 
International Governance (2002, OUP) 296-7. 
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within the Contracting State’s jurisdiction and will become part of the legal space 
in which the Convention operates.  In the Kosovan case of Behrami, in which 
judgment was handed down after Lawson published, the Court found that 
effective overall control was exercised by the United Nations, which is not a party 
to the Convention, and not by individual contributing states such as France.469  In 
relation to Lawson’s third and fourth categories, again there is no caselaw to 
support this bifurcation.  Whether authority is exercised over people and property 
on the territory of a Contracting or non-Contracting State is irrelevant.  Jurisdiction 
attaches to the fact of authority and control, independent of geography.  This is 
certainly the view taken by the UK House of Lords, which found that the UK’s 
Convention jurisdiction could attach under certain circumstances in occupied 
Iraq.470  Interestingly, Lawson has not included the so-called ‘Soering cases’ in his 
summary, though he did include them in his 2002 summary. 
299. In the House of Lords case mentioned above, Lord Brown identifies four 
categories of exceptions to the rule that jurisdiction is primarily territorial.  Based 
on his Lordship’s reading of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision of 
Bankovic, those four categories are:471 
(i) Where the state "through the effective control of the relevant territory and its 
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises 
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by [the government of 
that territory]" ... (i.e. when otherwise there would be a vacuum within a Council 
of Europe country, the government of that country itself being unable "to fulfil the 
obligations it had undertaken under the Convention" ...(as in Northern Cyprus). 
                                        
469 Behrami v France (2 May 2007) ECtHR 71412/01 & Saramati v France et al (2 May 2007) ECtHR 
78166/01, [113]-[114]: ‘KFOR was a multinational and international security presence so that at 
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470 Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26.  Finding no jurisdiction where UK 
troops, while on patrol in an Iraqi urban area in Iraq (over which they had no effective control), 
shot dead 5 people; but jurisdiction where an individual was taken prisoner, detained and beaten 
to death whilst in the custody of UK troops. 
471  Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [109] (Lord Brown). 
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(ii) "Cases involving the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and 
on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that state [where] 
customary international law and treaty provisions have recognised the extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction" ... 
(iii) Certain other cases where a state's responsibility "could, in principle, be 
engaged because of acts … which produced effects or were performed outside 
their own territory" .... Drozd v France...is the only authority specifically referred to 
in Bankovic as exemplifying this class of exception to the general rule... 
(iv) The Soering...line of cases, ...[which] involves action by the state whilst the 
person concerned is "on its territory, clearly within its jurisdiction" ... 
300. With respect, his Lordship’s first point appears to be a misreading of the Court’s 
concept of legal space in Bankovic.  The applicants in Bankovic had sought to rely 
on the Court’s reasoning in Cyprus v Turkey (2001), in which the court found 
Turkish jurisdiction and noted that to find otherwise would leave ‘a regrettable 
vacuum in the system of human rights protection’ in northern Cyprus.472  The 
applicants in Bankovic argued that the Convention had an ‘ordre public mission’ 
and that to find they fell outside its protection would “leave a regrettable vacuum 
in the Convention system of human rights’ protection”.473  The Court rejected this, 
explaining that the ‘regrettable vacuum’ to which it referred in Cyprus v Turkey 
(2001) would have resulted because the residents of the region, who but for 
Turkish occupation would have been protected by the Convention, would find 
themselves unprotected.  This was unacceptable to the Court.  In essence, 
occupation of a Contracting State’s sovereign territory does not remove the 
territory from the Convention’s espace juridique.  All Cypriots are still protected by 
the Convention by virtue of Cyprus’ ratification.  If I might be so bold, this is a 
species of what the common law calls ‘legitimate expectations’.  The Court 
distinguished the facts of Bankovic essentially because the residents of Belgrade 
had no legitimate expectation of falling within the Convention’s espace juridique: 
Serbia was not and had never been a Contracting State.  This is what the Court 
meant when it said that the Convention is primarily regional and does not apply to 
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the whole world.  It would be an error to assume that those under the effective 
control of a Contracting State on non-European territory would not also have 
legitimate expectations of falling within jurisdiction.  
301. In relation to Lord Brown’s second point, which is also a direct quote from 
Bankovic, it is a shame that his Lordship appears unaware that the Court was 
summarising its exposition of the law in Cyprus v Turkey (1975).  The 1975 
decision is much broader than the brief summary in Bankovic, referring to 
‘authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents and armed 
forces’.474  Again, in reference to the third category, while it is true that the 
Bankovic Court only referred to Drozd, in the latter it referred to a long line of 
authority.475  Finally, I cannot agree with his Lordship’s final category as a test for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, because it is a category of state responsibility.  Lord 
Brown himself acknowledges that these cases do not involve “the exercise of the 
state's jurisdiction abroad” and it is disappointing that he includes it nevertheless. 
302. Before I present my own attempt to summarise the Court’s caselaw on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, I note that the list of categories of circumstances which 
engage extraterritorial jurisdiction is not closed.  My summary only attempts to 
summarise the caselaw as it stood at the time of the Arar case and the Bali Nine.  
I note that the ‘Soering cases’ are not extraterritorial jurisdictional cases, because 
the individual to be refouled is already within jurisdiction.  These non-refoulement 
cases are best dealt with below under the more appropriate heading of ‘state 
responsibility’.  I also note that a Contracting Party’s Convention jurisdiction will 
                                        
474 Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136.  For full quote, see [261] 
above. 
475 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87, [91], citing examples 
of Commission decision on admissibility in: X v the Federal Republic of Germany (25 September 
1965) ECommHR 1611/62 (Yearbook, vol. 8, p. 158); Hess v. the United Kingdom (28 May 1975) 
ECommHR 6231/73 (Decisions and Reports (DR) no. 2, p. 72); Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) 
ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75 (DR 2, p. 125); X & Y v Switzerland (14 July 1977) ECommHR 
7289/75 and 7349/76 (DR 9, p. 57); and, W. v. the United Kingdom (28 February 1983) ECommHR 
9348/81 (DR 32, p. 190). For an account of many of these early cases, see: Tom Zwart (1994) n 
338, 109ff; see also, Al Skeini v Secretary for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911 (first instance decision).  
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only extend to its external territories if the Contracting Party has made a 
declaration under the Convention to this effect.476   
303. On one final note, an individual can fall under the jurisdiction of more than one 
Contracting State, such as the applicants in Ilascu who fell under both Moldovan 
and Russian jurisdiction.  However in these circumstances, the extent of each 
State’s responsibility to an individual within jurisdiction is not necessarily identical.  
Early on in its jurisprudence, the Commission also recognised the concept of ‘joint 
responsibility’, in which two or more parties share equal control over a territory or 
person and in which all decisions must be joint and unanimous.  In these 
circumstances, such as the detention of Herman Hess in Spandau prison, 
jurisdiction is joint and non-severable, leading to the conclusion that one party 
alone cannot be held responsible for any act or omission and therefore Convention 
jurisdiction does not attach.  In Ilascu, both respondent parties were Contracting 
States at the time of the application.  In the case of Hess, the USA and USSR, 
which held joint responsibility with the UK and France, were not Contracting 
States, but the Commission’s decision did not turn on this fact.  It might be that, if 
all respondent nations are Contracting States, then an applicant falls within some 
form of ‘joint jurisdiction’.  But this is pure speculation and, unfortunately, the 
exact parameters of joint jurisdiction remain unclear. 
304. Having reviewed the Court’s relevant caselaw, I conclude that the Court’s 
jurisdiction identifies four distinct categories in which a Contracting State’s 
‘jurisdiction’ will extend extraterritorially:477 
a. when a Contracting State exercises effective overall control of a 
foreign territory (‘effective control test’ of Loizidou); 
                                        
476 Thanh et al v UK (12 March 1990) ECommHR 16137/90; Quark Fishing Ltd v UK (19 September 
2006) ECtHR 15305/06.  See [271] & [287] above. 
477 the applicants in Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v UK (30 June 2009) ECtHR 61498/08 at [71] argued 
along similar lines, referring to (in my order): ‘the effective control over an area exception’, ‘the 
State agent authority exception’, and ‘the diplomatic exception’.  Gondek (2005), n 458 at 370-5, 
also (but less obviously) reduces the caselaw to the same three categories (in my order): ‘territorial 
control’; ‘control over persons’; and, ‘exceptions...recognised in international law and treaties’. 
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b. when a Contracting State exercises a decisive influence over a 
foreign administration in another Contracting State (‘decisive 
influence test’ of Ilascu); 
c. when agents of a Contracting State exercise authority over a person 
and/or property in a foreign territory (‘authority over people or 
property test’ of WM and Öcalan); or 
d. when, and to the extent that, customary international law or a treaty 
recognises extraterritorial jurisdiction (‘international law exceptions’). 
305. The effective control test for a Contracting State’s Convention jurisdiction is 
closely linked to control over foreign territory, either by way of military action or 
by agreement or acquiescence of the foreign sovereign power.478  Under such 
circumstances the Contracting State is obliged to secure all the Convention rights 
of everyone within the occupied territory over which it exercises effective control.  
The occupation of foreign territory can be long-term, as in the case of Turkey in 
northern Cyprus, or short-term, as in the case of Turkish military incursions into 
northern Iraq.  Furthermore, agents of a Contracting State who control foreign 
territory, but who act under the command and control of an international body 
(such as the UN Security Council) will not attract the Convention jurisdiction of a 
Contracting State because the State is not the body exercising effective total 
control.   
306. Jurisdiction also attaches in situations where a Contracting State exercises 
‘decisive influence’ over the administration of a separatist regime in another 
Contracting State.479  Presumably jurisdiction does not attach where a decisive 
influence is exercised over a separatist regime in a non-Contracting State.  This is 
because the people in that region have no legitimate expectation of protection 
under the Convention. 
                                        
478 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al (12 December 2001) ECtHR 52207/99, [60]. 
479 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [392]. 
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307. The authority and control test for jurisdiction is closely linked to the agents of a 
Contracting State exercising authority and control, lawfully or unlawfully, over 
people and/or property in foreign territory over which the Contracting State does 
not exercise effective control.  The foreign territory is not restricted to the region 
of Europe.  This application of jurisdiction is designed to ensure that a Contracting 
State cannot ‘perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another 
State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.480  In stating this reason, 
the Court cites inter alia the UN Human Rights Committee’s decision in Lopez 
Burgos.  The case of Al-Saadoon is a clear case of UK troops exercising authority 
and control over individuals in the foreign sovereign state of Iraq, by virtue of 
holding the individuals in detention.  Another example of agents exercising 
jurisdiction is judges of a Contracting State performing a judicial function on 
foreign soil in their capacity as judicial officers of that Contracting State.481  
Likewise in Issa, if there had been enough evidence of Turkish authority and 
control over the alleged victims, then Turkish Convention jurisdiction would have 
extended to the deceased men on Iraqi soil. 
308. In relation to the fourth category of cases, these involve little pockets of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised by international law and treaty law.  This 
includes embassies and consulates (under customary international law)482 and on 
board ships and aircraft registered in, or flying the flag of, a Contracting State and 
in international waters or airspace (under treaty law).483  These exceptions arise 
because a Contracting State’s Convention jurisdiction is, according to the Court, 
interpreted in conformity with the concept of jurisdiction at public international 
law.484 
                                        
480 Issa et al v Turkey (3 March 2005) ECtHR 31821/96, [71]. 
481 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87.  See [276] above.  
482 e.g. Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [97] (per Lord Carswell). 
483 see also [59]-[60]. 
484 e.g. see Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [312].  For a view that 
this is incorrect, see Milanovic (2008), n 372, 417. 
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5.3.3 state responsibility 
309. The extent of state responsibility is beyond the scope of this thesis, however I 
briefly cover it for completeness’ sake and where it is relevant to the issues of 
torture (Maher Arar) and the death penalty (Bali Nine). 
caselaw 
310. The facts of Soering are discussed above.485  It is best to view Soering as a non-
refoulement case.486  Many commentators, and even the early Court, categorise 
Soering  as a jurisdiction case, but it is best to recognise it as a matter of state 
responsibility.  Soering  is authority for the proposition that state responsibility 
may attach to the decision of a Contracting State to extradite an individual (who 
by definition is already within jurisdiction) to a country where there is a real and 
substantial risk that the individual’s fundamental Convention rights could be 
violated.  The concept of fundamental Convention rights is significant, because 
Soering  was decided as a ‘death row phenomenon’ case, turning on a violation of 
the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment.  The decision 
was not based on capital punishment as a violation of the right to life.     
311. The Court noted that not all of the extra-jurisdictional breaches of Convention 
rights attracts state responsibility.487  State responsibility only attaches to those 
Convention rights which enshrine ‘the fundamental values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe’.488  The guarantee against torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is such a fundamental right 
because no exceptions or derogations are permitted, even in times of war or 
national emergency.489  The prohibition on torture is absolute and no one should 
ever be extradited to face the real risk of torture.  The standard is reduced when 
                                        
485 see [267]. 
486 while Soering is an extradition case, its principles have been extended to include expulsion as 
well:  Cruz Varas et al. v Sweden (20 March 1991) ECtHR 15576/89, [70].  See also: Vilvarajah et 
al v UK (30 October 1991) ECtHR 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 & 13448/87. 
487 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [86]. 
488 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [85]. 
489 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [88]. 
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considering the guarantee against inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment.  An assessment of what constitutes such conditions is required to 
achieve:490 
...a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As 
movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger 
international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that 
suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the 
establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the 
State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the 
foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included among the 
factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the notions 
of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases. 
312. However, in exceptional circumstances, state responsibility will attach to any 
decision to extradite ‘in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks 
suffering a flagrant denial’ of a Convention right which ‘holds a prominent place in 
a democratic society’.491  The example the Court in Soering gives is the right to a 
fair trial.492  In the circumstances of Soering’s case, however, there was no such 
demonstrated risk associated with Soering’s potential trial in the United States.  As 
already stated, the non-refoulement principle attached to the ‘death row 
phenomenon’ in this case.  
313. The facts of Drozd v France are covered above.493  While most of the application 
was deemed inadmissible for want of jurisdiction, one ground was ruled 
admissible against France.  For centuries, offenders convicted in Andorra have 
served their sentence in a French prison.  Drozd argued that this detention in 
France was unlawful because inter alia the French courts had not satisfied 
themselves that the trial in Andorra complied with Convention standards.  The 
Court, applying Soering, found that the French courts did not have to do this.  
However, the Court reiterated that ‘Contracting States are...obliged to refuse their 
co-operation if it emerges that the conviction is the result of a flagrant denial of 
                                        
490 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [89]. 
491 Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88, [113]. 
492 see also: Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87, [110]. 
493 see [276] above. 
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justice’.494  The Court dismissed this complaint on the grounds that there was no 
evidence of a flagrant denial of justice. 
314. In its second judgment in Mrs Loizidou’s case, concerning the merits of the 
application, the Court clearly stated that a Contracting State could be held 
responsible for the acts and omissions of its agents ‘which produce effects outside 
their own territory’.495  Because Turkey exercised effective control over northern 
Cyprus, the Court found that local non-Turkish administrators  were subordinate 
to the Turkish authorities and, therefore, Turkey could be held responsible for the 
acts and omissions of these subordinate local administrators.496  Presumably a 
determination of whether Turkey was responsible for the actions of a local 
administration would only be made if there was little or no military presence and 
after a determination of whether Turkey exercises control over the administration 
and its policies.  But this further examination was not necessary in this instance, 
because of the overwhelming military presence. 
315. In Osman v UK, Mrs Osman and her son (Ahmet) brought an application alleging 
that the UK had failed to protect them and the deceased Mr Ali Osman from a 
dangerous private citizen.497  The applicants and the deceased were all British 
citizens living in London, so no jurisdictional issues arose.  Ahmet Osman attended 
a school at which Mr Paul Paget-Lewis taught.  Paget-Lewis was obsessed with the 
adolescent Ahmet Osman.  A series of inappropriate and criminal acts committed 
by Paget-Lewis were reported to police by the applicants, school authorities and 
other members of the public.  The police took several months to investigate these 
allegations and, before police could arrest and charge Paget-Lewis, he obtained a 
sawn-off shotgun and shot four people in their homes: killing Mr Ali Osman and 
the son of the school’s Deputy Principal; and wounding Ahmet Osman and the 
                                        
494 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87, [110]. 
495 Loizidou v Turkey (18 December 1996) ECtHR 15318/89 (merits), [52]. 
496 Loizidou v Turkey (18 December 1996) ECtHR 15318/89 (merits), [56]. 
497 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94 (Grand Chamber).  See also Lawson (2004), n 
397, 106 (though, Lawson incorrectly identifies this as a jurisdiction case, rather than a state 
responsibility case). 
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Deputy Principal.  The applicants alleged before the Grand Chamber that the UK 
had failed to take all ‘appropriate and adequate measures’ to secure the 
Convention right to life of Mr Osman and Ahmet Osman from the ‘real and known 
danger which Paget-Lewis posed’.498 
316. The Grand Chamber first set out the relevant principles of law in relation to a 
Contracting State’s positive obligation to secure the Convention right to life to 
everyone within their jurisdiction:499 
...bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources, [this positive] obligation must be 
interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for 
the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent 
that risk from materialising. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure 
that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner 
which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place 
restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to 
justice...  
317. Having established the principles which must be balanced in any determination of 
the breach of this Convention right, the Grand Chamber next turned to the 
requirement of a Contracting State’s knowledge with respect to a particular 
breach:500 
...where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive 
obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their [positive] duty to 
prevent and suppress offences against the person..., it must be established to its 
satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have 
been expected to avoid that risk.  
318. So before a Contracting State can be said to have breached this positive 
obligation, two circumstances must be satisfied.  First, there must be real or 
constructive knowledge, on the part of the State, of a real and immediate risk to 
                                        
498 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94, [101]. 
499 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94, [116]. 
500 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94, [116]. 
 – 130 –  
an individual.  Second, the State must have failed to use what power it has in the 
situation, to the extent that can be reasonably expected, to avoid that risk.  The 
Grand Chamber rejected the UK’s submission that gross negligence or wilful 
disregard was the requisite standard of state responsibility. 
319. The Grand Chamber summarised the applicant’s burden of proof in this fashion:501 
...it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that 
could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of 
which they have or ought to have knowledge. This is a question which can only be 
answered in the light of all the circumstances of any particular case. 
320. In Cyprus v Turkey (2001), Cyprus asked the Grand Chamber to recognise Turkish 
jurisdiction over the acts and omissions of private individuals in northern Cyprus.  
Having already found that Turkey had jurisdiction and an obligation to secure all 
Convention rights in the region,502 the Grand Chamber found that Turkish 
responsibility extended beyond the actions of its own nationals to include the acts 
and omissions ‘of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish 
military and other support’.503   The Grand Chamber further noted, in relation to 
Turkey’s state responsibility for the acts and omissions of private individuals in 
northern Cyprus, that: 504 
...the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the 
acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals 
within its jurisdiction may engage that State's responsibility under the Convention. 
321. In several cases determining a State’s responsibility for an alleged violation of the 
Convention, the Court has referred to and relied on the work of the International 
Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.  In Ilascu,505 the Grand Chamber cited the ILC’s 
Draft Articles with approval and accepted it as authority for the principle that a 
State may be held responsible for the acts and omissions of its agents even when 
                                        
501 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94, [116]. 
502 see [280] above. 
503 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94, [77]. 
504 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94, [81]. 
505 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [319]-[321]. 
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those agents are acting outside their authority.506  Or as the Court put it: “a 
State's authorities are strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates”.507  The 
Grand Chamber also cited with approval the ILC’s Draft Articles, and associated 
commentary, on the duration of state responsibility for a breach of an 
international obligation.508  In Behrami, the Grand Chamber again turned to the 
ILC’s Draft Articles, but in a more comprehensive manner and as authority for the 
principles relating to the responsibility of international organisations and States.509  
Specifically, the Grand Chamber adopted the ILC’s concept of ‘attribution’ in 
relation to identifying the entity responsible for any given act or omission.510  This 
willingness of the Grand Chamber to adopt the Draft Articles demonstrates an 
approval of their status as authority as a codification of international law on state 
responsibility.   
322. The applicants in Bader v Sweden were Kurds who had unsuccessfully sought 
asylum in Sweden on the grounds that they faced persecution if returned to 
Syria.511  Bader argued that he faced a substantial risk of execution if deported to 
Syria, in violation of his Convention rights to life (Article 2) and to be free of 
inhuman treatment or punishment (Article 3).512  The Court then traversed its 
jurisprudence and concluded that refoulement is prohibited by the Convention 
where Article 3 violations are likely, following Soering.513  With reference to capital 
punishment, the Court stated that the Convention does not necessarily prohibit 
refoulement in all death penalty cases.514  This is because, while Europe is a 
                                        
506 ILC Draft Principles, Article 7. 
507 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [319]. 
508 ILC Draft Principles, Articles 14 & 15, cited in Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) 
ECtHR 48787/99, [320]-[321]. 
509 Behrami v France (2 May 2007) ECtHR 71412/01 & Saramati v France et al (2 May 2007) ECtHR 
78166/01, [28]-[34]. 
510 Behrami v France (2 May 2007) ECtHR 71412/01 & Saramati v France et al (2 May 2007) ECtHR 
78166/01, [121]. 
511 Bader et al v Sweden (8 November 2005) ECtHR 13284/04. 
512 contrary to Articles 2 (right to life) & 3 (freedom from torture and cruel or inhuman treatment 
or punishment) of the Convention. 
513 see also: Öcalan v Turkey (12 May 2005) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 46221/99, [162]-[175]. 
514 Bader et al v Sweden (8 November 2005) ECtHR 13284/04, [41]-[42]. 
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“death penalty free zone”, the right to be free of capital punishment is only made 
a non-derogable right under Protocol 13 attached to the Convention, which has 
not been ratified by all European nations.515  Nevertheless, a Contracting State’s 
state responsibility might be engaged where the death sentence was the result of 
an unfair trial.  In short, the Convention prohibits refoulement in circumstances 
where ‘an alien...has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in 
the receiving State, the outcome of which was or is likely to be the death 
penalty’.516  In Mr Bader’s case, the Court considered his trial in Syria to be unfair 
and summary in nature.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that his refoulement 
would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 
323. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK,517 the Court observed that Protocol 13 establishes 
by implication a non-derogable right not to be subjected to the death penalty.  
The Court found that ratification of Protocol 13, therefore, removes the death 
penalty exception to Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention, thereby elevating 
Article 2 to the status of a “fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values 
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”.518  Consequently, 
for those Contracting States that have ratified Protocol 13, the principle of non-
refoulement now encompasses this implied right not to be subjected to the death 
penalty.  This extended the rulings in Soering  and Bader (both "death row 
phenomenon" cases based on Article 3) and closely follows the UN Human Rights 
Committee's finding in ARJ v Australia.519 
324. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, the applicants were Iraqi nationals arrested and 
detained by UK military forces in UK-occupied southern Iraq in 2003 on suspicion 
                                        
515 as at July 2009, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Poland, Russia had not ratified Protocol No. 13 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances: 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protoc
ols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/>. 
516 Bader et al v Sweden (8 November 2005) ECtHR 13284/04, [42]. 
517 Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v UK (2 March 2010) ECtHR 61498/08.  The earlier decision of 30 June 
2009 was a jurisdictional hearing, see [291] ff above. 
518 Al-Saadoon (2010), fn 517, [118]. 
519 see [162] ff. 
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of murdering UK nationals in Iraq.  The general facts are set out above.520  
Further and relevantly, in August 2004 Iraq reintroduced the death penalty for 
murder, and in November 2004 the UK and Iraq signed an MoU on the continued 
detention of prisoners by UK forces and their transfer upon request to the Iraqi 
authorities.521  Justifying the transfer of the inmates to Iraqi officials in December 
2008, the UK argued that international law required it to respect the sovereignty 
of Iraq and to transfer the suspects for trial.  The UK referred to the domestic 
decision of B.522  The Court distinguished the case of B on the grounds that B had 
voluntarily sought refuge in the British consulate in Melbourne, whereas the Iraqi 
detainees had been involuntarily arrested and detained by the UK.  Referring inter 
alia to the 2004 MoU, the Court found that, from the date Protocol 13 entered into 
force for the UK (1 February 2004), the UK “should not [have entered] into any 
arrangement or agreement which involved it in detaining individuals with a view to 
transferring them to stand trial on capital charges or in any other way subjecting 
individuals within its jurisdiction to a real risk of being sentenced to the death 
penalty and executed”.523  Furthermore, as the UK had originally arrested and 
detained the Iraqi nationals, the UK “was under a paramount obligation to ensure 
that the arrest and detention did not end in a manner which would breach the 
applicants' rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention [right to life and 
freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] and 
Article 1 of Protocol 13 [abolition of capital punishment and the implied right not 
to be subjected to the death penalty]”.524  Having found violations of the Covenant 
Articles 2 and 3, the Court ordered the UK to seek a guarantee that the men 
would not be executed, and awarded compensation and costs. 
                                        
520 see [291]-[293] above. 
521 Al-Saadoon (2010), fn 517, [23]-[25]. 
522 see [336] below. 
523 Al-Saadoon (2010), fn 517, [137]. 
524 Al-Saadoon (2010), fn 517, [140]. 
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analysis 
325. The European Court of Human Rights has developed its own jurisprudence on 
state responsibility, based on established principles of international law.  Since the 
adoption of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the Grand Chamber 
has shown a willingness to adopt the Draft Articles as an authoritative codification 
of that international law of state responsibility. 
326. In essence, once the Court has determined that a complaint falls within the 
Convention jurisdiction of a Contracting State, the legal focus shifts to the 
Contracting State’s state responsibility for the alleged Convention violation.  This 
state responsibility consists inter alia of negative obligations ‘to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of rights and freedoms guaranteed [by the 
Convention]’ and positive obligations to secure all the Convention rights to 
everyone within jurisdiction.525 
327. A Contracting State must discharge its positive obligations by taking all 
‘appropriate and sufficient’ measures. But it is not required to go beyond what is 
possible and proportionate in the circumstances.  The Court has acknowledged 
that it is not its role to dictate appropriate measures to Contracting States.  This is 
an alternative formulation of the ‘what can reasonably be expected’ standard.526  
In the discharge of these positive obligations:527   
...regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
general interest and the interests of the individual, the diversity of situations 
obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of 
priorities and resources. Nor must these obligations be interpreted in such a way 
as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden. 
...Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should 
take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that 
the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. 
                                        
525 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [313]. 
526 see [329] below, referring to Osman v UK. 
527 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [332], [334]. 
 – 135 –  
328. These positive obligations must not place ‘an impossible or disproportionate 
burden’ of responsibility on a Contracting State.  For example, the scope of these 
positive obligations might be limited in cases where part of the national territory of 
a Contracting State is not under its effective control, however even with such 
limitations a Contracting State is required to take ‘all appropriate measures’ within 
its power to discharge these obligations in the occupied or rebellious region.528  
The scope of these positive obligations will also be limited when agents of the 
Contracting State operate in the territory of a foreign State, simply because the 
Contracting State’s agents must respect the sovereignty of that foreign nation by 
obeying local law. 
329. To satisfy the Court that a Contracting State has breached its positive obligations 
to protect an individual’s right to life, an applicant must ‘show that the authorities 
did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and 
immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge’.529   
330. State responsibility also extends to the actions and omissions of subordinate local 
administrators in a foreign territory over which a Contracting State has 
jurisdiction.  This is so, even if those administrators are not nationals of the 
Contracting State.  To the extent that a Contracting State, in these circumstances 
of foreign occupation, colludes or acquiesces in the actions of private individuals 
which violate Convention rights, the Contracting State may be held responsible for 
those actions.530 
331. A Contracting State's state responsibility may also extend to acts which have 
‘sufficiently proximate repercussions’ on Convention rights, ‘even if those 
repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction’.  Of course, the individual complainant 
must be within jurisdiction to begin with in such cases.  This class of case deals 
with acts or omissions made within jurisdiction, which have adverse consequences 
outside jurisdiction.  The non-refoulement, or Soering-type cases, are of this class. 
                                        
528 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [313] & [332]. 
529 Osman v UK (28 October 1998) ECtHR 23452/94, [116].  
530 Cyprus v Turkey (10 May 2001) ECtHR 25781/94, [81]. 
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332. The principle of non-refoulement applies to the actions of a Contracting State 
where a decision to expel, extradite or surrender an individual within its 
jurisdiction to another State in circumstances where there are substantial risks of 
a breach of the individual’s fundamental Convention rights.  The Court has 
recognised that fundamental rights are those which are inter alia considered 
fundamental at international law or because they are non-derogable in the 
Convention or its attached Protocols.  The Court recognises the application of the 
principle of non-refoulement in all cases where there are ‘substantial grounds for 
believing that [an individual]...faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.531   The Court recognises the non-refoulement principle in death 
penalty cases, at least for those Contracting States that have ratified Protocol 13, 
as a violation of Article 2 of the Convention (right not to be executed).532  The 
Court also acknowledges the non-refoulement principle in all cases where there 
has been, or is a risk of, a flagrant breach of the right to a fair trial, as a violation 
of Article 6 of the Convention.533 
5.4 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
333. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also recognised 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.  It favours a test along these lines: “when 
agents of a state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and authority over 
persons outside national territory, the state's obligation to respect human rights 
continues”.534  The nexus is power and authority over individuals, no matter where 
that occurs. 
                                        
531 Ilascu et al v Moldova & Russia (8 July 2004) ECtHR 48787/99, [317]. 
532 Al-Saadoon (2010), fn 517. 
533 Öcalan v Turkey (12 May 2005) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 46221/99, [166].  See also: Bader et 
al v Sweden (8 November 2005) ECtHR 13284/04, [42]. 
534 Armando Alejandre Jnr v Cuba (“Brothers to the Rescue”) (29 Sept 1999) IACHR 86/99, [25]. 
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5.5 Other domestic courts 
5.5.1 United Kingdom 
334. The question of human rights jurisdiction was unsettled in the United Kingdom.  In 
the leading case of Al Skeini v Secretary of Defence, the House of Lords followed 
the European Court of Human Rights.535  However, lower courts in the UK have 
had difficulty reconciling the common law with the Human Rights Act  and 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
335. In Al Skeini family members of six Iraqis killed by UK forces in Iraq sought relief 
from British courts.  The majority in the House of Lords decision relied on 
Bankovic to conclude that the first five appellants, whose family members had 
been killed while UK troops were patrolling urban areas, were not within 
jurisdiction.536   The majority found that UK troops did not have effective control 
of the areas in which they were patrolling537.   However, the sixth Iraqi was killed 
while he was under detention in a UK military base in Iraq and was, therefore, 
within jurisdiction.  In this case, the House of Lords had difficulty reconciling the 
European decision of Issa with Bankovic.  This appears to be because their 
Lordships did not accept the ‘authority and control’ test over individuals, while 
recognising the ‘effective control’ test over territory.538  In 2011, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the UK had 
jurisdiction in all six cases under the ‘authority and control’ test on the grounds 
that the UK had assumed the responsibility for security in this area of Iraq and 
“through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in 
question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of 
                                        
535 Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26.  Finding no jurisdiction where UK 
troops, while on patrol in an urban area in Iraq, shot dead 5 people; but jurisdiction where an 
individual was taken prisoner and beaten to death in detention by UK troops. 
536 Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 (Lord Rodger, Baroness Hale & Lord 
Carswell; Lord Brown (six appellant only within jurisdiction of European Convention of Human 
Rights but not Human Rights Act); and, Lord Bingham dissenting). 
537 e.g. Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [97] (Lord Carswell): 
extraterritorial jurisdiction requires ‘high degree of control’. 
538 e.g. Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [82] (Lord Bingham). 
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such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the 
deceased and the United Kingdom”.539  The Grand Chamber went on to find that 
the UK had breached its procedural duties in the investigation of the deaths in all 
five cases.    
336. In the case of B, the UK Court of Appeal examined the extent of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on consular premises.  The applicants in this case were two juveniles 
who had arrived in Australia with their mother by boat in 2001.  The Australian 
government had refused them asylum on the grounds that it did not believe their 
claims that they were Afghan Hazaras.  The boys escaped from an immigration 
detention centre in the Australian desert and sought asylum in the British 
Consulate in Melbourne.  Asylum was refused and the boys were returned to 
Australian authorities.  The boys appealed this administrative decision in the 
British courts.   
337. In the UK Court of Appeal, two preliminary jurisdictional issues arose.540  The first 
issue involved whether the European Convention on Human Rights applied to the 
actions of the British consular officials in Melbourne.  The second issue concerned 
whether the Human Rights Act applied to the actions of British consular officials in 
Melbourne. 
338. Delivering the decision of the Court, Lord Phillips examined the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights from X v Federal Republic of Germany 
through to Ocalan v Turkey, recognising the importance of the exceptional nature 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction as identified in Bankovic.  Lord Phillips then examined 
the nature of jurisdiction that diplomatic and consular officials exercise.  Relying 
principally on WM v Denmark, Lord Phillips concluded that the protection afforded 
the boys in the British Consulate brought them under the authority of British 
consular officials and attracted Convention jurisdiction.541  For separate reasons 
based on domestic considerations, his Lordship also concluded that the acts of 
                                        
539 Al-Skeini v UK (7 July 2011) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 55721/07, [150]. 
540 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [25]. 
541 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [66]. 
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British officials in Melbourne fell within the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act.542  
Having found jurisdiction, the Court moved on to consider whether these 
instruments had been breached. 
339. It is important to understand that the consular officials were not accused of any 
action which violated the boys’ Convention rights.  Rather, the complaint was that 
by allowing Australian officials to arrest the boys, the British consular officials had 
exposed the boys to the real risk of a violation of their Convention rights, 
specifically that Australian officials would return them to mandatory immigration 
detention in the desert where the boys faced cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.543  In this light, the court saw this issue as one of state responsibility: 
when does a country have a duty to provide refuge on foreign soil.  Lord Phillips 
concluded that this duty arises, and is defined, in international law.  This duty 
arises when a fugitive faces ‘the risk of death or injury as the result of lawless 
disorder’.  But, in deference to the principle of territorial sovereignty, consular 
officials must hand over a fugitive as requested by the lawful sovereign, unless 
the requesting state ‘intends to subject the fugitive to treatment so harsh as to 
constitute a crime against humanity’.544  In obiter dicta, Lord Phillips speculated 
that the threshold at international law for granting diplomatic asylum might be 
lower than this.545  When applying this law to the facts, his Lordship reformulated 
the legal threshold as ‘immediate likelihood of experiencing serious injury’546 and, 
later, as a ‘perceived risk to the physical safety of the applicants…[which] was 
immediate and severe’ that refusing asylum would violate consular duties under 
international law.547  On the facts, this appeal was dismissed because the threat 
faced by the boys in the hands of Australian authorities was not so severe as to 
constitute an unacceptable violation of human rights. 
                                        
542 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [79]. 
543 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [80]. 
544 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [88]. 
545 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [89]. 
546 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [89]. 
547 R(B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, [93]. 
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340. B’s case was followed by the English Court of Appeal in Al-Saadoon.548  In this 
case, the court found that the UK, if bound by treaty, must return a person held 
by it in foreign territory (Iraq) to the local government unless such surrender 
would result in a crime against humanity.  As the death penalty is not a crime 
against humanity at international law, the UK must comply with its treaty 
obligations and hand a suspect over to face the real risk of capital punishment.  
This decision found no Convention jurisdiction.  However, the European Court of 
Human Rights overruled this decision and found jurisidiction based on authority 
and control.549  This ends the line of English authority limiting Convention 
jurisdiction where authority and control is not in question. 
5.5.2 United States of America 
341. Owing to the executive and legislative response in the United States to the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States Supreme Court has had 
to deal with several cases involving the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US legislation 
and the US Constitution.  While a narrow reading might limit these cases to the 
unique circumstances of Guantanamo Bay, it is possible to see a broader trend 
toward adapting a control test. 
342. Rasul v Bush was the first Guantanamo  Bay case to come before the Supreme 
Court.550  The case dealt with the issue of the extraterritorial reach of US statutory 
law.  The Supreme Court majority found US courts had jurisdiction in Guantanamo 
Bay because, by treaty with Cuba, US authorities have “complete jurisdiction and 
control” over the territory.  
                                        
548 Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 7 (Court of Appeal). 
549 Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 7 (Court of Appeal).  
This decision has been appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, see [Error! Reference 
source not found.] above.  
550 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466.  The case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2004) 542 US 1, was not a 
case about jurisdiction, because it did not involve Guantanamo Bay.  It confirmed the constitutional 
rights of an American citizen captured in Afghanistan & transported to South Carolina, where he 
was held on a naval brig. 
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343. The two Australian and 12 Kuwaiti applicants sought habeas corpus review of their 
detention at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The naval base was on 
the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cuba, which was leased to the United 
States.  The terms of the lease included a provision that ‘the United States shall 
exercise complete jurisdiction and control’ over the leased territory.551 
344. The jurisdictional question was summarised by the majority in this way:552 
The question now before us is whether the habeas statute confers a right to 
judicial review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in a territory over 
which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 
‘ultimate sovereignty’. 
345. The source of habeas jurisdiction upon which the applicants relied was legislation 
passed by Congress.553  The government argued inter alia that ‘congressional 
legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless such intent is 
clearly manifested’.554  However, the government conceded in argument that the 
federal courts would have jurisdiction to hear a claim for statutory relief made by 
a US citizen held at Guantanamo Bay.555  The question really came down to one of 
whether the legislation applied to aliens.  Since there was no express exclusion of 
aliens in the statute, the majority concluded that the statutory writ of habeas 
corpus applies to anyone in US custody, both citizen and alien.556  The majority 
drew further support for their conclusion from the long common law history of the 
writ, which applies to any territory “under the sovereign’s control”.557 
346. Another interesting argument relied on by the majority, but expressed in terms of 
control over territory, amounts to an in-the-custody-and-control argument.  The 
writ of habeas lies against the gaoler not the prisoner.558  Therefore, so long as 
the gaoler ‘can be reached by service of process’ (i.e. served with court papers), 
                                        
551 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 471. 
552 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 475. 
553 s.2241 of title 28, United States Code. 
554 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 480. 
555 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 481. 
556 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 480-1. 
557 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 482. 
558 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 478-9. 
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the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the matter.  Such service of process is 
possible at Guantanamo Bay because the territory is under the ‘complete 
jurisdiction and control’ of the US.  Here, jurisdiction is not founded on sovereign 
territory, but control of the relevant territory.  Given that habeas lies against those 
holding the detainees in custody at Guantanamo Bay (as agents of the US 
military), it follows that the court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.559 
347. The federal habeas statute limits the courts jurisdiction to the ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ of the United States.  This was potentially fatal to the applicant’s 
claims.  In the pivotal passage, the majority appears to extend the meaning of 
‘territorial sovereignty’ to incorporate the concepts of both sovereign territory and 
territory over which jurisdiction and control is established by other means (such as 
by lease or treaty):560 
Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other 
contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with 
respect to persons detained within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.  
By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises 
"complete jurisdiction and control" over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may 
continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses. 
348. Much in this case turned on the terms of the lease, as evidence of jurisdiction and 
the extraterritorial application of US laws.  The lease demonstrated that the US 
controlled the territory in which the applicants were detained.  This brought the 
area within the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States, a somewhat larger 
concept than ‘sovereign territorial jurisdiction’. 
349. In Boumediene v Bush issues similar to Rasul v Bush arose, but this time relating 
to the extraterritorial reach of the US Constitution with respect to Guantanamo 
detainees.561  The majority found that it is sufficient for the United States to 
exercise de facto sovereignty over a territory in order for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to exist. 
                                        
559 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 483-4. 
560 Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466, 480. 
561 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229. 
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350. In 2005, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v Bush, Congress 
had passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which amended the habeas statute and 
purported to remove the right of aliens held at Guantanamo to seek a habeas writ 
in any US court.562  In the place of habeas, the Act instituted habeas-like 
procedures.  The Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) was created to review 
a detainee’s detention and to determine a detainee’s status as an ‘enemy 
combatant’.  A detainee had limited appeal rights to the US Court of Appeals. 
351. The US Constitution prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus, except ‘when 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it’.563  The main 
issues in this case were whether this Suspension Clause applied to the Detainee 
Treatment Act and, if so, whether the ‘habeas-like’ procedures were adequate.  If 
the procedures of the CSRT were inadequate, then they would amount to an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus if the Suspension Clause applied. 
352. The government contended that the US Constitution did not extend to non-citizens 
outside of US territory.  The government argued that the applicants could not seek 
constitutional relief because (1) they are non-citizens designated as enemy 
combatants and (2) because they are held outside the sovereign territory of the 
United States.564 
353. The government also took the view that historically the writ of habeas corpus ran 
only to the King’s sovereign territory.565  Since Guantanamo Bay is located outside 
the sovereign territory of the United States, the writ did not run there and the 
constitutional Suspension Clause cannot apply to the detainees.566 
                                        
562 in Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006) 548 US 1, the Supreme Court majority held that these 
amendments did not apply to applications already on foot when Congress passed the changes.  
Note: in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, the issue of jurisdiction was not litigated.  The case dealt with the 
procedures and legality of the military commissions set up to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 
563 Article I(9)(2). 
564 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2244. 
565 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2248.  The applicants argued that the writ runs with 
the King’s officers. 
566 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2251. 
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354. In response to this argument, the Supreme Court majority clarified its rather 
confused definition of ‘territorial sovereignty’ from Rasul v Bush.  In Boumedine, 
the majority made a clear distinction between de jure sovereign territory and de 
facto sovereign territory.  The majority deferred to the government’s view that 
Cuba is the de jure sovereign of Guantanamo Bay.567  However, the majority 
confirmed the view in Rasul v Bush that the United States ‘maintains de facto 
sovereignty over this territory’, due to the US’ ‘complete jurisdiction and control 
over the base’.568 
355. The majority rejected the government’s assertion that habeas runs only to 
territory over which the United States has de jure sovereignty.569  The majority 
noted that, arising principally from a line of cases known as the Insular Cases,570 
the Court’s jurisprudence states that the Constitution extends completely over 
those territories which the US intends to incorporate into the Union.  While in 
territories which the US does not intend to govern indefinitely and which are 
therefore likely to gain independence (e.g. occupied Germany and Japan after the 
Second World War), the government is expected to guarantee ‘certain 
fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution’.571  The majority also 
observed the obvious separation of powers problems with the government’s 
view:572 
The necessary implication of the [government’s] argument is that by surrendering 
formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the 
same time entering into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to 
the United States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without 
legal constraint. 
                                        
567 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2252-3. 
568 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2253. 
569 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2253. 
570 see Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2254ff. 
571 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2255. 
572 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2258-9 (footnotes omitted). 
 – 145 –  
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants 
Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, 
not the power to decide when and where its terms apply. Even when the United 
States acts outside its borders, its powers are not "absolute and unlimited" but are 
subject "to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution”. Abstaining from 
questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To 
hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at 
will is quite another. The former position reflects this Court's recognition that 
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the political branches. 
The latter would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, 
leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say "what 
the law is." 
These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question in 
the cases now before us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable 
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.  The test for determining the 
scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those 
whose power it is designed to restrain. 
356. During their reasoning the majority referred again to the Insular cases and 
distinguished Guantanamo Bay from US-occupied Germany or the US colony of 
the Philippines:573 
Guantanamo Bay, on the other hand, is no transient possession. In every practical 
sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
357. The majority saw no problems arising from the concurrent jurisdiction of the US 
and Cuba over Guantanamo, since the terms of the lease grant to the US 
complete and total control of the territory.574  While it must abide by the terms of 
the lease treaty with Cuba, ‘the United States is, for all practical purposes, 
answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base’.575   
358. The majority of the court concluded that the constitutional protection of habeas 
corpus extended to the non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay.576  Having 
disposed of the jurisdictional question, the majority then went on to find that the 
habeas-like procedures of the Detainee Treatment Act were an inadequate 
                                        
573 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261. 
574 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261. 
575 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261. 
576 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2262. 
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substitute for habeas corpus and, therefore, amounted to an unconstitutional 
suspension of habeas corpus.577 The CSRT process was inadequate because 
detainees did not have access to a lawyer or all the evidence against them.578  
The appeal rights were also deemed inadequate for many reasons, including the 
inability of a detainee to present exculpatory evidence gathered since the CSRT 
hearing.579 
5.6 Australian Practice 
359. After the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, the Howard government 
authorised police-to-police cooperation between Australian and Indonesian police.  
Assistance was provided for both the investigation580 and prosecution581 of the 
terrorist offences.  Australian government action was premised on legal advice to 
the Australian government that:582 
The obligations under the ICCPR (and therefore also the OP) apply to 
“…individuals within [Australia’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.  This 
Department has previously advised that, in its view, the ICCPR and OP do not 
apply to individuals outside of Australia’s territory or not subject to Australia’s 
jurisdiction.  In the Bali attacks, the issue of Australia’s obligations under the 
ICCPR and OP do not arise. 
                                        
577 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2274. 
578 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2269. 
579 Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2273-4. 
580 Under the new MOU signed with the INP earlier in 2002 (see n 164), the AFP quickly offered its 
investigative and forensic assistance.  Within a week of the Bali bombings in 2002, official 
documents were publicly signed in Jakarta establishing an investigative task force, jointly headed 
by the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the AFP.   The task force was called Operation 
Alliance: Kerry O’Brien, ‘Indonesia, Aust join forces in Bali investigation’, 7:30 Report (ABC-TV), 16 
October 2002, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2002/s703502.htm>. 
581 the AFP prepared 20 victim impact statements to be used in the death penalty sentencing 
proceedings of the Bali bombers. See Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Assistance with criminal 
investigations in death penalty cases’ (9 April 2003) 2: released by the Attorney-General’s 
Department under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) to the New South Wales Council for 
Civil Liberties (December 2007), f.84 (“folio 84”), <www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/dpfoi.pdf>. 
582 NSWCCL, FOI docs, n 581, f.82. 
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360. Further advice from government lawyers appears to define the conditions under 
which a person, outside of Australia's territory, is not "subject to Australia's 
jurisdiction" :583 
• all charges are laid by foreign authorities abroad; 
• the persons charged are not Australian citizens; 
• the persons charged have not been extradited or otherwise removed from 
Australia's territory or jurisdiction; and 
• the persons charged are 18 years or over. 
361. The first point ensures that Australian judicial jurisdiction is not invoked.  The 
second point acknowledges the nationality principle at public international law.  
The third point acknowledges Soering-type cases.  The fourth point acknowledges 
Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  However, 
the Australian view is that, assuming none of these four conditions are satisfied, 
then assistance can be provided in death penalty cases.  
362. It should be noted that, consistent with this legal advice, the Australian 
government sought and obtained from the United States a guarantee that the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks would not be 
executed.584 
363. The Australian government which succeeded the Howard administration did not 
significantly change this view.  In response to question from the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the Rudd government did not acknowledge that Australian agents 
acting abroad (in territory over which they exercise no control) are required to 
comply with the ICCPR.  It only acknowledges that such agents must comply with 
Australian domestic law with extraterritorial application.  This means that 
                                        
583 Letter from Justice Minister Chris Ellison to AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty (20 February 2003). 
See: NSWCCL, Australia and the Death Penalty: A guide to confidential government documents 
obtained under FOI (2008), <http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/dpfoi%20guide.pdf>, [31]. 
584 on the Khadr-type question of whether a government has a duty to assist its nationals abroad, 
see: Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299, [93] (dismissing government application to strike out an 
application by David Hicks for an order requiring Australia to repatriate him to Australia).  
Ultimately, the Federal Court never heard the case because Mr Hicks withdrew his application, after 
he was returned to Australia. 
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Australian agents acting abroad may assist in death penalty cases, given that the 
only relevant domestic legislation is the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 
which does not apply to all forms of cooperation (e.g. direct police-to-police 
assistance) and which authorises assistance in death penalty cases with ministerial 
approval.585  Nor does the reply acknowledge the implied obligation to ensure 
Australia exposes no one to the real risk of execution for any offence. 
5.7 Canadian jurisprudence 
364. In Canada, the Supreme Court has rejected the ‘effective control’ test for 
extraterritorial application of the Charter.  While recognising the extraterritorial 
application of legislative and judicial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has 
constrained the operation of executive extraterritorial jurisdiction with a ‘consent’ 
test.  Canadian law, including the Charter, may only be applied on foreign territory 
where the foreign sovereign power consents to its application.  There is one 
recognised exception to this rather narrow interpretation: where Canadian officials 
abroad act contrary to Canada’s international obligations, the Charter will step in 
to protect Canadian citizens by restricting the unlawful activity of Canadian 
agents. 
365. Mr Hape, a Canadian citizen, was the subject of an RCMP anti-money laundering 
investigation.  With the permission of local authorities and acting under the 
supervision of local police, RCMP officers undertook covert searches of Mr Hape’s 
office in the archipelago of the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British Territory in the 
Caribbean.  At Mr Hape’s trial in Canada on charges of money laundering, the 
Crown adduced evidence that had been obtained during those searches, but did 
not adduce the warrants authorising those searches.  Mr Hape argued 
unsuccessfully at trial, and again unsuccessfully before the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, that the evidence was inadmissible on the ground that the searches were 
                                        
585 Commonwealth of Australia, Replies to the list of issues (ccpr/c/aus/q/5) to be taken up in 
connection with the consideration of the fifth periodic report of the government of Australia (21 
January 2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/Add.1. 
 – 149 –  
conducted without a warrant and therefore violated his Charter guarantee to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
366. The sole issue in the appeal before the Supreme Court was ‘whether the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to extraterritorial searches and seizures by 
Canadian police officers’.586  While all the Justices of the Supreme Court dismissed 
Mr Hape’s appeal, their reasons revealed a Court deeply divided on the issue of 
the extraterritorial reach of the Charter.  The majority declared that the Charter 
can only have extraterritorial reach where a Canadian agent abroad acts where 
there is ‘an exception to the principle of sovereignty’, such as when a foreign 
power consents to the application of the Charter in its territory.587  Three 
dissenting Justices found this test too narrow, criticised the consent test and 
preferred a ‘control test’.588  This minority thought the law required Canadian 
agents, no matter where they are in the world, to comply with the Charter.  This 
‘control test’ does not prohibit the participation of Canadian agents in foreign 
investigations which offend the Charter, but the test directs that Canadian agents 
must not take a ‘primary or directing role’ in such circumstances.589  Binnie J, in a 
separate judgment, preferred the Court’s earlier legal test from Cook, which stated 
that the Charter applied to the actions of Canadian agents abroad where those 
actions did not ‘generate an objectionable extraterritorial effect’ by interfering with 
the sovereignty of the state in which they act.590 
367. The majority observed that the Canadian Constitution places no jurisdictional 
limits on the Charter.591  However, they concluded that both international law and 
the principle of the comity of nations nevertheless limit the operation of the 
                                        
586 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [1] & [24]. 
587 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [113] (McLachlin CJ and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish & Charron JJ). 
588 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [178] (Bastarache, Abella & Rothstein JJ). 
589 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [154] & [162] (Bastarache, Abella & Rothstein JJ). 
590 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [181]-[182] (Binnie J).  However, the majority in Hape criticised 
the Cook decision: see [83]-[95].  Therefore, Hape effectively replaces the rule from R v Cook 
[1998] 2 SCR 597. 
591 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [33]. 
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Charter extraterritorially.592  Canada may not interfere in the affairs or territory of 
other nations.  However, in obiter the majority observed that this respect for 
sovereign equality of nations and the principles of non-interference and 
territoriality has its limits in criminal investigations:593 
In an era characterized by transnational criminal activity and by the ease and 
speed with which people and goods now cross borders, the principle of comity 
encourages states to co-operate with one another in the investigation of 
transborder crimes even where no treaty legally compels them to do so. At the 
same time, states seeking assistance must approach such requests with comity 
and respect for sovereignty. Mutuality of legal assistance stands on these two 
pillars. Comity means that when one state looks to another for help in criminal 
matters, it must respect the way in which the other state chooses to provide the 
assistance within its borders. That deference ends where clear violations of 
international law and fundamental human rights begin. If no such violations are in 
issue, courts in Canada should interpret Canadian law, and approach assertions of 
foreign law, in a manner respectful of the spirit of international co-operation and 
the comity of nations. 
368. A corollary of this observation is that the actions of Canadian agents abroad, 
beyond the reach of the Charter, might be unlawful where they violate Canada’s 
international obligations.594  This would cover instances where fundamental 
human rights are breached, such as the prohibition on torture.  In the following 
year, the Supreme Court was to confirm this corollary as law in the case of Omar 
Khadr. 
369. In 2002 Mr Omar Khadr, a 15 year-old Canadian citizen, was captured by US 
forces in Afghanistan and sent to the US military facility at Guantanamo Bay as an 
‘unlawful enemy combatant’.  On various occasions in 2003 and 2004, Mr Khadr 
was interviewed at Guantanamo Bay by Canadian intelligence and foreign affairs 
officials, who shared the information obtained from these interviews with US 
officials.  In 2005, Mr Khadr was indicted before a US military commission on 
charges of murdering a US soldier in battle by throwing a grenade and of 
                                        
592 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [40]-[41]. 
593 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [52]. 
594 Hape v R [2007] 2 SCR 292, [101]. 
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conspiring with al-Qaeda to launch terrorist attacks against US forces in 
Afghanistan.  Mr Khadr denied all charges. 
370. In order to prepare his defence, Mr Khadr asked the Canadian government for 
copies of all the information it held about these charges, including the information 
gathered during his interviews at Guantanamo Bay.  The government refused and 
Mr Khadr sought a declaration (of mandamus) from the Canadian Federal Court 
ordering the Canadian government to disclose this material to him.  As a 
preliminary matter, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered that all relevant 
documents be delivered unredacted to the Court for judicial review.  The 
government appealed this preliminary decision to the Supreme Court. 
371. Before the Supreme Court, Mr Khadr argued that he has a right to view these 
documents, under section 7 of the Charter, which requires Canadian officials to 
conduct themselves ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’ when someone’s 
liberty is at stake.595  The government, relying on Hape, argued that the Charter 
did not apply to the actions of Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay because the 
US had not given its consent for Canadian law to apply. 
372. The Supreme Court explained that, while it had been divided in Hape on the 
extent of the Charter’s extraterritorial application, the Court had nevertheless been 
united on the point that the principle of “comity cannot be used to justify 
Canadian participation in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary 
to Canada’s international obligations”.596  So if a Canadian participated in US 
activities at Guantanamo Bay which were contrary to Canada’s international 
obligations, then the Charter would apply to the extent of that participation.  
However, if US activities at Guantanamo Bay were not contrary to Canada’s 
international obligations, then Hape dictates that the Charter cannot apply to 
Canadian participation because the US had never consented to the Charter 
applying at Guantanamo Bay. 
                                        
595 Canada (Minister for Justice) et al v Omar Khadr et al [2008] 2 SCR 125, [29]. 
596 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [18]. 
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373. At this point the Supreme Court was confronted with the difficult question of 
whether it is appropriate for a Canadian court to adjudicate the legality of a 
foreign process.  However, in this instance, the Canadian Supreme Court simply 
deferred to two significant decisions of the US Supreme Court concerning the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, which:597 
...held that the detainees [at Guantanamo Bay] had illegally been denied access to 
habeas corpus and that the procedures under which they were to be prosecuted 
violated the Geneva Conventions. Those holdings are based on principles 
consistent with the Charter and Canada’s international law obligations. In the 
present appeal, this is sufficient to establish violations of these international law 
obligations, to which Canada subscribes. 
374. The Canadian Supreme Court noted that Canada was bound at international law 
by the same Geneva Conventions and that the Canadian Charter and other treaty 
obligations recognised the law of habeas corpus.598  As CSIS had conducted its 
interviews at Guantanamo and shared the relevant information with the Americans 
at the time covered by these US Supreme Court decisions, specifically during 2003 
and 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court had no difficulty concluding that CSIS’ 
participation in that process was contrary to Canada’s international obligations.  
This meant that the Charter applied in Mr Khadr’s case.  It is important to note 
that the Court did not decide whether the interviews, of themselves, violated the 
Charter, nor whether the handing over of the information, of itself, violated the 
Charter.  Under different circumstances these activities may have been lawful.  
However, the Court concluded that, by sharing the information from the Khadr 
interviews with the Americans at Guantanamo Bay, where processes were 
contrary to international law (as confirmed by the US Supreme Court), Canadian 
officials became participants in processes contrary to Canada’s international 
obligations.  This engaged the extraterritorial operation of the Charter.599 
                                        
597 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [21], citing Rasul v Bush (2004) 542 US 466 (re: habeus 
corpus) & Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006) 126 S. Ct. 2749 (re:Geneva Conventions). 
598 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [25]-[26]. 
599 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [27]. 
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375. By participating in the unlawful processes at Guantanamo Bay, Canada had 
breached Mr Khadr’s constitutional rights to liberty and personal security.  In these 
circumstances, the Charter imposes ‘a duty on Canada to provide disclosure of 
materials in its possession arising from its participation in the foreign process that 
is contrary to international law and jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian citizen’.600  
As a consequence, the Canadian Crown was required to disclose to Mr Khadr all 
records of the interviews and all material given to the Americans as a direct 
consequence of the interviews, subject to national security and other public policy 
considerations.601  The matter was remitted to the lower court to determine which 
documents could be released to Mr Khadr.602 
376. The lower court decision is significant because, after reviewing all the Khadr 
interview material, the court came to an astounding conclusion: Canada was 
aware of Mr Khadr’s torture at Guantanamo Bay and failed to take steps to stop 
it.603  (It is no wonder that the government fought so hard to keep the material 
from the court, Mr Khadr and the public.)  As a matter of public interest, the court 
ordered the government to release the bulk of the interview material.  
Subsequently, the taped interviews were broadcast on national television,604 
showing a scared young man asking for help. 
377. In Slahi v Canada, two non-citizen applicants sought disclosure of their records of 
interview with Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay.605  The facts were 
essentially identical to Mr Khadr’s except that these applicants were not Canadian 
citizens.  This proved fatal to their applications.  Because they failed to establish a 
nexus to Canada such as citizenship or being within Canadian territory, the 
                                        
600 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [31]. 
601 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [37] & [41]. 
602 Canada v Khadr [2008] 2 SCR 125, [38].  The Federal Court ordered that the videos of the 
interviews be released.  The videos were broadcast on Canadian national television. 
603 Khadr v Canada [2008] FC 807 (Mosley J). 
604 see e.g.: cbcnews.ca, “'You don't care about me’, Omar Khadr sobs in interview tapes” (15 July 
2008) <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/07/15/khadr-tapes.html>. 
605 Slahi v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2009] FCJ 141 (Blanchard J). 
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Federal Court dismissed their case.606  This case confirms that the Charter will only 
protect Canadian citizens, where the foreign government consents to the 
application of Canadian law or where Canadian agents act contrary to Canada’s 
international obligations.  The status of permanent residents was not raised in this 
case, but it is likely that permanent residency might establish a sufficient nexus to 
Canada to engage extraterritorial protection. 
378. In summary, if Canadian police were to participate in activities contrary to 
Canada’s international obligations, then the Charter’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
could conceivably be invoked.  In Soering-type cases of domestic actions resulting 
in human rights violations abroad, Charter rights would be engaged.  
5.8 some final comments 
379. The question of the extraterritorial application of domestic and international 
human rights law is a complicated one.  The first question arising is the question 
of jurisdiction: which domestic or international obligations, laws or treaties are 
being invoked; whether the impugned actions occurred domestically (with adverse 
consequences on foreign soil) or extraterritorially; and whether the impugned 
actions of state agents are justiciable under the invoked law.  If jurisdiction is 
found, then the question turns to the state’s responsibility for the particular 
actions in any given case. 
380. Most obviously there are decisions made within jurisdiction that have 
extraterritorial consequences.  For example, the letters and list of questions 
composed by Canadian agents in Mr El-Maati’s case and handed to foreign agents 
who used the information to torture and interrogate Mr El-Maati.607   
381. It might also be argued that the actions of AFP officers in Australia assisting 
Indonesian police in the Bali Nine case would, by analogy, fall into the Soering line 
                                        
606 Slahi v Canada [2009] FCJ 141, [48]. 
607 see [420] & [428]. 
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of cases: domestic actions resulting in extraterritorial violations of human rights.608  
In either case, a complaint could be made to the UN Human Rights Committee 
under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR alleging breaches of the ICCPR 
and/or Second Optional Protocol. 
382. But there are also decisions taken and actions made by domestic agents who are 
located overseas.  Most of the caselaw deals with military situations, in which the 
question of whether a country’s military forces have control over the territory in 
which they are operating or which they occupy.  In relation to police operations, 
close attention needs to be paid to precisely where these decisions and actions 
are taken, because embassies on foreign soil are recognised as sovereign 
territory.  It is supposed that the infamous ‘Bali Nine’ letters written by Federal 
Agent Paul Hunniford, the AFP Senior Liaison Officer in Bali, to the Indonesia 
National Police were probably written from his desk in the Australian Consulate.609  
If this is in fact true, then the letters would have been written within Australia's 
jurisdiction.610   
383. It is also worth noting that the mode of sharing or cooperation – whether it is 
formal or informal – is not relevant to any examination of jurisdiction or state 
responsibility for the actions of state agents. 
384. More generally, some authors have argued that States have an obligation not to 
interfere in individuals’ human rights through their extraterritorial actions.  This 
implication flows, it is argued, from the “principles, purposes and specific 
provisions of the UN Charter”, which calls on Member States to promote, protect 
                                        
608 see also Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [132]. 
609 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12. 
610 AFP officers exercise power under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) and the Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth).  Bother Acts apply extra-territorially: AFPA s.5A(1) and CA s.3A.  These powers are 
exercised on a foreign territory with the consent of the foreign government.  This consent can be 
on a case-by-case basis or under the terms of an MOU or treaty.  For example, the AFP operated 
with the INP in Indonesia after the Bali Bombings in 2002 under a joint operation “Technical 
Agreement” (MOU).  Thus, the AFP exercises its Australian powers overseas (by consent), which is 
a clear exercise of Australian jurisdiction (by consent). 
 – 156 –  
and respect human rights.611  As a normative principle, this argument carries some 
weight.  However, as a legal principle, this argument fails to consider the 
complexities of jurisdiction. 
                                        
611 Sigrun Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States' human rights obligation in international law 
(2006) 79; citing Roxström, Gibney & Einarsen, “The NATO Bombing Case: One Step Forward or 
Two Steps Back?” (2005) Boston University Journal of International Law, 118. 
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6 Best Practice: informal information sharing 
385. After reviewing law and practice for informal transnational police-to-police 
information sharing, I now look at best practice.  In this discussion, I want to 
examine how to construct best practice guidelines for transnational police-to-
police cooperation.  Not surprisingly, the guidelines are closely modelled on the 
RCMP procedures with the modifications suggested by the Arar Commissioner.  
This is because the RCMP procedures are quite good – and the AFP have not 
publicly released their procedures.  I acknowledge the heavy debt owed to the 
work of that Commission.   Particular emphasis will be placed on screening 
requests from countries with poor human rights records and examining the human 
rights implications of cooperation.  I will also discuss situations in which it might 
be possible to override these guidelines, and the appropriate procedures to ensure 
accountability.   
386. Due to space constraints, I will not present a detailed analysis of EU attempts to 
formalise cross-border police cooperation, in the form of the Schengen 
Convention, the Convention establishing Europol and other instruments.612  For 
example, there are provisions in the EU Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Convention for cross-border pursuits, joint investigation teams and covert 
surveillance.613 However, when these are instructive, then they will be mentioned 
briefly. 
6.1 Police culture and human rights 
                                        
612 e.g. Chantal Joubert & Hans Bevers, Schengen Investigated: a comparative interpretation of the 
Schengen Provisions on international police cooperation in the light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1995); Stephen Skinner, 'The Third Pillar Treaty Provisions on Police Cooperation: 
Has the EU Bitten Off More than It Can Chew?' (2002) 8 Columbia Journal of European Law 203; 
and, Nicholas Dorn (2009), n 87. 
613 see McClean (2002), n 262, 224-236.  Note: in May 2009, Canada and the US signed an 
agreement to jointly crew patrol boats on their shared waterways, thereby allowing cross-border 
pursuit of criminals engaged in inter alia human, drug and weapons smuggling: ‘US, Canada sign 
border patrol pact’ (27 May 2009) Boston Globe (Boston) A.2. 
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387. One question worthy of brief examination at this point is: how are rank-and-file 
police likely to interpret and respond to any minimum human rights standards and 
accountability mechanisms for transnational policing?  This is important because, 
as sociologists have observed, rank-and-file police sometimes deviate from black-
letter law in their day-to-day tasks.614   
388. As already discussed, an intelligence-led policing culture is not likely to respond 
favourably to any measures that restrict information exchange.615 Such resistance 
can be seen from the rank-and-file AFP Association, which expressed its 
frustration at the introduction of death penalty assurances in extradition law as an 
impediment to the swift and efficient operation of international police 
cooperation.616 
389. There is a more practical concern related to refusing to share information.  For 
information sharing to be effective, it must be reciprocal: ‘If an agency wishes to 
receive information from other agencies, it must be prepared to provide 
information in return’.617  Or as a senior AFP officer put it: transnational 
cooperation ‘is very much a two-way street’.618  The general concern is that 
anything that stops or slows the flow of information across borders infringes on 
the sovereignty of other nations and risks reducing the amount of information 
flowing back. 
390. Bayley observes that police reform succeeds best when it has police on-side.619  
He urges reformers to take this into account and to attempt to eliminate any 
impact on the effectiveness of operational policing:620 
                                        
614 e.g. R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (2000, 3rd ed) 171-4. 
615 see [104] ff. 
616 see [396]. 
617 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 102. 
618 Wockner & King (2006), n 161, 227. 
619 David Bayley, 'Police Reform as Foreign Policy' (2005) 38(2) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 206. 
620 Bayley (2005), n 619, 213. 
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...because reducing crime and disorder is what police have been taught to believe 
is their institutional mission, they reflexively discount reform proposals that they 
think impinge negatively on enforcement effectiveness...  Reformers need, 
therefore, to confront head-on the likely effect of reform on law-enforcement... 
Reform has a much better chance of succeeding if it can be shown to be 
effectiveness-neutral or, preferably, effectiveness-enhancing. 
391. Reiner has a similar view.  He believes that new police rules should not elicit a 
defensive response in police, because this will mean that such rules will not be 
‘co-opted’ into police culture.621  Reiner notes that ‘black-letter law’ is transformed 
by the filter of police culture before emerging as ‘blue-letter law’, the rules by 
which police carry out their day-to-day tasks.  He notes two schools of sociological 
thought on this process.  The ‘presentationalists’ believe that black-letter law is 
used to justify police action, but that it does not inform actual police practice.  In 
this model, police subculture is key to understanding police action, not black-letter 
law. For example, in any attempt to address police racism, education of police will 
achieve better results than a top-down reform of law enforcement procedures.  
The other school of thought belongs to the ‘structuralists’, who believe that police 
deviance from black-letter law does not come from rank-and-file officers, but is 
rather encouraged by senior officers, judges and politicians who do not correct 
deviance.  Presumably, in the structuralist model, reform of institutional racism 
must be addressed by figures of authority.  
392. Reiner notes that the ‘relationship between legal rules and police practice is 
complex’.622  He identifies four indirect and subtle functions of formal rules and 
accountability mechanisms in the regulation of police work.  First are constitutional  
functions, whereby police work is subordinated to democracy and the rule of law.  
Second are co-optive functions, wherein rules which are tailored to avoid a 
defensive response in police are more likely to be adopted into police culture.  
Third are communicative functions, which seek to keep open channels for routine 
                                        
621 Reiner (2000), n 614, 175-6. 
622 Reiner (2000), n 614, 176. 
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communication and complaint by police.  Fourth are control functions, which 
provide visible penalties for demonstrated deviance. 
393. Crawshaw et al argue that policing and human rights are not incompatible:623 
At a theoretical level there is no tension between human rights and policing. 
...Policing should not be a negative factor in the protection of human rights, and 
one of the great tasks of police leaders is to develop and sustain a human rights 
culture within police organisations'. 
394. Crawshaw argues that police should protect and respect human rights, investigate 
(serious) human rights violations, and are entitled to respect of their own human 
rights.624  Much of what police already do relates to the protection, respect and 
investigation of human rights.  However, the authors stress that by securing 
respect for the human rights of police officers, this could assist in instilling a 
human rights culture in the rank-and-file.625  Crawshaw is not just talking about 
guarantees of security of person, but also rights such as procedural fairness in 
disciplinary hearings, and also employment rights such as fair pay.  
395. In summary, if a black-letter law response to human rights and transnational 
policing is too far-removed from operational police culture and practice, then it is 
unlikely to become part of the ‘blue-letter law’ of operational policing and it might 
have little effect at all, irrespective of accountability mechanisms.  In the same 
vein, any reform which reduces the effectiveness of information sharing is likely to 
meet stiff resistance from senior and rank-and-file officers.  However, a human 
rights message might be better received by police if it is expressed in universal 
terms, owed to police as individuals as well as owed to others. 
6.1.1 Police attitudes to human rights safeguards 
396. There is considerable resistance from within the AFP to statutory changes 
requiring a death penalty guarantee in extradition cases.  In 1997, the president 
                                        
623 R. Crawshaw, B. Devlin & T. Williamson, Human Rights and Policing (2nd ed, 2007) 26. 
624 Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 26-9. 
625 Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 27. 
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of the AFP Association626 expressed concern to the Daily Telegraph that Australia 
would become a ‘safe haven’ for murderers and terrorists.  He also expressed 
concern about the time it takes to obtain a death penalty guarantee:627 
If the Government wants to take a moral position on capital punishment that is up 
to them.  However, our members are not happy with the delays now experienced 
in taking out provisional arrest warrants on people wanted overseas. 
397. These comments from 1997 came about the same time as leaks to the Daily 
Telegraph about the extradition of a Philippines-born US citizen living in Australia 
and wanted in the US for murder-related charges.628 
398. According to media reports, there is also considerable pressure on Australia from 
US law enforcement officials to do away with death penalty guarantees in 
extradition cases.629 
399. In 1996, the Interpol Secretary-General Raymond Kendall addressed an Australian 
parliamentary committee about the work of Interpol.630  During that session, he 
was asked about Australia’s recent legislative amendments to mutual assistance 
law requiring death penalty guarantees.  He was not well briefed on the topic and 
only responding to what he was being told, but Kendall described the requirement 
to obtain such undertakings as ‘counter-productive’.631  He argued such 
transnational police-to-police cooperation was analogous to international trade 
and human rights should not be linked to it.632  He also offered this opinion:633 
                                        
626 the AFP Association is a professional rank-and-file association and is not part of the AFP itself. 
627 Les Kennedy, ‘Loophole left three to rot in jail’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 April 1997, 19. 
628 Les Kennedy, ‘Execution threat kept fugitive free’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 15 April 1997, 4. 
629 Morgan Ogg, ‘Murder suspect extradited’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 20 Sept. 1997, 15. 
630 Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Committee 
Hansard (5 December 1996), <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j5963242.pdf>. 
631 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 22 (Raymond Kendall). 
632 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 21 (Raymond Kendall). 
633 Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 21 (Raymond Kendall). 
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I can well understand a refusal to extradite in a case where the country that is 
requesting extradition does apply the death penalty to a person who is convicted 
of a certain offence in that country. But I fail to see why the exchange of 
information should be affected by that because there are two levels of decision 
here. I think the decision to extradite is a legal decision which will be taken after 
due study of the issue, but I do not see why that should affect the exchange of 
information on a subject when you know full well that you do not have to extradite 
the person at the end of the day. 
400. What can be drawn from this superficial review of media and parliamentary 
reports is that police, understandably, are concerned about any measure that 
impedes the efficient flow of cooperation and information with foreign agencies. 
6.2 request assessment 
401. A request for information can be received at a centralised location, or by a liaison 
officer posted abroad, or in a more direct police-to-police fashion.  Once received, 
an assessment should be made of whether the request will be granted.  In the 
interests of efficient police-to-police cooperation, this initial filter should be kept as 
stream-lined as possible.  Initially it should be screened to determine if it is really 
a request for police-to-police assistance, or whether it is in fact a request for 
mutual legal assistance.  If it is a request for information in admissible form or for 
the exercise of coercive powers (such as the execution of a search warrant), then 
the appropriate mutual legal assistance legislation should be complied with.634 
402. If, however, the request is for police-to-police assistance, then an important 
question needs to asked: if the information is provided, is it likely that the 
information will be used to violate an individual’s human rights?  This involves a 
                                        
634 See Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c.30 (4th Supp.); and, Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth).  See also: Christopher Murray & Lorna Harris, Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters: international co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of 
crime (2000); and, Elaine Krivel, Thomas Beveridge & John Hayward, A Practical Guide to Canadian 
Extradition (2002), Appendix B (‘Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act’); and, Robert 
Currie, 'Peace and Public Order: International Mutual Legal Assistance the "Canadian Way"' (1998) 
7 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 91; and, McClean (2002), n 262, 213-8 (UN model treaty), 
196-203 (Commonwealth Scheme) & 172-88 (European Convention & Protocols) & 224-236 (EU 
Convention). 
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general assessment of the requestor’s human rights record and a specific 
assessment of the use to which the requested information will be put. 
403. The Arar Commissioner places this test under the general heading of examining 
content relevance.635  However, I think it is important to separate explicitly an 
assessment of content from an assessment of the requestor.  This will better allow 
the decision maker to focus on the individual country’s human rights record and 
the likely uses to which the information, if provided, would be put.  It is, of 
course, likely that, during an assessment of content relevance, these same 
questions will be asked for each piece of information that could potentially be 
shared. 
404. To assist them to assess both the requestor generally and the request on a case-
by-case basis, liaison officers and other officers cooperating with foreign agencies 
require human rights training. 
6.2.1 abandoning the ‘need-to-know’ principle? 
405. RCMP information sharing policies require an assessment of whether the requestor 
needs to know the requested information.  In essence, an assessment whether 
the information ‘is expected to further an ongoing investigation’ on a case-by-case 
basis.636  The Arar Commissioner did not find this requirement ‘particularly 
helpful’.637  His Honour thought that an assessment of content for its relevance to 
the requestor’s investigation was more meaningful.  Justice O’Connor also noted 
the 9/11 Commission’s criticisms of the ‘need to know’ culture.638 
406. The 9/11 Commission associated the need-to-know approach with the outdated 
Cold War assumption that ‘the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the 
benefits of wider sharing’.639  The Commission was critical of a culture where one 
domestic agency kept information from another.  The Commission recommended 
                                        
635 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 104 & 335. 
636 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 32-3.  
637 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 334 & 136 (fn 57). 
638 9/11 Commission Report (2004), n 8, 417. 
639 9/11 Commission Report (2004), n 8, 417. 
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increasing incentives for agencies to share information with each other.  Caution 
must be exercised when extrapolating this criticism to transnational policing.  The 
Commission was criticising the stonewalling of information sharing between 
domestic agencies, not between American and foreign agencies.  It is unlikely, 
had it addressed the issue of transnational cooperation, that the Commission 
would have been as enthusiastic and permissive about sharing information with 
foreign agencies. 
407. Nevertheless, the criticism that a culture of open information sharing is preferable 
to a ‘need-to-know’ culture has some merit.  A need-to-share approach is more 
consistent with international obligations to cooperate in matters of transnational 
crime.640 Of course, that does not mean that need-to-share equates to a share-
without-discrimination policy.  The AFP appears to favour a share-without-
discrimination policy.641  When discussing police-to-police information sharing, the 
senior AFP officer in charge of transnational policing told journalists: 642 
We operate exactly the same way no matter which country it is. ...We do not have 
the ability, nor the desire, to pick and choose which countries we will deal with, 
depending on the laws of those countries and how they will deal with offenders for 
offences that occurred in their own country. 
408. However, as the Arar Commissioner observed, caution needs to be exercised 
when sharing information to ensure that other considerations, such as a country’s 
international human rights obligations, are observed and discharged.643  This 
requires an assessment of the requestor’s human rights record and the use to 
which the shared information is likely to be put. 
                                        
640 e.g. ‘to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information’: TOC Convention.  See [186]. 
641 in relation to sharing with domestic agencies, including ASIO, see: Mick Keelty (AFP 
Commissioner), ‘Can intelligence always be right?’, speech to 13th Annual Conference of the 
Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (20 Oct 2004), 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media/national_media/national_speeches/2004/13th_annual_conference_
of_the_australian_institute_of_professional_intelligence_officers>.  See also: Laurence Street QC, 
Martin Brady & Ken Moroney, The Street Review: A Review of Interoperability Between the AFP 
and its National Security Partners (2007), 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/71833/The_Street_Review.pdf>. 
642 Wockner & King (2006), n 161, 227.  See also, [164]. 
643 see also comments of Duncan Kerr MP at [31] above. 
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6.2.2 assessment of human rights and usage 
409. The RCMP’s current policy, which applies to ‘governments that violate human 
rights’, was criticised by the Arar Commissioner on several grounds.  The 
Commission recommended that the review be redrafted to ensure that information 
is ‘never...provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will 
cause or contribute to the use of torture’.644  Similarly, information received from a 
country with a questionable human rights record should be clearly marked as such 
and treated with great caution.645 
410. There appears to be no similar requirement for AFP agents to assess a requesting 
country’s human rights record or the use to which shared information will be put.  
In the case where agents must consider if the death penalty would be involved, 
the death penalty guidelines must be consulted.  When allegations of torture are 
made, as in the case of Australian Mamdouh Habib who reported that he’d been 
tortured in Egypt and Guantanamo Bay, it appears to be standard AFP procedure 
to report the allegations to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT).646  This is because the welfare of detainees is seen as a consular issue, 
not a police matter. 
411. It is at this stage that it would be appropriate to alert the requestor that an 
undertaking would be required that no one will be executed or tortured as a result 
of cooperation.  Of course, the provision of an undertaking would need to be 
assessed for credibility.  The requirement to seek an undertaking should apply to 
requests from foreign agencies, as well as request to foreign agencies or the 
spontaneous provision of information.  For example, AFP agents would require a 
                                        
644 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 345.  See also: [238] above. 
645 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (September 2006), n 175, 348-9. 
646 in May 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, during an interview with AFP officers, Mr Habib raised 
allegations that he had been tortured by people who ‘spoke the Egyptian language’.   The AFP, 
believing it was the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to 
investigate, informed DFAT of Mr Habib’s allegations of torture: Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP 
Commissioner) to Senate Legal & Constitutional Legislation Committee (15 February 2005) 7-8.  
For details of Mr Habib’s treatment: Mamdouh Habib, My Story: the tale of a terrorist who wasn’t 
(2008). 
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death penalty undertaking before spontaneously providing information in a matter 
attracting the death penalty in Indonesia, such as drug trafficking or terrorism. 
412. The need for police to screen for potential human rights violations is 
demonstrated by cases such as the Canadian torture cases and the Australian Bali 
Nine case.  The Australian case is quite straight forward: AFP agents, who 
spontaneously provided  information to the INP under an existing MOU, knew that 
the activities of the Bali Nine involved the trafficking of heroin, which attracts the 
death penalty in Indonesia.  Such information should not have been shared 
without first securing a guarantee that no one will be executed. 
413. The AFP appears to have very low standards when it comes to screening 
information to be shared with foreign agencies.  Speaking of the Bali Nine case, 
the AFP Commissioner told a Senate Committee that:647 
We cannot give over a piece of information, have [the police operation] become a 
broad operation and then say, ‘Look, we are sorry about that – can we take that 
information back, please?’. 
414. This information was provided spontaneously to the INP, prior to the arrest of any 
suspects.  In fact, it appear that the Indonesians were unaware of the suspects, 
until informed by the AFP.648  The intelligence was provided under the police-to-
police MOU existing between the two agencies.649  The text of the MOU is not 
public, but it appears that it fails to include a provision stating that any 
information or cooperation provided by Australian officials under the agreement is 
provided on the condition that it will not be used for the investigation of an 
offence that might attract the death penalty, unless a guarantee that no one will 
be executed is provided.  Given that the information was provided spontaneously 
                                        
647 evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (17 February 2006), n, 
41 (AFP Commissi 105oner Mick Keelty). 
648 Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005), 
n 165, 170: ‘On 8 April 2005, [the AFP] provided information to the Indonesian National Police. As 
a result of that, the Indonesian National Police commenced an operation on 13 April 2005. On 17 
April 2005, a number of arrests were made in Indonesia’ (emphasis added). 
649 Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005), 
n 165, 170. 
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in the Bali Nine case, and that the AFP liaison officer involved would have been 
well aware that the offence attracted the death penalty, this information should 
not have been handed over until a guarantee had been secured that no one would 
be executed.  If Indonesia chose not to provide such a guarantee, then the 
information should never have been handed over.  Such a procedure is recognised 
in European Conventions and even exists in some of the international treaties to 
which Australia is a party.650  Spontaneous cooperation should first secure a 
guarantee that no one will be executed.  If such a guarantee is not forthcoming, 
then the information should not be shared. 
415. This approach is endorsed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
Mr Philip Alston:651 
It's a matter of saying we have a strong opposition in Australia to the death 
penalty, and we would condition our cooperation on your not applying the death 
penalty when you are operating on the basis of information or assistance provided 
by us. 
416. Such a procedure does not offend the sovereignty of a foreign nation, which can 
take the assistance or leave it.  Nor does this solution compromise Australia’s 
sovereign right to insist that Australian resources will not be used to assist another 
country to execute anyone.  This solution does not mean that Australia stops 
cooperating with foreign law enforcement agencies.  Nor does it mean that 
international criminals will walk free.  This solution only ensures that when 
suspects are convicted they will not face the death penalty. 
417. In the case of Mr Arar, it is hard to fault RCMP officers for assuming that Mr Arar 
would be sent back to Canada from New York.  Prior to the events of 11 
September 2001 it would have been unthinkable that the US would kidnap a 
Canadian citizen travelling on a Canadian passport and render him for torture to 
Syria.  The shift in the US’ human rights policy was swift and secretive, including 
                                        
650 see n 14. 
651 ABC Radio, 'UN advisor urges Australia to take strong stance against death penalty', AM (25 
January 2006).  
 – 168 –  
the introduction of torture and extraordinary rendition.652  Though, of course, this 
does not excuse the failure to follow established information sharing procedures 
or to train staff adequately. 
418. The screening of requests for human rights implications could be done in a narrow 
or broad fashion.  The screening tests could be directed at avoiding specific 
violations, such as execution or torture.  This is the current approach of the AFP’s 
death penalty guidelines.  More broadly, the RCMP’s current guidelines speak of 
‘negative human rights connotation[s]’.  The Arar Commissioner recommended 
that policies be formulated that seek to eliminate ‘any possible Canadian 
complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring 
accountability’.653  Given the international obligation to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights,654  it is preferable to follow the broader Canadian example. 
419. It is also worth recalling that Interpol’s databases are capable of restricting who 
can or cannot view information shared with Interpol.655  This mechanism should 
be employed to ensure that countries with questionable human rights records will 
not have access to Interpol records, at least not without specifically requesting the 
originating country.  Such restrictions need to be placed on information at the 
time it is entered into the Interpol database. 
                                        
652 on extraordinary rendition, see e.g.: e.g. European Parliament, ‘resolution on the alleged use of 
European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners’, 14 
February 2007, A6-0020/2007, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-
0020&language=EN&mode=XML>.  On torture, see e.g.: Barak Obama (US President), ‘Remarks 
by the President on National Security’ (21 May 2009), speech at the National Archives (Washington 
DC), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/>. 
653 recommendation 14, see [93]. 
654 the UN Human Rights Committee, commenting on Article 2, stated that Article 2 imposes a 
general obligation ‘to respect the Covenant rights and to ensure them to all individuals in their 
territory and subject to their jurisdiction’:  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 
(2004), n 289, [3].   According to Nowak, the obligation to respect human rights is a negative 
obligation as it requires forbearance on the part of the State Party; while the obligation to fulfil and 
protect human rights involve positive obligations, requiring the State Party to actively secure these 
rights: Nowak (2005), n 376, [2.18]-[2.20]. 
655 see [56] & [113]. 
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420. It is also important to perform this screening on all incoming and outgoing 
requests for police-to-police assistance.  Before deciding to send a request for 
assistance to a foreign country, an assessment should be made of that country’s 
human rights record and the use to which it might put the details contained in the 
request.  For example, in the case of Mr Elmaati, Commissioner Iacobucci found 
no evidence that the RCMP had considered Syria’s poor human rights record 
before sending a letter to Syria linking Elmaati to al-Qaeda and requesting 
assistance.656  Such a lapse, failed to follow RCMP procedures and likely exposed 
Mr Elmaati to extreme abuse. 
6.2.3 training in human rights and information sharing 
421. If officers are to screen requests for police-to-police assistance on human rights 
criteria, then staff will need to be trained and regularly updated on the human 
rights records of countries with which they cooperate.  The Arar Commissioner 
noted that the RCMP liaison officer in Rome, who handled liaison with Syria in the 
Arar case, was never trained about Syria’s human rights record.657  His Honour 
recommended that RCMP training should include courses on human rights and 
cooperating with countries with poor human rights records.658 
422. If time is of the essence and officers have not had such training or little 
experience in information screening, then it is important that they be supervised.  
This was one of the major factual findings of the Arar Commission in relation to 
                                        
656 Both the Arar and Iacobucci Commissions were also critical of the use of Elmaati’s confession as 
evidence in the application for search warrants in Canada: Iacobucci Inquiry, Report (2008) n 157, 
138-140; and, Arar Commission, Factual Background Addendum, n 192, 99.  The confession was 
placed before the judge, but “did not mention [Syria’s] poor human rights record or the fact that 
the information might be the product of torture”: Arar Commission, Factual Background, 
Addendum, n 192, 99.   This is an example of information obtained from foreign sources, and in 
which there is no rigorous assessment of the accuracy of the information or the reliability of the 
source. See also, Iacobucci Inquiry, Report (2008) n 157, 350.  
657 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 214. 
658 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 325-6 (recommendation 3). 
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Operation AOC: that management failed to supervise untrained and/or 
inexperienced staff.659 
423. Training officers in how to screen effectively and adequately will assist in 
encouraging acceptance among operation police of this impediment to the free 
flow of information.660  As Crawshaw also observes, the obligation to provide 
human rights training is contained in article 10 of the Convention against 
Torture.661 The UN Human Rights Committee has found a similar obligation in the 
ICCPR.662 
6.3 content assessment 
424. As the Arar Commissioner observed, there is a need for caution when sharing 
information.663  Sharing outdated, inaccurate or unreliable information can have 
serious consequences, as it did in the case of Maher Arar.   Some police-to-police 
arrangements also require that the information be current and accurate. 
425. The Arar Commissioner made the following recommendation:664 
Recommendation 8 
The RCMP should ensure that, whenever it provides information to other departments and agencies, 
whether foreign and domestic, it does so in accordance with clearly established policies respecting 
screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy and with relevant laws respecting personal 
information and human rights.  
426. Interpol places emphasis on ‘accuracy and relevance’ of information placed on its 
databases.665  
427. Ideally, once a request is determined to be for police-to-police assistance and 
unlikely to expose anyone to a real risk of a human rights infringement, the 
                                        
659 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 24 & 77. 
660 see Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 375. 
661 see Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 375. 
662 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: concerning prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment (10 March 1992) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [10]. 
663 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 103.  
664 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 22 & 103-4.  
665 Interpol, Rules on the processing of information for the purposes of international police co-
operation, Article 5.3(a), <http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/info/default.asp>. 
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requested information should be collated and each item of information screened 
for relevance, accuracy, reliability and data protection.   Again, these steps closely 
follow the recommendations of the Arar Commissioner, who examined these 
issues in detail. 
428. Content assessment is equally valid for the assessment of information obtained 
from a foreign source.  This is particularly important when the foreign country has 
a questionable human rights record and the information might have been obtained 
under torture or other threats.  It is a simple matter of public policy that such 
information should be treated with scepticism.  A written assessment of the 
accuracy and reliability of the information should be attached to such information, 
in order to alert others who read it.  Unfortunately, as was seen in the Arar case, 
RCMP officers, seeking a search warrant, relied on confessions obtained by Syria 
from Mr Elmaati.  The application did not alert the judicial officer to the nature of 
the evidence or Syria’s poor human rights record.666  Similar use of questionable 
confessional material has been used by Australian authorities to support a decision 
to deny Australian torture victim Mamdouh Habib his passport.667 
                                        
666 see n 656. 
667 Habib v Director-General of Security [2009] FCAFC 48 (24 April 2009).  This appeal (to the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia) was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant was 
afforded procedural fairness by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which had found that 
the oral evidence of Mr & Mrs Habib was not credible when checked against material obtained inter 
alia in Guantanamo Bay.  Tellingly, the Full Court expressly observed that Mr Habib’s lawyers did 
not raise the issue of the AAT accepting into evidence and relying upon confessions made by Mr 
Habib in Guantanamo Bay (at [80]).  Though not tendered as evidence in this matter, Habib 
‘confessed’ to US military officials at Guantanamo Bay that he ‘knew about the September 11 
attacks in advance, had trained in martial arts with two of the core terrorists [groups] and planned 
to later hijack a plane himself’: Martin Chulov, ‘Aussie admitted knowledge of 9/11 plot: US’, The 
Australian (Sydney), 8 October 2004, 1.   Despite these serious allegations, Mr Habib was released 
from Guantanamo Bay without charge in January 2005 (shortly after his allegations of torture and 
rendition were made public in a US court): Liz Foschia, ‘Mamdouh Habib returns to Australia’, PM 
(ABC Radio), 28 January 2005, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2005/s1291428.htm>; and, 
Marian Wilkinson, ‘What Should We Believe?’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 January 2006, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/what-should-we-
believe/2006/01/13/1137118970093.html>.  
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429. Content assessment is referred to specifically in the police-to-police agreements 
between Europol and the RCMP and the AFP.668  For example, article 10 of the 
Europol-AFP agreement requires an assessment of the reliability of the source and 
of the information being shared to be attached to all shared information.  If such 
an assessment is missing, then any attempt by the recipient to make its own 
assessment must involve the supplying agency. 
430. The importance of screening information is self-evident.  Because it is not always 
possible to predict how the information will be used once it has been shared, it is 
important that the information be accurate and precise. The Arar Commissioner 
was critical of the lack of precision in some of the documents shared with 
American authorities: the terms ‘suspect’ and ‘person of interest’ were used 
interchangeably; and emotive terms like ‘Islamic Extremist’ and ‘jihadist’ were also 
used.669 
6.3.1 relevance 
431. Each piece of information to be shared should be screened for relevance, with 
respect to the original request.  In essence, the test for relevance provides a 
nexus between the request and the information to be shared.  Each piece of 
information should only be shared if: first, it falls within the scope of the request; 
and second, it is connected to the investigation being undertaken by the 
requesting agency.  This assumes that the request articulates the parameters of 
the subject investigation. 
The Arar Commissioner was of the view that relevance should be measured in 
terms of “a possible connection or use to the recipient’s investigation”.670  His 
Honour was of the view that the threshold for relevance need not be too high, 
                                        
668 Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the European 
Police Office (Feb 2007), article 10, 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/Australia.pdf>; Cooperation 
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Police Office  (Nov 2005), article 
5,  <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/227746.pdf>. 
669 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 86 & 113-4. 
670 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 136, fn 57.  
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assuming that reliability, accuracy, privacy and human rights assessments are 
made and caveats are used.671 
6.3.2 reliability of source and accuracy of information 
432. As with reliability, it is important that information be accurate.   
433. As Justice O’Connor observes: “sharing unreliable or inaccurate information does 
not provide a sound foundation for identifying and thwarting real and dangerous 
threats to national security and can cause irreparable harm to individuals’.672  It 
does the reputation of a police agency no good if the information it shares is 
unreliable.  So it is in the best interests of an agency to classify for reliability.673  
Or, in his Honour’s words: ‘Providing unreliable or inaccurate information to other 
agencies is in no one’s best interests and can create potentially serious problems 
for those who rely on it and possibly those who are the subjects of the 
inaccuracies’.674 
434. The Arar Commissioner stressed several times the importance of information 
being accurate and precise.675  As his Honour observes, police should take special 
care not to overstate or misrepresent information, because ‘statements made by 
police officers tend to be taken at face value’.676  The Commissioner was critical of 
the inaccuracies contained in some of the information about Mr Arar that Project 
AOC shared with the Americans.  He was concerned that it ‘was inflammatory and 
unfairly prejudicial’ to Mr Arar.677  Commissioner Iacobucci had similar concerns 
about the reliability and accuracy of information shared about Mr Almalki, Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin.678 
                                        
671 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 335. 
672 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 335. 
673 the RCMP already does this, in the 2001 Criminal Intelligence Program Guide: see Arar 
Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 324 & 335-6. 
674 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 104. 
675 e.g. Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 25-6.  
676 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 25. 
677 e.g. Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 24. 
678 Iacobucci Inquiry, Report (2008) n 157, 350-1, 369, 375. 
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435. An assessment of the reliability of the source of shared information should be 
included with any shared information.  This is in addition to an assessment of the 
reliability of the content of the shared information.  This is important as it alerts 
the recipient of the information as to how cautiously they should approach the 
information.  Furthermore, in many ways it is important that the source be 
assessed before the content can be accurately assessed.  As the Arar 
Commissioner observes, ‘reliability relates primarily to the source of the 
information’.679  
6.3.3 privacy provisions 
436. Raab observes that data protection has two distinguishing elements that are 
sometimes in conflict with each other: privacy protection and data security.680  
The former is about protecting the privacy of individuals by, for example, 
recognising an individual right to view and correct private data kept by police.  
The latter is about maintaining the confidentiality of data held by police through 
protecting data and computers from ‘hacking, unauthorised access, corruption of 
data, or other damage’.681  Raab argues that both forms of data protection are 
important and need to be addressed.   
437. While originally developed in Europe,682 this dual-purpose view now prevails in 
most jurisdictions and both the RCMP and AFP are bound by domestic privacy 
legislation.683  As a matter of best practice, privacy should be considered in all 
police-to-police arrangements due to the importance of individual privacy.  In 
relation to mutual legal assistance, a European provision for personal data 
                                        
679 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 335. 
680 C. D. Raab, 'Police cooperation: the prospects for privacy', in Malcolm Anderson & Monica den 
Boer (eds), Policing Across National Boundaries (1994, London), 124. 
681 Raab (1994), n 680, 124. 
682 see e.g. M. Spencer, 1992 and All That. Civil Liberties in the Balance (1990, London) ch 3; and, 
Raab (1994), n 680.  Specifically for Canada, see: Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror: 
Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril (2005). 
683 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.60A, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); and, Privacy Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. P-21. 
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protection stipulates that such data can only be used for evidentiary purposes with 
the consent of the source agency or individual involved.684 
438. Another factor that affects the integrity of personal data kept on file is that it will, 
over time, become out-of-date.  This is best remedied by giving shared 
information a ‘use-by’ date, as discussed below. 
6.4 content control: caveats 
6.4.1 generally 
439. As well as assessing the quality of shared content, it is also important to attempt 
to exercise control over that content once it is shared.  It is not possible to 
guarantee that, once in the hands of others, information will not be misused.685  
Therefore it is important to assert ownership of information and place conditions 
on the use of information before it is shared.  In Canada, this is commonly done 
by way of caveats.  In Australia, the position has been less clear and more 
worrying. 
440. When sharing information internationally, Interpol practice recognises that 
ownership of any information in its databases remains in the hands of the 
contributor.686  The information source may alter and delete their information.  
The information source may also restrict access to certain parties and/or deny 
access to others. 
441. The Arar Commissioner was unequivocal in his recommendation:687 
Recommendation 9 
                                        
684 see McClean (2002), n 262, 235.   
685 see Kenneth G. Robertson (1994), n 145, 108-111. 
686 Interpol, Rules on the processing of information for the purposes of international police co-
operation, Article 5.4, <http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/info/default.asp>.  
687 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 22 & 103-4.  
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The RCMP should never share information in a national security investigation without attaching 
written caveats in accordance with existing policy. The RCMP should review existing caveats to 
ensure that each precisely states which institutions are entitled to have access to the information 
subject to the caveat and what use the institution may make of that information. Caveats should also 
generally set out an efficient procedure for recipients to seek any changes to the permitted 
distribution and use of the information. 
442. The standard caveat used by the RCMP ensures that the information will not be 
passed on to other agencies without RCMP approval. This provides the RCMP with 
some level of control over how the information is used.  Caveats are not legally 
enforceable, but it is in the best interests of the receiving agency to observe them.  
The Commissioner recommended that, when a caveat is breached, an objection 
should be lodged with the breaching agency and the Foreign Minister of the 
breaching country.688 
443. The AFP is more relaxed in its approach and is resigned to the loss of control of 
information once it has been shared.  The AFP has indicated that they sometimes 
place conditions on information shared with foreign agencies, though this is not 
standard practice.689  When asked about this process, the acting National Manager 
of AFP International and Border told a Senate Committee:690 
At the end of the day, we cannot do an audit of a foreign law enforcement 
agency. We have to respect their sovereignty but we have overseas police liaison 
officers... They work quite closely with the local police, so we will get an indication 
if a rampant or systemic breach has occurred of any conditions we may have 
placed on the use of information. 
444. So what does a caveat look like?  There are many conditions which can be 
imposed by a caveat.  However, there are some commonly recognised caveats: 
for example, a condition that that the shared information may only be used for the 
purpose for which it was requested.  Another common example is that the shared 
information must not be passed on to any other agency.  Another common caveat 
                                        
688 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 12. 
689 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Canberra, 4 September 2006, 7 (Federal 
Agent Tim Morris, Acting National Manager, International & Border, Australian Federal Police). 
690 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Canberra, 4 September 2006, 7 (Federal 
Agent Tim Morris, Acting National Manager, International & Border, Australian Federal Police). 
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is that, if the recipient agency wishes to alter these terms, they must contact the 
originating agency and ask for permission.   
445. A caveat is not legally binding, but any foreign agency that breaches the caveat 
risks its reputation as a reliable partner in international law enforcement.691  The 
mandatory use of caveats helps to ensure that an agency maintains control of the 
information it shares.   
446. The Arar Commission stressed the superiority of written over oral or ‘implicit’ 
caveats, noting that ‘those who are considering breaching a caveat, which is a 
type of agreement, will be less likely to do so in the face of a clear and express 
written directive’.692  
6.4.2 exercising control over information retention and deletion 
447. Though not raised by the Arar Commissioner, another important caveat condition 
expresses the need to control when the recipient agency should delete the 
information.  This might be upon request or after a certain amount of time.   
448. Information needs to be revisited on a regular basis.  Police intelligence is affected 
by its input data and it is important that such data is accurate.  One dimension of 
information’s accuracy is its currency.  Introducing a ‘use-by date’ on shared 
information ensures that it is accurate and current.  If a recipient agency wishes 
to retain the information, then it should be required to contact the source agency 
and re-request it.  This will require the source agency to provide updated 
information.  This process might reveal important developments of which the 
recipient agency might otherwise have been ignorant, such as the arrest, 
conviction or flight of a person of interest. 
449. Such conditions are recognised in the bilateral Europol agreements with the RCMP 
and AFP.693  Both agreements require the other agency to delete information 
                                        
691 e.g. Iacobucci Inquiry, Report (2008) n 157, 350. 
692 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 105-106. 
693 n 76.  The US Customs database (TECS) is also capable of limiting the time that data is 
retained, see: Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 61. 
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when requested.  However, the time-limits are more vague.  The Europol-RCMP 
agreement requires personal information to be retained only as the recipient ‘has 
a relevant use’ for it, ‘if not legally required to retain it for a longer period’.694  The 
Europol-AFP agreement requires personal information to be deleted after six 
months if the recipient party has no use for it.695  Ultimately, the vagueness of 
these provisions is unsatisfactory because it could result in ‘stale’ information 
remaining on the recipient agency’s file. 
6.4.3 responding to breaches of caveats 
450. The Arar Commissioner recommended that the breach of caveats by recipient 
agencies should be dealt with at a very high level.  Specifically, his Honour 
recommended:696 
Where Canadian agencies become aware that foreign agencies have made 
improper use of information provided by a Canadian agency, a formal objection 
should be made to the foreign agency and the foreign minister of the recipient 
country. 
451. The Commissioner stressed the need to object to the foreign agency and 
diplomatically.  Such an objection is not necessarily a negative exercise.  As his 
Honour notes:697 
Objections to breaches of caveats may prompt productive discussions about 
misunderstandings concerning information-sharing agreements with foreign 
agencies and the scope of caveats.  They may lead to constructive remedial 
measures to make caveats and information-sharing agreements clearer and more 
effective. 
6.4.4 Improving Australian practice 
452. Given the AFP’s unwillingness to caveat information, the Minister could direct the 
AFP that all information shared across borders contain a written caveat stating 
that the information: 
                                        
694 Canada-Europol agreement, n 76, article 7(6). 
695 Australia-Europol agreement, n 76, article 8(2). 
696 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 12, 344. 
697 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 344. 
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• should not be passed to any other agency (international or domestic) 
without permission of the AFP; 
• should not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it is 
provided; and, 
• should be deleted after 6 months, or earlier if requested. 
6.5 written cooperation agreements 
453. The Arar Commissioner made a formal recommendation that all national security-
related cooperation agreements between the RCMP and other agencies, both 
foreign and domestic, ‘should be reduced to writing’.698 The need for written 
agreements was particularly acute in the Arar case.  After the September 11 
terrorist attacks in the United States, RCMP officers from Project AOC shared 
unprecedented amounts of information with US agents.  Project AOC members 
were under the impression that written caveats were no longer required (‘caveats 
were down’), but that a mutual legal assistance request would be required if the 
shared information was needed for court.699  The RCMP officers thought of Project 
AOC as an 'open-book investigation', in which all information could be shared with 
their American counterparts without screening for accuracy or relevance.  
Information was first shared verbally, then later in documentary form.  Officers 
believed that RCMP information sharing policies did not need to be followed, 
including caveats and respect for third party caveats (respecting the caveats of 
other agencies).700  The Arar Commissioner was critical of this misunderstanding 
of official policy.  While his Honour accepted that there might be circumstances in 
which there is an urgent need to establish a verbal cooperation agreement, 
Commissioner O’Connor was critical that the terms of the Project AOC agreement 
                                        
698 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 2(e), 321. 
699 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 45. 
700 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 45-6. 
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were not committed to paper and distributed, and that no expiry date was set on 
the verbal agreement.701   
454. Though the Commissioner never expressly makes comment, it could be said that a 
short review date should be set for such informal case-by-case agreements.  This 
will encourage the drafting of a more formal document in the medium term.  By 
the time of the review date, a draft MOU or letters of understanding should be 
ready for consideration or the informal cooperation agreement might be scrapped 
if the urgent need has passed. 
455. In 2002 the Canadian Solicitor General issued a directive requiring the RCMP to 
reduce agreements with foreign agencies to writing, and to obtain legal and 
foreign affairs advice.702 The directive required the RCMP to keep a register of all 
such agreements and to review the agreements regularly.  In evidence to the 
Inquiry, the RCMP Deputy Commissioner expressed his view that the directive did 
not refer to day-to-day operational police-to-police cooperation.703  Commissioner 
O’Connor disagreed, arguing that the agreements contemplated by the directive 
applied more generally.704  While it was not necessary for agreements to be 
‘unduly formal or lengthy’ or applicable to each piece of information exchanged, 
his Honour believed that “written agreements should set out a general approach 
within which ‘day-to-day’ exchanges may take place”.705 
6.6 dealing with exceptions 
456. It is important, when drafting guidelines for police-to-police cooperation, that they 
not be completely inflexible.  Crisis situations do arise, such as the days and 
weeks immediately following 9/11 or the Bali bombings, in which it is not in the 
                                        
701 Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 49. 
702 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 321. 
703 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 322. 
704 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 322. 
705 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 322. 
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public interest for police to follow standard operating procedure.  The very nature 
of policing can, unlike the courts, require immediate action to prevent harm. 
457. However, such exceptions to standard operating procedure, should be 
contemplated in internal guidelines.  Exceptions should be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis.  There should be no blanket exception for a particular type of 
offence, such as terrorism.706  Given the serious consequences which could flow 
from overriding established procedure, accountability should be an important 
factor involving consultation with the Minister, who should report exceptional 
circumstances to Parliament as soon as possible. 
458. In relation to weighing potential benefits of cooperation against any potential 
human rights violations, there will be limits.  For example, the prohibition on 
torture is absolute and is so fundamental a value that ‘it can never be legally 
justified’.707  On the other hand, there might be extreme circumstances under 
which cooperation in death penalty cases is justifiable.  While the right to life is 
also a fundamental non-derogable human right, I conclude below that there may 
be circumstances in which the public interest will trump this individual right and 
cooperation in death penalty cases could be acceptable.  This suggests a complex 
hierarchy of human rights to be considered before a Minister makes a decision to 
override existing cooperation procedures. 
6.6.1 credible and imminent threat to human life: an exception? 
459. In short, this section deals with the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario.  It concludes that this 
scenario does not justify cooperation where there is a real risk of torture, but it 
might justify cooperation where there is a real risk that someone will be executed. 
460. The AFP’s death penalty guidelines were never originally intended to be standard 
operating procedure, but were meant only to cover exceptional circumstances in 
                                        
706 see Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006), n 175, 347.  
707 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 51ff & 346. 
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which there is an imminent threat to human life: the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario.708  In 
all other circumstances, the AFP should not put anyone at real risk of execution.  
This is a matter of both practicality and principle.   
461. However, there are instances where Australian agents could be in possession of 
credible information suggesting that explosive devices have been planted in a 
crowded public place in a foreign country which retains the death penalty.  It 
would be criminally negligent not to pass that information on immediately if to do 
so would save lives.  In these circumstances, the Minister should have the power 
to authorise cooperation with foreign agencies without a guarantee that the death 
penalty will not be sought or carried out.  As an extra safeguard, the Minister 
should be required to inform Parliament that she or he has exercised this 
discretion. 
462. The requirement of imminence to this exception should be stressed.  If there is 
time to seek a request that no one will be executed as a result of information 
sharing or cooperation, then that request should be made.  However, if time is of 
the essence to save human lives, then the Minister should have the power to 
authorise police to share the information without a guarantee that the death 
penalty will not be sought or carried out.  I note the need for ministerial approval 
and the need for the Minister to inform Parliament that she or he has done so.   
463. Another requirement to be stressed is an assessment of the credibility  of the 
intelligence suggesting an imminent threat.  If it is not highly credible, serious 
consideration should be given to requesting a no-capital-punishment guarantee 
before the cooperating with foreign agencies. 
464. Accordingly, the AFP death penalty guidelines should be reviewed to ensure that 
they are not misinterpreted as standard operating procedure, but exceptional 
operating procedure.  It should also be clear that information may only be 
provided in non-exceptional death penalty situations (both pre- and post-charge) 
                                        
708 see [78]. 
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when either: there is a guarantee from a competent foreign body that no one will 
be executed; or, when such cooperation is exculpatory.   
465. Torture, on the other hand, should not be the subject of this exception.  The 
prohibition on torture is absolute.  The Arar Commission was unequivocal in its 
recommended that ‘[i]nformation should never be provided to a foreign country 
where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use of 
torture’.709  CSIS Director Jim Judd endorsed this view, when he publicly 
repudiated the following statement from a senior CSIS lawyer:710  
The simple truth is that if we get information that can prevent something like the 
Air India bombing, the twin towers, or whatever, frankly, that is the time we will 
use [information obtained under torture], despite the provenance of that 
information. 
466. So the obvious question arises: why should torture and death penalty cases be 
treated differently?  At first glance, they are both the subject of non-derogable 
human rights guarantees and both singled out for their own specific human rights 
treaties.  It seems to me that the answer lies in the way in which the information 
was gathered. 
467. Information obtained under torture is the product of a human rights violation and 
is highly unreliable.  The Canadian torture cases are just another example of the 
unreliable nature of information extracted this way.  Given this lack of credibility, 
such information could not satisfy the test for a ‘credible and imminent threat to 
human life’.  Police could never be certain that acting on such information would 
actually save lives, or simply divert resources away from other important 
problems.  Nor can such information ever be obtained (under torture) without 
violating human rights. 
468. With respect to capital punishment, circumstances are different.  Assuming the 
intelligence is credible and obtained in a lawful fashion, it would be negligent not 
to act on that intelligence; not to save human lives.  An abolitionist country like 
                                        
709 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 14, 345. 
710 see [181]. 
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Canada and Australia would still not cooperate in the subsequent investigation and 
prosecution, unless a guarantee is forthcoming. 
469. Both the right to life and the right to be free from torture are jus cogens at 
international law.711  However, while the prohibition on torture is absolute at 
international law, the right to life is qualified by a codified exception recognising 
the death penalty for the ‘most serious crimes’.712 
470. A further distinction is that information extracted under torture can only be 
obtained extra-judicially.  Whereas, lawful execution will only occur after a judicial 
determination of guilt and sentencing procedures.  
471. To summarise, it is the way the intelligence is gathered that distinguishes the two 
scenarios.  In the torture scenario, a human rights violation is committed to obtain 
(questionable) intelligence.  In the death penalty scenario, credible intelligence is 
available of an imminent human rights violation and to do nothing is worse than 
sharing the information.   
472. This leads to the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of human rights.713  The only 
other human right with jus cogens status is the prohibition on slavery.714  Police 
should also refuse to cooperate in cases where it would assist the slave trade.  
Police should also exercise caution in relation to other non-derogable rights, such 
as the guarantees against imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation 
and against retrospective criminal laws, and the freedoms of thought, conscience 
                                        
711 for torture, see [177].  For right to life, see: Paul Gormley, ‘The Right to Life and the Rule of 
Non-derogability: peremptory norms of jus cogens’ in B. G. Ramcharan (ed), The Right to Life in 
International Law (1985, M. Nijhoff).  
712 see Rick Lines, The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: a violation of international human rights 
law (2007; International Harm Reduction Association, London) 20, citing: Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (Bacre Waly Ndiaye), Report (1996) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/60, [91] (‘...the death penalty should be eliminated for crimes such as economic 
crimes and drug-related offences.’); and, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions (Philip Alston), Report (2007) UN Doc. A/HRC/4/20, [51].  Special Rapporteur Alston 
(2007) cites: A/50/40, para. 35 (1995) (Sri Lanka); A/55/40, para. 13 (2000) (Kuwait). 
713 see Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: extradition and other 
mechanisms (Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 151. 
714 the prohibition on genocide is a violation of the right to life (jus cogens).  For slavery, see: 
Gormley (1985), n 711, 140; and, Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz & Melissa Castan, The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: cases, materials and commentary (2004, 2nd ed), [10.01]. 
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and religion.715  Ultimately, implications for any other human rights obligations 
should be weighed in the balance against the public interest. 
6.7 implementation 
473. One of the great challenges for transnational policing today is living up to its 
commitment to human rights.  The international legal framework of transnational 
policing has largely developed in a culture of respect for national sovereignty, at 
the expense of individual rights.  As this model is likely to continue into the 
foreseeable future, ethical standards and police accountability will continue to be 
the responsibility of domestic law.  However, there are some improvements that 
could be made to transnational policing at the international level.  
474. The likelihood of a treaty-based codification of standards for transnational policing 
is unlikely in the short term, especially given the example of Interpol’s inability to 
draft a treaty.  However, a UN Rapporteur on transnational policing could be 
established under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), perhaps attached to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) or the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Such a 
Rapporteur could be asked to research, draft and encourage the adoption of ‘best 
practice’ guidelines for transnational policing, similar to the guidelines established 
for best practice in inter alia policing and treatment of prisoners.716  Another 
helpful initiative could be sponsored by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights: namely, an international forum for domestic arms-length police 
oversight bodies to meet and exchange experiences and expertise. 
                                        
715 ICCPR, n 233, article 4(2). 
716 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957) approved by ECOSOC 
Resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 & 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; and, Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials (1979) UNGA Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979.  For a full list of 
human rights standards in the administration of justice, see: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm>. 
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475. The UN has adopted model treaties for international assistance in criminal 
matters: namely, extradition and mutual legal assistance.717  It makes sense for a 
third model treaty to deal with transnational policing, another increasingly 
important form of international assistance in criminal matters.  Alternatively, a 
model police-to-police agreement, perhaps based on Interpol’s model bilateral 
agreement718 or the recent Europol agreements, could be drafted to incorporate 
important human rights protections such as an understanding that all cooperation 
is provided on the understanding that any assistance will not be used to breach an 
individual’s rights, such as through torture or execution.  By placing this caveat at 
the MOU or even treaty-level, the need to evaluate human rights factors on a 
case-by-case basis would be greatly alleviated. 
6.8 centralisation of decision making: internal 
oversight 
476. Another important recommendation of the Arar Commission is that the existing 
centralisation of information sharing decisions be maintained and improved.719  His 
Honour notes that centralisation provides many useful purposes, including: as a 
check that information sharing procedures are being applied consistently; as a 
level of review and accountability; as a management tool ‘allowing coordination of 
investigations’.  Commissioner O’Connor also noted that the RCMP needs to be 
adequately resourced to implement this recommendation.720 
477. The centralised unit also acts as one contact point for international agencies, 
making the exchange of information more efficient, by reducing the time to 
identify the correct agency and office to approach for information.  
                                        
717 Model Treaty on Extradition (1990), adopted by General Assembly (GA) Resolution 45/116 
(1990) and amended by GA resolution 52/88 (1997); and, Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters (1990), adopted by General Assembly (GA) Resolution 45/117 (1990) and 
amended by GA resolution 53/112 (1998). 
718 see [42]-[43]. 
719 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 7, 332-4. 
720 the AFP has a similar centralised unit, hosting inter alia Australia’s NCB, see: [41]. 
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478. The new AFP death penalty guidelines provide for internal oversight prior to 
someone being arrested or detained.721  All requests must be sent through the 
International Desk/AFP Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC) in Canberra.  A 
decision to cooperate must be authorised by the AFP’s Manager International 
Network or the National Manager Border and International. 
6.9 the need for external oversight 
479. While internal oversight is important, there is a need for external oversight to 
ensure public confidence in transnational policing.  Such external oversight could 
be provided by either a parliamentary or statutory body, regularly auditing police 
practice.  The Arar Commissioner also recommended that all information sharing 
practices and arrangements be subject to review by an independent, arms-length 
body.722 
480. According to the Paul Kennedy, Chairman of the independent Commission for 
Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC), the CPC was unable to say in 2009 
whether ‘the RCMP has implemented the recommendations of Justice O'Connor, or 
if such recommendations, if implemented, are either being adhered to or are 
adequate to achieve their stated purpose’.723 This is due to legislative restraints on 
the CPC, which allow the RCMP to withhold information from the oversight body.  
Despite the recommendations of the Arar Commission and a separate report on 
                                        
721 AFP, AFP Practical Guide on international police-to-police assistance in potential death penalty 
situations (December 2009): <http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/~/media/afp/pdf/g/guideline-for-
international-death-penalty-situation.ashx>. 
722 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 10. 
723 Evidence of Paul Kennedy to Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House 
of Commons (5 March 2009), 1. 
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the governance of the RCMP,724 there was still no independent body which can 
come in and audit RCMP operations and policy in the mid-2000s.725 
481. This is why ministerial oversight is also a useful form of external oversight.  The 
new AFP death penalty guidelines provide for external oversight once a person is 
charged, convicted or sentenced.726  All cooperation must be approved by the 
Attorney-General or Home Affairs Minister.  A bi-annual report of all cooperation 
(both pre- and post-charge) must be sent to the Minister. 
6.10 Australia-specific requirements 
6.10.1 Amending the AFP Act 
482. I recommend that the AFP Act and death penalty guidelines should be amended to 
ensure the protection of human rights and Australia’s compliance with its 
international obligations.  Unlike Canada, or any other common law jurisdiction, 
Australia does not have a comprehensive national legislative or constitutional Bill 
or Charter of Rights.  This is the Federal Court could find that the AFP had acted 
lawfully in the Bali Nine case.727 
483. Surprisingly, in 2006 the federal Attorney-General’s Department expressed the 
view that police are not bound by Australia’s human rights obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.728  The 
                                        
724 David Brown QC, Rebuilding the Trust: Report of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural 
Change in the RCMP (December 2007), <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmp-
grc/_fl/Task_Force_Report-English.pdf>: see Recommendation 3, recommending the ‘creation of 
an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP’. 
725 Evidence of Paul Kennedy to Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House 
of Commons (5 March 2009), 1. 
726 AFP, AFP Practical Guide on international police-to-police assistance in potential death penalty 
situations (December 2009): <http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/~/media/afp/pdf/g/guideline-for-
international-death-penalty-situation.ashx>. 
727 see [86]. 
728 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Hansard  (4/9/2006) 13 (evidence of Joanne Blackburn, 
First Assistant Secretary). 
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Department argued that those treaties have not been adopted into domestic law 
and are, therefore, not legally binding. 
484. The AFP took the view that, irrespective of Australia’s international human rights 
obligations, it is obliged by Australia’s international obligations to cooperate and 
share information with foreign law enforcement agencies.  The AFP points to 
Australia’s treaty obligations under various UN anti-drug and anti-terrorist 
treaties.729 
485. However, the UN has made it abundantly clear that human rights must be 
respected in the “wars” against drugs and terror.  In 2002, the UN General 
Assembly stressed that “respect for all human rights is and must be an essential 
component of measures taken to address the drug problem”.730  In 2001, the UN 
General Assembly reaffirmed that “all measures to counter terrorism must be in 
strict conformity with the relevant provisions of international law, including 
international human rights standards”.731  
486. To remedy this culture of ignoring human rights, section 8 of the AFP Act should 
be amended to add a core operational function to ‘respect and protect human 
rights’.732  Concurrently, it is important that human rights training be updated, in 
order to encourage a human rights culture among rank-and-file police.733 
487. This is not so revolutionary, considering that the enforcement and protection of 
human rights is being increasingly recognised as one of the core functions of 
policing.734  This is especially so in the realm of transnational policing, in which 
                                        
729 e.g. Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Hansard  (4/9/2006) 2 (evidence of FA Tim Morris, 
Acting National Manager, International and Border, Australian Federal Police). 
730 UN General Assembly, International cooperation against the world drug problem (24 January 
2002) UN Doc. A/RES/56/124. 
731 UN General Assembly, Human Rights and Terrorism (13 February 2002) UN Doc. A/RES/56/160. 
732 the phrases ‘respect human rights’ and ‘protect human rights’ are taken from the UN Charter.  
They also appear in Victoria’s Public Administration Act (2004) s.7(1)(g), which binds Victorian 
police. 
733 for more detail, see [391] & [423]. 
734 Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 26: ‘the protection of human rights is a police function’.  See 
also: J. Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing 
(2002) 156. 
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law enforcement agencies are increasingly policing international human rights 
treaties, such as the conventions against people trafficking and child 
pornography.735 
488. The AFP death penalty guidelines should also be modified to ensure that they are 
not misinterpreted.  It should be clear that information may only be provided in all 
death penalty situations (both pre- and post-charge) when either: there is a 
guarantee from a competent foreign body that no one will be executed; or, when 
such cooperation is exculpatory.  The only exception should be when there is an 
imminent threat to human life, and then only with ministerial approval and a 
report to Parliament. 
489. Had these changes to the AFP Act and death penalty guidelines been in place 
when the AFP volunteered information to the Indonesian police about the Bali 
Nine,736 the outcome would have been very different.  In all potential capital 
cases, the requirement for a condition that the assistance will not lead to anyone’s 
execution should be mandatory. 
490. Such a mandatory requirement could be legislated or it could take the form of a 
ministerial direction to the AFP.  Section 37(2) of the AFP Act grants the Justice 
Minister the power to direct AFP general policy.  The AFP Commissioner must 
comply with the Minister’s directions.737 
491. It is, of course, important not to be absolutist about this.  There will be 
exceptional circumstances in which lives can imminently be saved by the exchange 
of information or other cooperation.  In those cases, ministerial approval should 
be required. 
                                        
735 e.g. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child  pornography [2007] ATS 6 (entered into force 8 February 2007); and, 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime [2005] ATS 
27 (entered into force 14 October 2005). 
736 Paul Toohey, ‘Death Dealing: a secret AFP memo may have doomed the Bali Nine’, The Bulletin 
(Sydney), 16 November 2005, 
<http://bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/site/articleIDs/4D99AA1EC72B3763CA2570B8007F2B0B> . 
737 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.37(4). 
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7 Some Final Remarks for Further Research 
7.1.1 Agency-to-Agency legislation 
492. While this paper is about transnational police-to-police cooperation, many of the 
lessons could be extrapolated and applied to other agency-to-agency cooperation.  
Other agencies which cooperate transnationally include immigration, customs, 
intelligence and financial tracking agencies.  The potential exists for human rights 
violations to occur when such cooperation arises.  Such transnational inter-agency 
cooperation is increasing, as confirmed by Mr Jack Hooper, Assistant Director of 
Operations for CSIS:738 
“compromising al-Qaeda operations requires an unprecedented level…of 
cooperation between police, law enforcement, immigration officials and the like, 
not just domestically, but internationally as well.” 
493. Extradition and mutual legal assistance are governed by statute,739 have built-in 
human rights safeguards and provide for judicial oversight and review of 
decisions.740  They are sometimes referred to as ‘formal assistance’. 
494. Transnational agency-to-agency assistance, sometimes referred to as ‘informal 
assistance’, is not governed by statute.  There is often no recourse to the courts 
for a person aggrieved by such assistance, as was demonstrated when members 
of the Bali Nine took the AFP to court.741 
495. To correct this anomaly, a framework Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act could be 
drafted, providing human rights safeguards and legal remedies and formalising 
this form of international assistance. 
496. An Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act only needs to set out the legal framework for 
international cooperation, it does not need to micro-manage such assistance.  It 
                                        
738 Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 102. 
739 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). 
740 the extradition process includes a hearing before a Magistrate.  Decisions made under the 
mutual assistance Act can be reviewed by a court under the ADJR Act. 
741 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12 (Finn J). 
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sets the boundaries for assistance, in which agencies may operate according to 
their own discretion. 
497. The legislation should bind all Australian agencies, including the military.  
Australia’s human rights obligations under the Convention Against Torture and the 
Second Optional Protocol are non-derogable – even in times of war.742 
498. An Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act should provide that assistance which has a 
negative human rights connotation should never be provided to countries that 
violate human rights.743  The Act should state that assistance should not be 
provided if it exposes anyone to the real risk of execution or torture. 
499. The Act should include an exception for death penalty situations in which there is 
an imminent threat to human life.  Under such exceptional circumstances, there 
should be a ministerial discretion to assist.  However, Parliament should be 
informed.  This exception should not apply to torture. 
500. The Act should stipulate that all information shared with foreign agencies must 
contain a written caveat restricting its use.  Information collected by Australia 
belongs to Australia and we should maintain control of it. 
501. The Act should provide that all agency-to-agency treaties and MOU are subject to 
the Act.  The Act should require that all such treaties and MOU contain an express 
clause that all cooperation takes place, and all information is shared, on the 
understanding that no one will be executed or tortured.  This also eliminates the 
need to obtain guarantees on a case-by-case basis.744 
                                        
742 Convention Against Torture Article 2(2): ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a 
state of war or a threat of war…or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
for torture’.  Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Article 6(2) (Australia did not enter a war-time 
reservation under Article 2 when acceding to the Protocol). 
743 this is the test used in Canada for police-to-police assistance: see [91]. 
744 police complain that the need to obtain death penalty guarantees adds frustrating delays to the 
work of obtaining extradition and providing assistance: e.g. Les Kennedy, ‘Loophole left three to 
rot in jail’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 April 1997, 19.  By including these guarantees at the 
treaty-level, there is no need to obtain individual guarantees on a case-by-case basis, thus saving 
valuable police time and resources. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: International Counter-Terrorism Instruments 
    entered into force 
treaty date aka ATS internationally Australia Canada 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 1963 (Aircraft Convention) [1970] ATS 14 4 December 1969 20 September 1970 5 February 1970 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 
(Unlawful Seizure Convention, aka 
Hijacking Convention) [1972] ATS 16 14 October 1971 9 December 1972 24 July 1972 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation 1971 
(Civil Aviation Convention, aka 
Montréal Convention) [1973] ATS 24 26 January 1973 11 August 1973 26 January 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973 (Diplomatic agents Convention) [1977] ATS 18 20 February 1977 20 July 1977 20 February 1977 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979 (Hostages Convention) [1990] ATS 17 3 June 1983 20 June 1990 3 January 1986 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material745 1980 (Nuclear Materials Convention) [1987] ATS 16 8 February 1987 22 October 1987 8 February 1987 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and 
supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety) 
1988 (Airport Protocol) [1990] ATS 39 6 August 1989 22 November 1990 1 September 1993 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation746 1988 (Maritime Convention) [1993] ATS 10 1 March 1992 20 May 1993 16 September 1993 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf747 1998 (Fixed Platform Protocol) [1993] ATS 11 1 March 1992 20 May 1993 16 September 1993 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991 (Plastic Explosives Convention) [2007] ATS 25 21 June 1998 25 August 2007 21 June 1998 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 (Terrorist Bombing Convention) [2002] ATS 17 23 May 2002 8 September 2002 3 May 2002 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 (Terrorist Financing Convention) [2002] ATS 23 1 April 2001 26 October 2002 10 April 2002 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) [2005] ATNIF 20 7 July 2007 n/a
748 n/a749 
                                        
745 as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force; ratified by Australia 17 July 2008; not signed by Canada. 
746 as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force. 
747 as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force. 
748 Australia signed 14 September 2005.  As at 1 June 2009, Australia has not ratified. 
749 Canada signed 14 September 2005.  As at 1 June 2009, Canada has not ratified. 
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